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Meal REASONING STRUCTURES AND CHARACTER STRUCTURES: A REVIEW AND
EXTENSION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MORAL JUDGMENT STAGES AND
PERSONALITY ORGANIZATION
Gregory H. Wilmoth June, 1977
Directed by: Sam McFarland, John O'Connor. and Carl Martray
Department of Psychology Western Kentucky University
The theoretical and empirical relationships of moral behavior and
moral judgment to personality were reviewed. Kohlberg's moral develop-
ment theory and Fromm's character development theory provided the inte-
grating organization for the review of nineteen personality variables
examined with six moral judgment instruments.
The Moral Judgment Scale, the Sexual Moral Judgment Scale, the
Objective Moral Judgment Scale, and the Measure of Moral Values were
administered to eighty adult students. Four problems were tested:
(1) psychometric comparisons of the four moral reasoning instruments,
(2) a test of a trait theory of moral character, (3) a test of increased
self-actualization with moral development, and (4) a test of a structural
model of moral reasoning and character.
Comparison of the MJS and SMJS essentially replicated the findings
reported by Gilligan, et al (1971). Analysis of the OMJS revealed that
its reliability was inadequate for research purposes and failed to parallel
the MJS scores. The MMV possessed substantial reliability and its scores
paralleled MJS scores. The MMV scores failed to statistically distin-
guish the moral stage classifications.
The test of a trait theory of moral character involved analyzing the
POI and 16 PF subscale scores for the moral stage groups on the MJS. This
analysis failed to reveal either a substantial number or consistent set of
xiii
significant findings. The trait theory was rejected as being inadequate
to explain moral development.
Analyses of POI scores by moral stage groups indicated that self-
actualization did not significantly increase with moral development.
MJS stages 3 and 5 individuals possessed the most consistent set of high
POI scores. Moral development as a concomitant construct of an increase
in the self-actualization construct under examination was rejected.
A factor analysis of the POI and 16 PF scores was further examined
by a discriminant analysis with the MJS moral stages as the a priori 
groups. This analysis revealed two significant dimensions which distin-
guish the moral stage groups: ego strength - superego strength, and
conventionality. Stage 2 subjects showed the lowest superego strength
scores, the highest ego strength scores and the highest conventionality
scores. Stage 3 individuals had scores on all three dimensions between
those of the stage 4 and 5 subjects. Stage 4 individuals had the highest
superego strength scores and the lowest ego strength scores. Stage 5
subjects possessed a balanced proportion of ego strength and superego
strength with the least amount of conventionality.
This model of character predicted over 86'; of all subjects correctly
into Kohlberg's three primary levels of moral reasoning: preconventional,
conventional, and postconventional. The prediction rate of the model
remained significantly higher than chance when five stages of moral judg-
ment were used. This evidence supported the conclusion that there is a




Consistency of Moral Character: An Historical Overview
To be told that one is a moral person is generally considered a
strong compliment of one's character. This use of the term 'moral' as a
compliment indicates its colloquial usage as a trait of personality.
Such a perspective tends to either dichotomize people into moral and
immoral or to place them along a continuum between these two extremes.
The consistency of a moral trait of personality has received extensive
investigation. This chapter will review the historical development of
both the theoretical conceptualization of mural character and the re-
search undertaken which attempted to verify the various theories.
Psychologists have generally rejected such a conceptualization as
being manifestly too simple. Hartshorne and May (1928 and 1929) conclud-
ed from behavioral measures of moral character of children that there
was little evidence for the existence of a constant moral factor in
personality. This conclusion was based on an analysis of the evidence
which indicated that acts in a potentially moral situation were as much
a function of the specific situation as of the individual. Critics
(Allport, Vernon & Lindzey, 1960; and Burton, 1976) of Hartshorne and
May's findings re-analyzed and re-interpreted the data. They have
detected a variety of constant trends in the evidence: developmental,
socio-economic, and a personality moral trait. One trend clearly emerges
from the numerous interpretations of Hartshorne and May's evidence:
there is little agreement on the consistency of moral character.
1
mavighwrst_ahd(Taba: plo_grphintion Of Cherptter 
Havighurst and Tab& (1949) believed that moral character was a
trait of personality and therefore was characterized by organization
and persistence. instead of studying specific behaviors, they used
primarily reputational measures. These measures were thought to dis-
close the persistence of moral character. They further used a number
of projective instruments, questionnaires and case studies to discern
organizational characteristics of moral character. This combination
of reputational measures (based on observations of moral conduct by
peers), projective measures, case studies, and questionnaires on moral
beliefs and values distinguished a persistent, moral character trait.
This moral character trait consisted of five dimensions: honesty,
responsibility, loyalty, friendliness, and moral courage. Significant
and substantial correlations were found between these traits across
subjects.
The total organization of the individual's values, attitudes,
impulses, abilities, habits, and ratings was studied. Five personality
types were empirically delineated from the data as shown in Table 1.
A Clinical Conference Group determined the personality profile which
consisted of factors characterizing each member of that type but no
other.
The self-directed, adaptive, and submissive persons all had 'high'
character reputations while the remaining two types were characterized
by 'low' character reputations. An individual with a 'good' character
could possess any one of three personality structures. These subjects
with 'good' character, however, varied in their profiles of the five


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































moral tOur.90. AdmPtive persons were higher on friendliness than on honesty
and responsibility. Self-directive individuals, conversely, were
higher on honesty and responsibility than on friendliness.
Two types of criticisrs can be made of Havighurst and Taba's study.
One area of criticism concerns the selection of moral traits. The traits
of loyalty and friendliness are open to challenge. The trait of loyalty
has been seriously impugned by the commission of inhumane acts by Hitler's
subordinates and dishonest acts by Nixon's subordinates. Friendliness
was not defined but appeared to include sociality, altruism, and empathy
as defining characteristics. Sociability is neither a necessary nor
sufficient component of morality. The unethical used car salesman succeeds
on his sociability skills.
The second area of criticism concerns the data itself. Almost a
third of the subjects could not be typed by personality. The Population
sample was divided on a mean split into high moral versus low moral croups.
The personality types were clinically rather than statistically derived
and maximized traits which were exclusive to a type. This exclusivity
principle may have hidden trait similarities within the two character
groups which were more important than the exclusive traits. The corre-
lations of moral traits were based on reputational measures. A potential
halo effect is an inherent liability of such a reputational rating scale
and may be the basis of spurious correlations.
Although Havighurst and Taba divided their subjects into dichotomous
'high' versus 'low' character types, they further noted both distinctive
moral trait profiles within each extreme and different levels of varia-
bility, relativity, and ambiguity in moral beliefs and principles within
the polar types, a finding which further substantiates the complexity of
moral character.
Wright (1971), after reviewing Hartshorne and May's research.
Havighurst and Tabes research and additional research on five apes
of moral behavior, concluded that individual differences in one aspect
of morality were only weakly and uncertainly associated with individual
differences in other aspects. If valid,there is great difficulty in
treating morality as a network of moral traits. Wright suggests that
each trait is a complex dimension which is influenced by many different
kinds of learning and experience. Wright further concluded that
"character is defined not so much through an inventory of actions per-
formed. as by a description of the principles that give coherence and
meanino to an individual's behavior, and of the relatively enduring
dispositions and motivations that underly it " (p. 203). This conception
of character (and thus morality) clearly denotes its two components:
moral reasoning and moral behavior.
Peck and Havighurst: The Structure of Character
The research reported in The Psycholgsy_of Character Development
by Peck and Havighurst (1960) was a follow-up study begun in 1948 of the
subjects in Havighurst and Taba's 1943 sample. They selected thirty-four
of the original subjects who were administered additional and repeated
measures on a wide range of psychological components. The types of
measures were essentially the same as in the previous research: self-
report projective and objective measures, reputational measures, and
clinical interviews.
Peck proposed the theoretical typology upon which to design their
research and to interpret the findings. He drew this typology from a
synthesis of Freud's oral, anal, and genital developmental stages, Fromm's
(1947) receptive, exploitative, hoarding, marketing, and productive
9
character stages. and Reisman's (1960) anomy. tradition-directed conform-
ity. other-directed conformity. and autnnomy types. A significant theo-
retical contribution of Peck WS his introduction of a developmental theory
to accompany and explain character. This schema is presented in Table 2.
This set of character types was intended to (1) be defined and la-
beled in terms of the control system the individual uses to adapt
his search for satisfaction to the requirements of the social world.
(2) include all the possible modes of adaptation. (3) be defined in
terms of motivation (so long as it achieves behavioral expression).
(4) represent both operational patterns of behavior, and the stage
of psychosocial development to which each pattern presumably is most
appropriate. (p. 4)
Peck's motivational theory of character expressed the theories of
Freud (unconscious motivational dynamics) and Fromm's conative structures.
Peck and Havighurst's research represents the first American study to be
based on data other than behavior. Their emphasis was on the individual's
reasons for acting either morally or not morally. Only reasoning associated
with actual behavior was considered; reasoning about hypothetical moral
behavior was not included. This study is, therefore, an intermediate type
of analysis between the purely behavioral analysis of Hartshorne and May
(1928 and 1929) and Kohlberg's (1958) strictly cognative analysis.
The over seventy measures of personality collected were analyzed as
comprising six personality factors (see Tables 3 and 4). These six fac-
tors were then applied in two different analyses. In the first analysis,
the eight observed character types were rank ordered by the relative pro-
portion of Rational-Altruistic character structure the subject possessed.
This ranking from lowest to highest percentage of Rational-Altruistic
reasoning was called 'Maturity of Character.' The six personality factors
Table 2
10
Peck's Developmental cnemia of Character













Factorial Pattern of the Personality Characteristics:
Peck and Havighurst 1
After Second Personality*
Before Potation Rotation Vector
Trait I II III IV I" 11' Ill' 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Functional IQ .77
t
.38 .25 -.lb .51 .17 .72 2
3. Ot,servation .81 .26 .14 .10 .58 .05 .63 2
4. Insight .83 .33 .34 .03 .48 .11 .81 2
5. Fmpathy .42 .10 .28 .19 .16 -.01 .49 4
6. Locus of Concern .86 .13 -.08 .32 .73 -.09 .48 2
7a. Outward Accept-
ance of Father's
code .28 -.41 -.10 -.37 .19 -.47 .02 -6
7b. Positive Feeling
toward Father .51 -.09 .33 -.21 .17 -.22 .55 4
7c. Negative Feel-
ing toward
Father .06 .35 .22 -.18 .00 .32 .28
8a. Outward Accept-
ance of Moth-
er's Code .47 -.27 -.66 -.23 .81 .14 -.20 1
8b. Positive Feel-
ing toward





before Notation Rotation Vector
-Tir- III TrTTM


















Sex Peers .38 -.35 -.21 .54 .34 -.44 .01 -6
11. Range of
Moral Horizon .84 .19 -.31 .04 .87 -.03 .30 1
12. Emotional




Before Rntatinn Rotation Vector
Trait xl 111---1V Tr
13. Identity of
Impulse and
Behavior .26 -.17 .68 .34
14. Heteronomy-
-.26 -.23 .65 4
Autonomy 86 .28 .35 .07 .49 .05 .84 2
15a. Assignment
of Respon-
sibility .90 .14 .13 .21 .63 -.10 .66 2
15b. Rationality .92 .25 .11 .08 .69 .01 .67 2
16a. Inner Consis-
tency .92 .05 -.06 .04 .73 -.18 .51 2
16b. Conformity .65 .15 -.66 -.35 .93 -.02 -.11 1
17. Guilts about
Outer Be-
havior -.32 .19 -.33 .30 .00 .26 -.43 -4
18. Guilts about
Inner Be-
havior -.52 .62 .04 .16 -.30 .73 -.19
19. Self-Perception .89 .21 .10 .08 .66 -.02 .65 2
27. Emotional
Stability .80 .19 -.43 -.23 .91 -.02 .18 1
28a. Absence of






Before Rotation Rotation Vector 
T iv Ttr-- i -1-11 6
280. Absence of
Covert Hos-
tility .64 -.57 -.18 .24 .49 -.71 .16 5
30. Superego
Strength .40 .62 -.46 -.12 .71 .50 -.02 3
*Pl: Moral Stability, P2: Ego Strength, P3: Supereoo Strength.
P4: Spontaneity, P5: Friendliness, P6: Hostility-Guilt Cqfplex.
tWith an N of 34 children, loadings of .20 or less considered to be
not significantly different from zero. Loadings above .40 are the only
ones of significance in the table.
1 Based on Table 20, p. 244 from Peck and Havighurst (1960).
Table 4
Peck and Havighurst's Personality Factors in Character
IS
Label Description
Moral Stability Tendency to follow the established moral code.
willingly and with genuine satisfaction.
Ego Strength A complex of capacities to react to event with
accurate perception, appropriate emotions, and
insightful, rational judgment.  all proceeding
from a well-integrated personality system.
Superego Strength The degree to which behavior is directed by or
in accord with, a set of internalized moral
principles--a conscience.
Spontaneity Tendency to express feelings and wishes direct-
ly in action.
Friendliness A generalized attitude of warm liking for other
people.
Hostility-Guilt Complex A complex of intense feelings of hostility,
linked with strong feelings of guilt about inner
impulses.
16
were correlated with Maturity of Character (see Table S).
This preliminary analysis indicated that consistency in overt morality
as measured by the Moral Stability factor was more dependably produced as
one moved up the Maturity of Character scale from Expedient. to Conforming.
to Rational-Altruistic character structure This finding was somewhat
surprising since it was hypothesized that the Conforming and Irrational-
Conscientious types would be as consistent as the Rational-Altruistic type.
Another unexpected finding concerned the Spontaneity factor. One view
of human nature assumes that spontaneous expression of human nature un-
leashes man's innately evil self. The findings not only revealed that
spontaneity was not inversely related to morality but also that the actual
relationship was curvilinear. Both those at the low end of the Maturity
of Character scale and those at the high end showed a high decree of spon-
taneity. Subjects with an intermediate maturity of character (Conforming
and Irrational-Conscientious) had low spontaneity scores.
The Hostility-Guilt correlation was less significant than the other
measures. Further analysis revealed that this factor clearly differentiated
Amoral (high hostility-guilt) type subjects from Rational-Altruistic (low
hostility-guilt) subjects but was inconsistent within the other character
types. Peck and Havighurst concluded from this series of analyses that
mature character requires rational judgement, emotional maturity, and
psychological integration.
In the second analysis in which the personality factors were used,
the factor scores were visually charted by character type using pre-selected
ranges of scores. I rearranged their Table 6 for clearer interpretation
by transforming the scores into a graph (see Figure 1). This analysis was
used to generate the personality profiles for each character type.
17
Table S
Correlations of Personality. Character. and Moral Reputation
Personality Maturity of Adult Peer




Ego Strength .77 .55 .69
Superego Strength .68 .63 .53
Spontaneity .24 .05 .16
Friendliness .57 .13 .04
Hostility - Guilt -.33 -.25 -.07
Levels of significance: .44 = .01; .54 = .001; .33 - .05.








































































































































































































































































































Analysis of these character-type Wing profiles revealed eight distinct
patterns of profiles. The resulting analysis of character and personality,
therefore, included the eight observed character types. Each type will be
briefly described.
The Amoral type is characterized by low ego strength; poor control
over impulses; hostile. immature emotionality; inappropriate emotional
lability; active, generalized hostility; weak superego strength. lacking
any integrated system of internalized moral principles; blind impulsive-
ness; poorly socialized; irrational; suffering from punitive but ineffectual
guilt feelings; sharp inner conflict; and lacking positive, healthy self-
regard.
The Expedient type indicates weak ego strength with below-average
accuracy and integration of ego perceptions and controls; high egocentricity;
low autonomy; ineffectual superego; and low spontaneity.
The CEA (posesses approximately equal proportions of Contorming, Expedient,
and Amoral reasoning) type is very similar to the Amoral character, except
with less hostility and guilt, and CEA's are more passive.
The Conforming character type has weak-to-moderate ego integration and
moderate-to-strong superego. This type is passive and conforming to outer
pressures (outer directed) with strong, chronic guilt and low spontaneity.
The Irrational-Conscientious character shares a weak-to-moderate ego
strength with the Confolming character. This type differs in possessing
a compulsive superego; intolerance; appreciable generalized hostility; low
spontaneity; low self-confidence, and a lack of positive concern for others
(low empathy).
The two subjects with the IAE character (possess approximately equal
proportions of Irrational-Conscientious. Amoral, and Expedient reasoning)
'20
show high inner conflict resulting from an active, controlling super-
ego but high compulsiveness; covertly hostile with a punitive guilt, weak
ego strength, and low self-regard.
The seventh group consisted of individuals who had high proportions
of both Rational-Altruistic and Amoral type responses (high secondary R).
These subjects are the only ones who received average or better scores
on Rational-Altruism. They have, however, as high or higher scores on
another of the remaining type dimensions. This group is characterized by
high ego strength which included a high degree of rationality, a reality-
adapted ego, and firm ego integration. (hey also show high autonomy,
high spontaneity, good regard for people, and high altruism.
The Rational-Altruistic type is very similar to the high secondary
R group. Both have a well-integrated ego free from serious conflict, few
guilt feelings, emotional maturity, high rationality, high spontaneity,
and high self-regard. ihe difference between the two groups is consistently
higher scores on all ct these personality factors by the Rational-Altru-
istic type.
Further analysis of the longitudinal data revealed developmental
trends in character and personality relationships. There were increasing
ego strength scores from Amoral to Rational-Altruistic types. These
scores included increasing rationality, emotional maturity, and integrated
behavior.
Superego strength also showed a linear progression in scores from
Amoral to Rational-Altruistic. Peck and Havighurst distinguished four
stages ot conscience in this sequence. The Amoral character possesses a
repressive, punitive, and internally inconsistent superego. The second
stage of conscience is willing compliance to expected rule conformity as
21
defined by society. This type of superego is other-directed and passive
In making moral decisions. The Conforming character possesses this stage
of conscience. This type is very similar to the 'conventional' type of
authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950). The irrational-Conscien-
tious character has instead a deeply internalized, rule-rigid superego.
These rules are neither questioned nor adapted to the reality of the moral
situation. Moral reasoning and behavior, therefore, is stereotyped and
self-righteously dogmatic. This type of conscience was labelled the
tyrannical neurotic superego first described by Freud. The most develop-
mentally mature type of superego strength is exemplified by the Rational-
Altruistic character. Their superego is integrated into their ego.
Their firmly internalized moral principles are, therefore, open to ques-
tioning in order to achieve the moral purpose inherent in the moral prin-
ciple as appropriate to the reality of the moral situation. As a result,
the superego strength score above is lower for the Rational-Altruistic
type than for the Irrational-Conscientious type.
Although not one of the six personality factors, regard for others
and self, labelled 'love' by Peck and Havighurst, was the final develop-
mental trend. Both the Amoral and Expedient character types are incapable
of loving and feeling loved. Although the Irrational-Conscientious type
can act loving, they do not feel loving or loved. The Conforming type
feels more loved and more loving but is limited to considerateness and
affection rather than deep love. The Rational-Altruistic person is deeply,
spontaneously loving, gives love freely, and feels lovable.
After the completion of the analysis, Peck and Havighurst interpreted
their findings within the theoretical models of Freud and Erikson (1950).
The data for the Amoral character were interpreted as indicating that this
21
type is:
heavily fixated at the early 'oral' stage of psychosocial development.
They demonstrate a profound lack of what Erikson has called 'basic
trust' (Erikson. 1950). and also lack the perceptual and judgmental
ego powers which are necessary to achieve what both Erikson and Piaget
have referred to as 'psychological autonomy (Peck and Havighurst.
1960: p. 167).
The Lxpedient character is psychogenetically described as narcis-
sistic and their orientation not being much past the late oral stage.
They show more of Erikson's initiative but are compelled by drives and
frustrated by lack of satisfaction of these drives.
Both the Conforming and Irrational-Conscientious characters are seen
as having mastered the developmental tasks of the 'anal' stage with the
exception of an underdeveloped autonomy. The difference between the two
types is a matter of degree.
The Rational-Altruistic type shows "the characters of Freud's 'genital'
type and of Erikson's person who has firm identity, good capacity for
human intimacy, and a creative, generative orientation. They likewise
fit Fromm's productive orientation and Reisman's 'autonomous character'"
(p. 170).
Despite Peck and Havighurs:.'s inclusion of Erikson's stages of devel-
opment, their conclusions about the nature of development are basically
Freudian. They concluded that an individual's characteristic personality
and character pattern were "largely laid down by age ten and changed little
thereafter" (p. 157). Changes in development after age ten consisted of
becoming more stable in the basic character pattern and of changing the
surface details of behavior. This view of development was to be flatly
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rejected by Kohlberg (1958. 1969).
Peck and Havighurst (1960) also reported an 'obverse factor analysis
conducted by Ruth Cooper. This analysis entailed a subject-by-subject
correlation matrix which generated ten bipolar personality factors. These
ten factors were then compared for the subjects within the character groups
previously determined. This procedure indicated both substantial profile
agreement between subjects within character types and substantial agree-
ment with the composite, character type descriptions generated by the
original six factors. The obverse factor analysis tended to maximize
differences within groups. This revealed that several kinds of personality
and behavior patterns could be evaluated morally as a particular character
type.
This finding supported the hypothesis that character is a oersistent
pattern of underlying, dynamic motives. Each character type consists of
a core Gestalt or organization of motives. Various atomistic personality
traits can cluster in varying configurations around the character core.
This hypothesis was further supported by correlating the personality var-
iables singly with the character types. The number of significant corre-
lations which resulted were fewer than expected by chance. Only when the
core profiles were compared with the six factors did distinctive relation-
snips appear. Fromm (1947) had predicted this type of relationship between
personality organization and character. Kohlberg (1969) later expressed
similar ideas.
The research of Peck and Havighurst was based on detailed, in-depth
data gathering and analysis. Despite the exacting and advanced analytic
procedures used, crucial criticisms must be made. The first and most
serious criticism focuses on their data analysis. Thirty-plus personality
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variables were factor analyzed based on thirty-four Subjects. This ratio
between number of variables and number of subjects is not substantially
reliable for this type of analysis. Partially recognizing this liability.
Peck and Havighurst set .40 as the minimum loading for inclusion of a
defining variable in a vector. Still, the possibility of spurious factors
remains significant.
A second criticism concerns their substitution of 'vectors' for
actual factors. The factor analysis produced three factors. From this
three-factor system, six vectors were constructed based on "six clusters
of variables which were statistically distinct from one another, and
which represented psychologically separate and meaningful dimensions that
it was desirable to retain" (p. 243). There are NO consequences from
this procedure. First, some personality traits load above .40 on more
than one vector. The vectors, therefore, are not statistically independent.
Secondly, two vectors are defined by only one trait. The practice of
isolating one trait as a vector which is not a distinguishable facLor is
questionable. This procedure is even more questionable considering the
limited number of cases upon which these vectors are based.
The vector scores were then used to define character types and to
differentiate between types. Reference to Figure I reveals that these
type definitions and differentiations are based on groups ranging in size
from three to eight. At no point are the vector scores statistically
checked for significant differences between groups. This brings the
type profiles into serious question as statistically reliable classi-
fications. Since actual scores were not provided, it is not possible to
make this crucial test. There may be no statistical difference between
Amoral and Rational-Altruistic types or any comparison of types. The
character profiles have, therefore, not been statistically substantiated.
2S
In spite of the difficulties inherent in Pock and Navighurst's study,
it remained one of the most in-depth and significant studies of moral
development until the research of Kohlberg. Although Peck and Navighurst
only briefly mentioned the work of Viaget. Piaget's influence on subse-
quent research in morality was to be important. Piaget's influence com-
pleted the transition from moral research based on behavior to research
based on moral reasoning.
Chapter II
The Structure of Moral Thousht and Its Relation to Personality
Piaget: The Structure of Childhood Moral Reasoning
Jean Piaget (1932) not only systematically pioneered the Psy-
chological study of moral reasoning but also constructed a develop-
mental theory of moral judgment. As a genetic epistemologist, Piaget
studied the way the child's acquisition of knowledge of the world and
the child's construction of a representational schema of his knowledge
developed. Behavior, and moral behavior as a necessary subset of
behavior, was ccnceived as a function of cognitive structures (schema)
possessed and used by the individual. These schema are relatively
lasting structures of adaptation to the environment which develop towards
an increasingly complete and stable equilibrium with the environment.
Each succeeding schema represents a new Gestalt which supersedes and
incorporates through transformations the preceeding schema.
Planet outlined two developmental moral schemas which he labeled
'moral realism' and 'the morality of reciprocity.' Children whose
characteristic moral reasoning was classified as moral realism operated
with a schema that assumed moral rules were external and rooted in authority.
Their application of moral judgments tended to be literal, socially in-
sensitive, and based on material damage rather than on intentions. The
basic elements of the morality of reciprocity are an awareness of another's
point of view, the realization that rules are created out of human rela-




Although these schemes were presented as distinct stages, Piaget
emphasized that there was 41104ri a certain mixture of the two. A tran-
sitional phase was discerned by Piaget between the moral realism stage and
the morality of reciprocity. Peters (1971) considered this transitional
phase an intermediate stage which he labeled 'transcendental,' During
this stage the individual internalizes and neneralizes the rules, and
recognizes that he is obeying an imposed rule. An implicit reference to
a fourth, more developed stage of moral development in Piaget's theory
was examined by Kay (1969). This fourth hypothesized stage goes beyond
normative autonomy to the types of autonomy exemplified by Christ and
Socrates.
Piaget considered moral reasoning as an intrinsic aspect of general
intellectual development. As such, this conceptualization was one of the
first to avoid the moral character controversy. By incorporating and in-
tegrating what had previously been viewed as a distinct 'moral' trait into
an overarching perspective, many of the criticisms levelled against trait
theories were inaoplicable. A person neither possesses nor fails to possess
the trait of moralness, instead, everyone develops through a sequence of
moral schemas. One no longer has 'high' or 'low character, or 'good' or
'bad' character, or is on a continuum between these bipolar terms. Each
individual is moral but his moral perspective is different. All individ-
uals, however, can be classified into a certain number of specific moral
schemas. Piagees theory represents a radical shift in psychological
thinking about morality and an individual's possession of morality.
With this divergent formulation of morality, it is no longer a
search for moral traits or profilesthat occupies the psychologist. The
question now becomes one of determining which personality traits and/or
profiles, if any, are related to the various stages of moral judgment.
Piaget (1932) initially gave very little attention to this relationship.
This lack of attention may be due to two reasons. Although certain person-
ality-like traits can be deduced from Plaget's stages, these are disposi-
tions which change with the child's development from one stage to the
next stage. The fact that he was studying children between the ages of
fotir and twelve would seriously qualify any personality conclusions.
In later work, Piaget (1967) proposed that emotions develop through
a process analogous to that of intellectual development (and thus moral
development). He speculated that emotions in the small child were impul-
sive and follow each other singly. Through the course of development,
these various emotions become organized in such a way that emotions
compensate each other in a kind of equilibrium. This compensation is
a function of simultaneously processing several perspectives ot the
environment and one's role in it, not only one's immediate feelings but
also one's awareness of the other's intentions and an ability to place
one self into the other's emotional perspective in evaluating possible
courses of action (included in this equilibrium). This coordination of
emotional structures, which becomes a relatively persistent aspect of an
individual's personality, "emerge as regulations whose final form of
equilibrium is none other than the will" (Piaget, 1967 and Wright, 1971).
Kohlberg: The Structure of Life-Long Moral Reasoninl
Piaaet's developmental theory of moral judgment was modified and
elaborated by Lawrence Kohlberg (1958, 1963, 1969, 1973). He constructed
his stages and theory of development on a review of past theories and
upon empirical evidence. His review of theories current during his re-
search included: 1. the philosophical position of Hume, Smith, Mill, and
Stephen; 2. the psychoanalytic theory of Freud (and Nietzsche's similar
philosophical thesis); 3. Durkheim's respect for society treatise; 4. Mead's
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socially organized role-taking postulation: and S. the formal cognitive
theories of Baldwin and Piaget.
Kohlberg's theory has been a dynamic one. he (1468) originally
claimed that there were SiX stages. These stages are defined by Kohlberg
(1971) in Table 6. This schema was expanded by dividing stage 5 into
a stage 5A and 58 (Kohlberg. 1973). Stage 5A consisted of a social contract,
utilitarian law making perspective, while stage 56 reco9nized a higher
law of inalienable rights and a scrupulous duty to such rights (a con-
science orientation).
In this same article, Kohlberg hypothesized a seventh stage. Con-
templative experience of a nonegoistic and nondualistic nature character-
ized this seventh stage. The self is seen from the persnective of the
cosmic and there is a sense of being a part of the cosmos. A cosmic
identification develops as opposed to a universal humanistic (Stage 6)
perspective. An individual's value of life is from the standooint of
identifying himself with the cosmic perspective. Kohlberg makes no claims
for having yet recognized this stage in structural analyzes of protocols.
It exists as a philosophical and theological concept.
Recently Kohlberg has been reluctant to score stage 6, Kohlberg's
1974 Moral Judgment Scale scoring manual proscribed scoring protocols for
stage 6. This recent edition of the scoring manual provided neither prin-
ciples nor examples for scoring stage 6 responses.
Kohlberg, like Planet, is not studying moral character. He has re-
placed this dichotomous trait with a develoomental stage construct. Never-
theless, Kohlberg (1958) has speculated about the relationship of moral
reasoning to personality.
On one level of analysis, Kohlberg (1958) viewed the moral reasoning
Table 6
Kohlberg's Definition of Moral Stages
1. Preconventiondl level
At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of
good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of
either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment.
reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those
who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the
following two stages:
Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical
consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the
human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment
and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not
in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment
and authority (the latter being stage 4.)
Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action con-
sists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasion-
ally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those
of the market place. Elements of fairness, physical pragmatic way. Re-
ciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours,"
not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.
II. Conventional level
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family.
group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right , regardless
of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of
)1
conformity to oeruonal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to
it. of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and
of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level,
there are the following two stages:
Stage 3: The ,interpersonal_ copcprdance Or. .".9pod_ 2Arl:
Orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is
approved by them. There is much conformity tostereotn ical images of
what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged
by intention--"he means well" becomes important for the first time.
One earns approval by being "nice."
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation
toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order.
Right behavior consist of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority,
and maintaining the given social order for it's own sake.
III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and
principles which have validity and application apart from the authority
of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the
individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has
two stages:
Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with 
utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of gen-
eral individual rights, and standards which have been critically examined
and agreed upon by the whole society There is a clear awareness of the
relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis
upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is consti-
tutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal
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'values and 'opinions.- The result is an emphasis upon the 'legal
point of view." but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing
law in terms of rationa considerations of social utility (rather than
freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal
realm, fret agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation.
This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.
Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is de-
fined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical
principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and con-
sistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule,
the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the
Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice,
of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the
dignity of human beings as individual persons.
From: L. Kohlberg, The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of
moral judgment. The Journal  of Philosophy. 1973, 70, pp. 631-632.
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stages as Personality types. Not hypothesized that 'the general elements
of the types my hang together to forr a distinct and unitary %Mole, or a
concrete 'personality type" (p. 229). While explaining and describing
the six stages. Kohlberg (1958) specifically noted a variety of oerson-
ality traits that might be related to the particular stages: autonomy,
conformity, need for social approval, flexibility, authoritarianism,
sympathy, guilt, anxiety, and ego strength.
In considering autonory. Kohlbern distinouished between life-style
autonomy and moral autonomy as necessary for clearly delineating the re-
lationship with moral reasoning. The autonomy of developing and main-
taining personal tastes, goals, and opinion in the face of pressure to
conform to other's personal preferences was not expected to show a con-
sistent relationship to moral reasoning. The stage 2 individual should be
autonomous in the sense of being resistant to social oressure (i.e., life-
style autonomy). The stage 6 individual is also resistant to social pres-
sure to change,,qhich violates his moral reasoning (i.e., moral autonomy).
Conformity can be defined as subordinating one's own opinions to
those of others (social pressure). Kohlberg (1958) stated that stage 3
individuals were oriented towards conformity, Particularly as associated
with situational social pressure. The stage 4 person does not conform as
much to situational social pressure as to the social pressure exerted by
authority.
The need for social approval was another trait discussed by Kohlberg
(1958). The need for social approval is felt most strongly by stage 3
persons for whom it is their primary orientation. Stage 4 individuals
have a more specific need than stage 3 individuals, a need for approval
from those in authority. The stage 5 person has yet another type of
approval need: recognition of achievement and reputation by peers.
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Kohlberg (1958) further noted certain trait stnilarities between
stage 2 and S individuals. Those classified into these stages were mt.
Pected to share a high level of flexibility in instrumental, utilitarian
affairs. Both stages also shared a motivational orientation toward
enhancement of the purposes of the self. Flexibility wdS seen as an
asset in instrumental enhancement.
Although Kohlberg (1958) criticized the typology of the Author-
itarian personality, he did explain the relationship between it and stage
4 moral judgment. He claimed that staoe 4 individuals would possess a
few characteristics of the "Authoritarian Personality." although he failed
to specify which ones. There is no necessary relationship, however,
between the "Authoritarian Personality" characteristics of prejudice and
anti-democratic attitudes and stage 4 reasoning.
A strictly emotive view of moral judgment was inadequate from
Kohlberg's (1958) view, but he did consider moral judgment's likely
relationship to several emotive traits. Kohlberg cited Hume's theory
that morality was based on sympathy. The stage 3 individual would indeed
be motivated by sympathy, according to Kohlberg (1958). Duty to the
value and dignity of human life rather than sympathy would be the motiva-
tion of stage 6 individuals. These same individuals, however, may demon-
strate through their behavior a high level of sympathy.
Guilt and anxiety, as emotive traits, bear an uncertain relation to
morality (Kohlberg, 1958). The unclear relationship results from the
multin10 definitions of guilt and anxiety. If the guilt or anxiety is
felt only as an external avoidance force then Kohlberg (1958) does not
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consider this related to being moral. Only self reproach would qualify
as moral guilt. Kohlberg (1958) did not specify how moral guilt would
vary between stages.
Kohlberg (1958. 1963) has placed strong emphasis on ego strength
as an important coaponent of moral reasoning. He has not, however,
specified the relationship between ego strength and moral stages. It
is clear that ego stren9th is necessary for all six stages but it is
unclear whether a significant difference between stages should be expect-
ed. A stage I child requires ego strength, for example, to behave in
order to avoid punishment and to receive rewards.
In a major theoretical exposition, Kohlberg (1969) reviewed,
criticized, and modified major developmental theories of personality,
socialization, and moral judgment. The theorists reviewed included
Freud, Gesell, Erikson, and Piaget. Kohlberg showed that all of these
theorists viewed personaltiy development as changes in the child's world
views and coping mechanisms rather than as maturation of fixed character
traits.
Personality traits, like character traits, do not change through a
process of development. Kohlberg (1969), following the tradition of the
other developmental theorists, contended that polar personality traits
are rarely either stable or aae-developmental. Most longitudinally stable
traits are non-cognitive ones such as temperment traits like introversion-
extroversion and activity-passitivity. Polar personality traits are those
traits which are defined by a quantitative ordering of individuals on a
single dimension such as conformity, aggression, affiliation, anxiety, need
achievement, condescension, etc. Most developmental theories assume that
such traits are differentiated balancings of conflicting forces and that
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these balancings differ at different forint, in the 1ife cycle as new
developmental tasks are focused upon. Such traits would not, therefore,
have a formal-structural base parallel to the developnental, structural
basis of Kohlberq's moral judgment theory.
Only those personality traits which have a structural. develop-
mental basis parallel to that of cognitive and moral developrent should
be significantly related to moral judgment. Kohlberg (1969) proposed
two personality domains which possessed a structural basis: affective
and interpersonal schemata. These affective schemata appear analogous
to Piaget's (1967) emotional structures. Types of feeling, according
to Kohlberg, develop a set of general structural properties which re-
present successive forms of psychological equilibrium. These structural
properties are the same as those of cognitive and moral schemata. The
development of affects is largely mediated by change in cognitive
patterns. Each more mature emotion involves a cognitive differentiation
not made at the next less mature affect. Kohlberg (1969) stated that
moral judgment stages should be described in both cognitive structural
terms and affective structural terms like guilt and empathy. He did not
define and discuss guilt and its specific position in the descriptions of
each stage.
Motivational personality traits such as dependency, aggression,
affiliation, anxiety, need-achievement, and conscience strength are neither
stable nor developmental according to Kohlberg. The interpersonal schema
was not defined and was only discussed in connection with how it shared
the same elementary structural features as moral judgment.
Kohlberg (1973; and Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969) has compared his
structural moral judgment stages to only one personality theory: Erikson's
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functional. ego-development theory. In an attempt to explain apparent
retrogression of sore college-aged individuals in moral judgment. Kohlberg
and Kramer (1969) interpreted this evidence in term of Erikson's concepts
of moratorium, identity crisis, and identity achievement through crisis
resolution. Although retrogressed subjects indicated the capacity for
and awareness of principled thought, they lacked the committment to this
stage of moral reasoning. Committment was thought to often be a part
of the resolution of the identity crisis. Kohlberg (1973) stated that
the available evidence indicated that no individuals who had not undergone
an identity crisis had developed to a stage of principled reasoning.
Simultaneously, not all subjects who had undergone and resolved an identity
crisis had matured to a principled stage of morality. Identity questioning,
apparently, must be combined with explicit cognitive-moral stimulation
and reflection.
The preceding analysis led Kohlberg (1973) to revise his analysis
of moral judgment and ego-development. He concluded that Eriksonian ego
stage progression was insufficient to produce principled morality. It
was necessary to integrate Piaget's cognitive-structural accounts of
experience with the personal exPerience of choice central to Erikson's
theory for an adequate theory. "All those moving to principled morality
would be expected to go through this identity progression. The movement
from conventional to principled morality is one which must be considered
as a matter of personal choice and as a choice of self in a sense not
true of earlier moral stages," (Kohlberg, 1973). Kohlberg (1973) further
proceeded to give a detailed comparison of his theory and Erikson's. This
is reproduced in Tables 7 and 8.
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Table 7




Conventional Morality 3 & 4
Identity crisis or Moratorium Traditional or retrogressed
relativism 2 5A
Identity Achievement Principled morality 5B & 6
Table a








ter stages replace earli-
er stages. Experience
leading to develop-
ment is cognitive ex-
perience, especially
experiences of cogni-
tive conflict and match
Focus
The developmental change
is primarily a changed per-
ception in the physical,
social, and moral world.
The outcome of movement is
perceptual change. The
ability of the new stage is





Stages are choices Or uses of new
functions by an eoo--earlier
functions or choices remain on
background to the new stage. Ex-
perience leading to development
is personal experience, especially
experiences and choice of personal
conflict.
of Stages
The development change involved
is primarily a self-chosen, self-
perception identification with
goals. The outcome of a move-
ment is relatively permanent and
results in a choice or a commitment.
continued
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later stages are more COgnitively
adequate than earlier stages:
(1) including the earlier stage
pattern. (2) resolving the same
problems better. and (3) in being
more universally applicable or
justifiable, i.e.. in the univer-
sality and inclusiveness of
their ordering of experience.
From: Kohlberg, 1973, p. 200, Table 2.
later stages are more adequate
than earlier stages, not in cog-
nitive inclusiveness, but in
virtue or ego strength, i.e.,
in their ability to order per-
sonal experience in a form
that is stable. positive, and
purposive. Attainment of a
stage and adequacy of stage use
are distinct, however.
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10100r2  one FE9nm: TI p Interface of Character Structqres and.oloral
Thought Structures
One of the purposes of the present review is to demonstrate the
Interfaces between Kohlberg's moral judgment stages and Fromm's (1947)
character types. The application of Fromm's theory in moral theorizing
has already been noted in its use by Peck and Havighurst. There are sig-
nificant differences between the theoretical assunntions and characteristics
of Kohlberg's and Peck and Havighurst's theories as well as important
differences between their types of data and analyses. It is partially for
these reasons that an effort will be made to discover the parallel be-
tween Kohlberg and From, and to then empirically demonstrate these parallels.
Another theory analyzing and constructing a developmental typology
of moral judgment current during Kohlberg's initial work was Fromm's (1947)
character theory used in Peck and Havighurst's research. Kohlberg (1959)
included Fromm's name once in his dissertation (p. 285) without providing
bibliographic reference. Kohlberg's succeeding publications have con-
sidered Fromm's theory no more than did his dissertation. This review
will attempt to broaden Kohlberg's initial and subsequent analytic review.
Fromm provides the most complete theory of personality and character.
His theory, therefore, is believed to present the best framework in which
both to organize the available evidence and interpretations and to explore
the relationships between Kohlberg's moral reasoning stages and personality
structure.
Since Fromm's work foreshadowed later theoretical developments in
American existential and humanistic psychology by May and Shostrom, the
present analysis will also point to their parallels with Kohlberg.
The relation between one's morality and his personality was the focal
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thesis of Erich Fr' s (1947) Han qr Himself: An Inquiry Into  The
Psychology of Ethics. Fromm viewed personality and noralness as being
inherently related. "The subJect matter of ethics is character ....
problems of ethics cannot be omitted from the study of personality"
(pp. 42 and v).
Fromm (1947) conceptualized personality as the totality of inher-
ited psychic Qualities (temperament) and acquired qualities (character).
Temperament represented the person's constitutional mode of reaction.
The stimulus to which the person emitted a reaction through a particular
mode (e.g. choleric vs sanguine) was dePendent on his locus of relatedness
to the environment. The mode of reaction (temperament) determined neither
the reaction nor the ethicalness of the reaction. Temperament determined
only the medium and amplification (the mode) of the reaction.
Character was, however, "the subject matter of ethical judoment and
the object of man's ethical development" (From, 19A7). Fromm defined
character as the organization of motivations underlying a person's orien-
tations by which one relates oneself to the world. Man relates himself
to the w6cld in two ways: 1) by acquiring and assimilating things, and
2) by relating himself to other people and to himself.
The fundamental entity in character was the organization (structure)
of motivations. A number of single character traits followed from the
specific motivational structure. The character structure was analytically
and ontologically prior to the traits themselves.
There are distinct structural parallels between Kohlberg and Fromm.
Kohlberg's(1969) moral judgment stage theory was also structurally, as
opposed to trait, centered. His focused criticism of the hypothesis that
moral judgment was related to personality traits then was consistent with
4)
FrOWS theorising. Kohlberg (1969) did not, however, eliminau the
existence of a relationship between character and moral judgment.
Types of valuing and of feeling, like reasoning, were hypothesized
as schematic which developed general structural characteristics. These
structural characteristics represented successive stages of psycholcgical
equilibrium. The structural equilibrium of "affective and interpersonal
schemata involves many of the same basic structural features as the
equilibrium of cognitive schemata and moral schemata " (Kohlberg, 1969).
Kohlberg's (1969) discussion of these affective and interpersonal
schemata indicates that they are similar to Fromm's conative structures.
The affective schemata resemble Fromm's motivational structures. Fromm's
orientation of relatedness to others and oneself parallels Kohlberg's
interpersonal schemata. From further hypothesized that Freud's superego
conscience was only one developmental stage. The productive character
was proposed as a higher developmental stage represented by a structurally
distinct orientation.
In his theorizing, Fromm demarcated five character orientations
based on a non-exhaustive matrix of personality traits (Table 9, and 10).
Fromm did not indicate that the four nonproductive orientations were develop-
mental.
The similarities previously discussed, however, between Fromm's five
character orientation types and Kohlberg's six moral judgment stages
generates the proposed structural parallels presented in Table 11. The
findings of the present empirical study are not, however, dependent
on the adequacy of this model.





















Unproductive Character Types and Traits
RECEPTIVE ORIENTATION (ACCEPTING)
Positive Aspect Negative Aspect













Positive Aspect Negative Aspect
active exploitative
able to take initiative  aggressive





















Positive Aspect Negative Aspect
purposeful opportunistic
able to change inconsistent
youthful childish
forward-looking without a future or a past
open-minded without principle and values











*From Fromm (1947, pp. 120-121).
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to this hypothesized relation between moral judgment structure and
character structure. As an exploratory study. it will perform analyses
of three interrelated aspects of the probler. The first of these analyses
will compare four of the measures previously used to scale moral judg-
ment. The second stage of the study will investinate the relationships
between a sample of potentially relevant personality trait scores and
moral judgment scores. The final stage of analysis will attempt to
determine the character structures and their personality trait compo-
sitions which relate to Kohlberg's moral judgment structures.
Chapter III
The Measures  of Moral Judgment
The study of character must be based on the instruments
assessing moral judgment and those measuring personality traits. A
prerequisite of such a study, therefore, must be a review of such instru-
ments, their psychometric properties, and their interrelationships.
Only the moral judgment measures will be reviewed, however, due to
the lack of published compendium of this information and the volume of
data on personality instruments.
Instruments Based on Kohlberg's  Theory 
The major instruments have been developed from either Kohlberg's
research or Hogan's research (1973 & 1975). Kohlberg's theory has already
been presented. Four instruments have been derived from Kohlberg's theory:
the Moral Judgment Scale, the Sexual Moral Judgment Scale, the Objective
Moral Judgment Scale, and the Defining Issues Test.
Moral Judoment Scale
The development of a moral development scale (Moral Judgment Scale,
MJS) and a cognitive theory of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg
(1958), revived interest in moral judgment research. At least six other
measures related to assessing moral judgment have been developed since
then; for ease of reference and as an aid in readina, these are presented
in Table 12. Published data on the relationships between these measures is
insubstantial. These instruments will be surveyed and critiqued.
The Moral Judgment Scale is a structured, projective test consisting
of a series of stories involving moral dilemmas to which the subject makes
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Table 12
Moral Judgment Instruments Reviewed
Name
Moral Judgment Scale (MJS)
Sexual Moral Judgment Scale (SMJS)
Objective Moral Judgment Scale
(OMJS)
Defining Issues Test (DIT)
Empathy Scale (ES)
Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA)












Gilligan, Kohlberg et al 1971
Maitland & Goldman 1974
Rest et al 1974
Hogan 1969
Hogan 1970
Hogan & Dickstein 1972
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moral judgments and presents reasoning to support these decision. The
scale can be scored in one or both of two ways: a global system and/or a
detailed system.
For global scoring each subject's response per dilerra is assiclned
a score on one of the Kohlberg stages. The subjects results can be
reported for either each dilemma or the dominant stage across dilemmas
can be computed.
The detailed scoring method entails categorizing the responses as to
respective moral thought-issue units (see Appendix A; Kohlberg, 1971:
Kurtines & Grief, 1974). The responses are then assigned stage scores
within each thought-content unit. Percentages of responses at each stage
are then computed. A moral maturity score (MMS) can be computed by multiplying
the percentages of stage usage by the assigned weights for each stage. This
procedure yields a total score for each subject between 100 - 600.
Kurtines and Grief (1974) reported two major problems with these
scoring procedures. First, the judgmental nature of the coding procedures
necessitated by the projective technique introduces potential scorer bias.
Second, the use of two scoring systems confounds the generalizability of
results. Fodor (1971 & 1972), for example, reported a significant difference
between detailed mean scores for delinquents and nondelinquents, although
both groups had the same global score. Kohlberg (1958) reported another
drawback of the MJS. The effectiveness of the various dilemmas for
assessing moral reasoning is not equal. The inter-dilemma reliability
coefficient, however, was not reported. The test-retest reliability was
also reported as "Door" by Rest et al (1974).
S3
Sexual Moral Judrent SW,
Gilligan, Kohlberg. Lerner. and Belenky (1971) developed the
Sexual Moral Judgment Scale (SMJS) as an extension of the MJS. The
SMJS has an identical format to the MJS and differs only in the nature
of the area of human affairs (sexual relations) for which moral judgments
and reasoning are probed (see Appendix C. stories 2 and 3 for examples).
Only one published study has used the SMJS. The respondents were hirh
school juniors.
Scores for the adolescent sample showed that the SMJS was only
moderately, .405 for females and .482 for males, correlated with the MJS.
The results further demonstrated that this deviation was directional.
Approximately 80 of those subjects showing any difference in level of
moral reasoning exhibited lower moral reasoning for the sexual dilemmas.
Direct comparison of scores on the MJS versus scores on the SOJS for
the same sample supported the inequality in the effectiveness of the various
dilemmas for assessing moral reasoning. The interscorer agreement level
was lower for two out of three of the SMJS stories compared to three MJS
stories (see Table 13).
Objective Moral Judgment  Scale
Maitland and Goldman (1974) developed an objective form of the MJS.
Their scale (OMJS) attempted to eliminate the cumbersome administration
and scoring procedures of Kohlberg's MJS. The OMJS stimulus set consisted
of fifteen moral dilemmas (see Appendix B for the stimulus set) followed
by a question designed to elicit one particular issue of moral judgment.
The subject was then required to select one of six stage responses which
followed each dilemma. These responses were derived from Kohlberg's

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The test was scored by summing the steno responses across the fifteen
dilemmas, resulting in scores with a possible range from fifteen to ninety.
The reported OMJS test-retest reliability was 1'6.83 for 12 to 19-
year-olds and ..60 for 11th and 12th grade pupils. The split-half
reliability coefficient was re.71 and a Kuder-Richardson Formula 20
yielded an .!1..67. A direct validity comparison with Kohlberc's MJ
was not conducted. OMJS scores were, however, transformed to compare
with Kohlberg's moral maturity score (MMS) by multiplying the total score
by 100/15. These scores were compared with the MMS norms for a sample
of the same age and academic level. This comparison provided hiclhly
supportive validity data (MJS=364, OMJS transformation scores=365). lhese
means were not, however, based on the same subjects. Neither the standard
deviations nor the correlation between the two sets of scores were reported.
Defining Issues Test
Rest, Cooper, Coder, Nasanz, and Anderson (1971) constructed another
objectively based instrument for assessing moral development. Their Defin-
ing Issues Test (DIT) consisted of moral dilemmas which were presented
with twelve issues bearing upon that dilemma. The subject was to evaluate
each dilemma and its concomitant issues, and to then indicate on a Likert
scale how important each issue was in resolving the dilemma. The issues
exemplified a distinctive characteristic on one of Kohlberg's stages. The
DIT has a test-retest Pearson correlation of .81. The DIT correlated .68
with the MJS. Rest et al„interpreted this result as showing that the PIT
and MJS were not equivalent measures.
Instruments  Based on Hoyan's Theory
Robert Hogan (1973 & 1975) constructed an alternative theory of moral
development to that of Kohlberg. Hogan emphasized the ontogenesis of
S6
character structure analogous to Fromm's theory. The dimensions of this
character structure according to Hogan's typology are moral knowledge,
socialization, empathy, autonomy, and ethical attitude.
Moral knowledge is defined as awareness and comprehension of the
relevant social rules. Socialization is the degree to which one has
internalized these social rules as personally obligatory and binding.
Empathy is the capacity and disposition to regulate one actions in
accordance with the expectations of others. Autonomy is seen as the
capacity to make moral judgments without beina influenced by peer group
pressure or the dictates of authority. Ethical attitude is the degree
to which one perceives moral rules as being instrumentally valuable for
regulating social conduct versus beina valuable for personal integrity.
Hogan has developed instruments to assess three of these dimensions.
He constructed the Empathy Scale (ES) to measure empathy. and the Survey
of Ethical Attitudes (SEA) to scale ethical attitude. Hogan used I.Q.
tests to measure moral knowledge, since earlier research had shown a high
correlation between intelligence and moral knowledge. The Socialization
scale of the California Personaltiy Inventory was used to assess social-
ization. Hogan (1973 and 1975) used both Barron's Scale of Independence
of Judgment and Kurtines' (1973) CPI Autonomy Scale to scale autonomy.
Measure of Moral Values
To determine the importance of each of these dimensions. Hogan and
Dickstein (1972) developed the Measure of Moral Values to measure moral
maturity. This scale was comprised of fifteen statements requiring a
projective response. These responses were scored two points if any one
of four predefined moral concerns was clearly expressed: 1) concern for
the sanctity of the individual, 2) judgments based on the spirit rather
than the letter of the law, 3) concern for the welfare of society as a
ST
whole. and 4) capacity to see both sides of an issue. An answer was
assigned one point if any of the four concerns was easily implied. This
method yielded a range of possible scores from 0-30 for the totaled items.
Neither item analysis nor reliabilities were reported.
The construct validity of this instrument must he critically examined.
Hogan and Dickstein (1974) used this same W.> to assess the construct of
'perception and attribution of injustice by using a different scoring
theme criteria (blame) than that used for assessing moral values (Hogan
and Dickstein, 1972). The instructions were identical, however, in both
studies. Low scorers were defined as possessing a tendency to attribute
injustice to institutions. High scores conversely denoted a tendency
to perceive injustice as due to individuals.
The attribution of injustice to institutions rather than individuals
is a different type of moral judgment. Moral decisions about people and
institutions beyond self are not the same as Kohlbern's moral reasoning
about personal behavior. Attribution in Hogan's dilemmas might reflect
moral rationalization rather than moral judgment, where rationalization
means defensive projection of responsibility rather than acceptance of
responsibility. If the same projective responses to the MMV can be
scored to determine both maturity of moral judgment and degree of moral
rationalization, then these two sets of response scores should be analyzed.
This analysis mould determine whether maturity of moral judgment correlates
with the degree of moral rationalization. The more morally mature should
show less moral rationalization. A failure to support such a prediction
would challenge the construct validity of the MMV.
Hogan and Dickstein (1972) found that the level of sensitivity to
injustice (not attribution of injustice) was significantly correlated
..01, n•92, with maturity of moral juogment. An increase in
moral maturity was accompenieo by an increase in assigned lives of sensi-
tivity to injustice.
Although the MMN was explicitly presented as a parallel technique
for the MuS, no estimate of method variance or between instrument score
Isomorphism was reported. Hogan 0973. Rogan and Dickstein. 1972) re-
ported two significant correlations between the SEA and his MMV, r=-.34
(n=41, p=.01) and r=-.40 (n=41, p=.01) respectively. These apparently
were based on the same sample data but no explanation of the inconsistency
has been provided.
Empathy Scale 
The Empathy Scale (ES) (Hogan, 1969) was postulated to measure one
aspect of moral reasoning because empathy was defined as an inherent
element ot taking the moral point of view. The moral point of view was
conceptualized as adopting impersonal motivations and ends for one's
actions through identifying with the goals and expectations of one's
social group.
The ES was made-up of sixty-four true-false items. Thirty-one ot
these were drawn from the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) while
twenty-five were taken from the MMPI and eight items were from other
sources.
Much of the validity evidence and the reliability coetficients for
the ES were based on comparisons with results from the CPI and the MMPI.
This lack of indepenC.ence between the ES and the validity criteria measures
represents serious contounding. The personalogical correlates reported by
Hogan (1969, 1970, and 1972) which relied on the ES as the moral judgment
index and used the CPI and MMPI as the personality measures must be
seriously qualified.
S9
Hogan (1968) used the ES AIS an index of moral judgment in his
research and reported (Ho)an and Dickstein. 1972) correlations of .48
n • 41. p • .05. and .58 n • 30. p • .01, between the ES and MHO/
for two samples.
A more serious criticism of Hogan's Empathy Scale involves the
underlying construct Hogan used for empathy. Hogan confounds the construct
himself by using different conceptualizations in different expositions.
His (1969) initial definition was: "the act of constructing for oneself
another person's mental state.. .without actually experiencing that
person's feelings (p. 308)." In a later article. Hogan. (1973) defined
empahty as "role-taking ability." Role taking was not defined but G.H.
Mead's (1934) theory was most frequently cited. A third definition was
still later presented (Grief and Hooan, 1973); empathy was conceived as
"the ability to adopt the moral point of view, to consider the implications
of one's actions for the welfare of others... (p. 280)." Grief and Hogan
also stated that empathy referred to "a sensitivity to the needs and values
of others" in the same paper. Finally, Hogan (1975) defined empathy as
"the capacity and disposition to regulate one's actions in accordance with
the expectations of others... (p. 160).
A factor analysis of the ES and Grief and Hogan's (1973) interpreta-
tion of the resulting factors further calls into question both the nature
of the construct measured and its conceptual validity. The ES items
divided into three factors. The first factor suggested that a tolerant,
even-tempered disposition was a component of empathy. The second factor
was interpreted to reflect that an empathetic person was also self-possessed,
outgoing, and socially ascendant. The third factor indicated that a human-
istic and tolerant set of sociopolitical attitudes was an aspect of an
empathetic disposition.
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How (1969 6 197S) has further supported this interpretation.
He stated that the validationil evidence substantiated that high scorers
on the ES were msocillly acute and sensitive to nuances in interp,rsonal
behavior." low scorers were "hostile cold, and insensitive to the feel-
ings of others." This conceptualization is not equivalent to considering
the implications of one's actions for the welfare of others. Hogan
seems to confuse role-taking empathy with moral empathy which are two
distinct concepts. The face validity of the ES items (Table 14) more
strongly supports the role-taking empathy concept than the moral empathy
concept. Kohlberg (1958) criticized the assumption that role-taking
empathy was synonomous with moral empathy.
Survey of Ethical Attitudes
The Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA) was conceptualized as measuring
the existence of two sets of ethical ideals employed in moral justification
and decision making: the ethics of personal conscience and the ethics of
social responsibility. The bases for the ethics of social responsibility
were the legal system and the general welfare of society. The ethic of
personal conscience was based on a higher order of personal integrity.
Although Hogan proposed that these two ideals appeared to form a part of
Kohlberg's distinction between stage 5 and stage 6 reasoning, Hogan philo-
sophically argued that neither ideal represented a higher form of moral
reasoning. For this reason, the SEA will not be used as an instrument in
this study. The research generated by the SEA will, however, be reviewed
because of its exploration of personalogical variables.
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Table 14
Empathy Scale Role-Taking Items
1. I like to talk before groups of people.
2. 1 think I am usually a leader in my group.
3. I usually don't like to talk much unless I am with people I
know well.
4. I am a good mixer.
5. 1 usually take an active part in the entertainment at parties.
6. I have a natural talent for influencing people.
From: E. Grief and R. Hogan (1973, p. 282).
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The SEA consisted of both forced-choice and weighted-continuum
items. These items involved both attitude items and forced-choice items
related to a moral dilemma story. Neither item analyses nor reliabilities
were published. Hogan and Dickstein (1972) reported a correlation of
r.-.34, n=41. p_ =.05 between the SEA and the MMV. This negative relation-
ship indicated that those scorinn in the personal conscience ranne on
the SEA scored in the higher range of moral maturity on the MMV. A
correlation coefficient between the SEA and MJS was not reported.
The most inconsistent findings to be reviewed in this study derive
from the ES and SEA scales. The relationship of these two instruments
compared on the CPI and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator showed them to be
measures of almost completely independent constructs, even though both
were presented as inherent elements of moral reasoning. The justification
for including the research based on these instruments resides in their
claim to report personality-moral judgment relationships. Neither instru-
ment, based on this critique, will be used, however, as a measure of moral
judgment in this study.
The seven measures of moral judgment are all techniques which have
been used in morality-personality research. This research will be re-
viewed in relation to the specific personality variables studied and
the moral judgment instrument used.
Chapter IV
The Mature of Relponsibility and Research Relationships  to Moral  Jud9nent
The character typology constructed by From (1947) and presented
in Tables 9 and 10 will serve as the organizational structure through
which the research will be presented. The primary division in Fromm's
schema was between the 'unproductive' character structures and the
'productive' character orientation.
Three axial dimensions distinguishing between the unproductive and
productive character can be gleaned from Fromm's presentation. The first
of these dimensions concerns the nature and source of responsibility:
whether responsibility exists within, to and for oneself; or within and
to sociofreligious authority. The second dimension centers on the nature
of our relation and interaction with others: whether it is founded in
symbiosis (e.g. to loose the self either through submission to or domi-
nance of others), in withdrawal (e.g. to protect the self through either
distance or destruction of others), or in love (e.g. the affirmation of
the truly human self through caring, knowino, and respecting others).
The third dimension turns upon the acceptance and development of Kierkeoaard's
and May's (1967) construct of certitude : the full development of the
human potential (both reason and emotion), and the creation of integrity
through thinking, feeling, and acting as a psychological and ethical,
fully conscious entity.
Alker and Poppen (1973) presented a similar tripartite loci for
representing the nature of an ideolocical choice. Their schema was also
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grounded in Fromm (1942) and more recently in existential theory.
The research findings testing the relationship between personality
traits and moral judgment will be presented within Fromm' triadic
structure.
The problem of responsibility has. according to Fromm, a number
of aspects and a wide range of implications. These asoects include
socialization, authoritarianism, autonomy, and conformity: while the
implications encompass guilt, anxiety, dogmatism and tolerance.
Each of these will be treated separately.
Socialization
In Fromm's theorizing, socialization (superego). authoritarianism,
autonomy, and conformity to social approval were all dimensions defining
the individual's orientation to responsibility. The possession of an
authoritarian character orientation placed one into a chain of dependency
to authority. The mechanism of authoritarian ethics was the formation
of a dependency reaction through the arousal of guilt feelinps. Fromm
explained the relation as such: "Guilt feelings have proved to be the
most effective means of forming and increasing dependency. and herein
lies one of the social functions of authoritarian ethics...At is this
interaction between guilt feelinq and dependency which makes for the
solidity and strength of the authoritarian relationships"(p. 159).
Fromm stayed within the Freudian psychoanalytic tradition to define
superego socialization as the internalization of an external authority, i.e.
the parent and the society. As the basis for responsibility, Fromm
claimed that superepo-socialization conscience was authoritarian based.
The measure of conscience followed as the degree of conformity to
authority. The productive character, however, developed beyond authori-
6S
tartan socialization to an autonomous responsibility for his existence.
A number of studies present findings which bear on these aspects.
A review of children's moral judgment literature by Kohlberg (1964)
concluded that the obtained correlations between supereoo strength
and moral behavior were inconclusive. Kohlberg explained this incon-
sistency by relying on selected findings which indicated that moral
character was based on reason (ego strength) rather than superego strength.
Reason entailed the processes Kohlberg theorized as necessary for moral
behavior: a) foresight - the ability to consider consequences, and b)
generalization - the ability to recognize the effects of one's actions
on others. Kohlberg reported that the control of unsocialized fantasies
was significantly related to reason.
A number of findings nave been based on the Socialization subscale
of the California Psychological Inventory. This scale was specifically
designed to assess the dearee to which a person had internalized the
rules, values, and conventions of his society. Table 15 presents the
findings of four studies which used the CPI Socialization scale and a
measure of moral judgment.
The tabulations show the SEA and MMV to be significantly correlated
with the CPI Socialization scale. The ES, however, was not significantly
related for either of two samples. The two MMV correlations, although
from different reports, Hogan and Dickstein (1972) and Hogan (1973),
appear to be based on the same sample and data. If such was indeed
the case then Hogan did not provide any explanation for the change in the
coefficient.
The socialization dimension has also been explored through the MMPI.
An individual with a chronic lack of superego socialization has been
Tabl• IS








ES .05 1 -.012 .11
7 .078
SEA10 .383 .344
MMV 11'12 .325 .406
1 n= 90, p > .05
2 n = 51, p .05
3 n = 94, p ..01 Form A
4 94, 2 ..t.01 Form B
5 n = 41, _21.05 one-tailed test
6 n = 41, p5.05 one-tailed test
7 _n = 70, p >.05
8 n = 51, _p
9 Hogan (1969)
10 Hogan (1970)
11 E3gan & Dickstein (1972)
12 Hogan (1973)
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labeled as a psychopathic deviate. A major feature of this disorder
is °reputed and flagrant disregard for social customs and mores'
(Hawk and Peterson, 1974). The Psychopathic Deviate (Pd) scale of the
MMPI was designed to measure this trait. Hogan (1969) did not find a
significant relationship between the MMPI Pd scale and the ES for either
of two samples, r=.11, n=7 and r=.07, n=51.
A study by Hawk and Peterson (1974) to test the hypothesis that
the MMPI Pd scale measures deviancy and not psychopathic deviancy yielded
data pertinent to this review. As Table 16 demonstrates, delinquents had
both lower socialization indices (higher Pd mean score) and lower moral
maturity mean scores than either college students or mental health pro-
fessionals. The finding that the mental health professionals had both
significantly higher moral maturity scores and Pd scores than the college
student sample was interpreted by Hawk and Peterson (1974) to indicate
that the Pd and Pd+.4K (K measures ego functioning; Pd+.4K is the index
of psychopathology) indices measured deviancy and not necessarily psycho-
pathic deviancy. These indices measured deviancy but did not and cannot
distinguish the underlying motivations and schemata of this unconven-
tionality.
The findings between socialization and moral judgment are conflicting.
This conflict may be due to the various measures of socialization and
moral judgment used which may not be measuring the same construct.
Further research needs to attempt to clarify these conflicting results.
Fromm's (1947) conceptualization of superego socialization entailed
a strong authoritarian personality orientation. This authoritarian
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A twritarianipi
The California F scale (Adorn°. Frenkel-Brunswik. Levinson 6
Sanford. 1950) was developed to measure authoritarianism as a personality
trait. Kohlberg (1964) reported a significant. re..52, negative
correlation between MJS scores and the California F Scale scores.
The F Scale was also used by Hogan (1969) with his ES scale. He
reported both a significant correlation, r=-.52. p =.01. for a nale
sample and an insignificant finding. r=-.30. n=2S. for a sample of
females. No interpretation was offered for this sexual disparity.
Hogan's (1970) study of the relationship between the SEA and the F Scale
also determined a significant finding, r=.45 for Form A (SEA) and r .35
for Form B (SEA), n=90, p=.01 . These positive correlations were inter-
preted as follows: high scores on the SEA were associated with low to
moderate scores on the F Scale while low SEA scores were related to very
low scores on the F Scale. Low scores on the SEA represented holding
ethics of personal conscience which Hogan stated as forming a part of
Kohlberg's stage 6 moral judgment level.
Another verbal measure of authoritarianism is found on the Belief
Systems Inventory (Kaats, 1969). Using this measure, O'Conner (1971)
found that the actual rank order of MJS global scores based on BSI
Authoritarianism scale scores was 4,3, 1-2, and 5-6. This result did
not match O'Connor's predictions (1 & 2, 5 & 6) nor did it reach the
significance level, p_ = .05, based on an analysis of variance of the
mean scores on the BSI Authoritarianism scale for the moral stages
overall.
The Law and Order Scale (LOS) has been used by Rest, et al (1974)
as another authoritarian scale. Rest et al used this instrument with
their Defining Issues Test to investigate the relationship between
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moral judgment. attitudes, and values. Significant correlations between
authoritarianism (1.01S) and moral judgment (D1T) were found for three
different samples. re-.60, -.48. and -.46. 0.01.
Milgram's (1974) obedience to authority research paradigm can be
used as a behavioral measure of authoritarianism. Kohlberg (1969)
reported that seventy-five percent of stage 6 subjects versus thirteen
percent of stages 1 through 5 subjects discontinued shock administration
in a Milgram-type situation. The compliance to administer shock was the
obedience to authority measure.
A study conducted by Podd (1972) investigated the relationship be-
tween moral judgment, Milgram-type obedience to authority, and Erikson's
ego identity statuses. This research showed that those subjects classified
as preconventional on Kohlberg's MJS did not administer greater shock
intensities than those classified as postconventional. Conventional moral
stage subjects were not included in this comparison. The relationship
between identity status and compliance in the Milgram-task was also inves-
tigated. Twenty-one subjects in a foreclosure ego identity group
(individuals who are committed to goals and values of parents and signif-
icant others) were preconventional and conventional in moral stage while
five were either transitional and/or postconventional. These foreclosure
subjects as a group displayed significantly greater, t=4.12 (18), p_ s.01,
obedience to a low authority experimenter (a student) than to a high
authority one (a professor). This finding was contrary to the experimenter's
hypothesis.
In his explanation of his research results, Milgram (1974) stated that
moral judgment was not adequate to account for the results. The crucial
point in this argument was that the morality of harming an innocent victim
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was constant regardless of the spatial relation of the victim to the
subject. Essentially all subjects espoused the belief that to cause
pain to an innocent victim was immoral. Yet, the stronnest manipulation
of the results (disobeying) was the simple change in spatial proximity
of the victim. The closer the victim then the greater the proportion
of subjects who disobeyed.
Moral judgment was, however, an important component of Milgram's
explanation. Milgram applied both an information theory approach and
a phenomenological approach. The focus of a moral judgment was theorized
to be controlled by the perceived information and social field. Proper
manipulation of the definition of the situation controlled the subject's
level of assignment of responsibility. The subjects who did not disobey
shifted their moral concern from the results of their actions on the victim
to the results of their actions on the experiment. This moral concern
shift was consistent with their perceived definition of the situation.
Milgram's conception of the basis of moral judgment was consistent
with Fromm's. Morality was conceived as the acceptance of responsibility.
In order to feel and accept responsibility for one's actions, the person
must believe that his behavior and his responsibility originated from
within his own motive system" (Milgram, 1974). This paralleled Fromm's
conative axis of morality. The failure to include the person's perception
of the definition of the situation in the assessment of moral judgment
may explain the inconsistent results reported by Kohlberg (1969) and Podd
(1972). Podd found that perception of the confederate's willingness to
participate was important in distinauishing the behavior of identity
achievement versus identity diffusion subjects on the Milgram task.
Fromm claimed that the person with the productive character developed
7?
beyond the authoritarian conscience to an autonomouS conscience. In
certain ways, autonomy can be considered as the opposite end of a con-
tinuum with authoritarianism.
Autonomy 
A definition of autonomy offered by Kurtines (1974) approximated
Fromm's conceptualization. Autonomy consists of making decisions and
judgments independent of immediate social pressure and considerations of
external influences. Kurtines' research imlicated that autonomy was
personalogically complex. Autonomy included self-control, moral
responsibility, achievement orientation, and dominance in interpersonal
style. Dominance in interpersonal style, however, was not an attribute
of Fromm's productive character. The studies to be reviewed, however,
have used a variety of measures of autonomy which may not all equally
measure the same construct.
The Omnibus Personality Inventory (Heist & Yonge, 1968) contained
a scale to measure autonomy. Sullivan and Quarter (1972) found that
postconventional and preconventional subjects scored higher than conven-
tional subjects. Sullivan and Quarter did not report whether the
percentile differences between groups were significant.
O'Connor (1971) rank ordered MJS global scores on the Edwards
Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) autonomy scale. The actual rank
order was stages 5 & 6, 3, 1 & 2, and 4. An analysis of variance
failed to show a significant difference between autonomy scores by
moral stage. Research by others (Haan, Stroud, & Holstein, 1973;
and Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968) indicated that stage 2 subjects in these
studies showed strong indications of autonomy.
Barron's Scale of Independence of Judgment (S1J) was used by Hogan
in his research of the relationship between autonomy and his measures
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of moral reasoning. Hogan and Dickstein's (1972) NM correlated Sig-
nifiCIntly. cy.36. 11=41 p.01, with the S1J. Hogan (1973) 4PParently
presented these findings again for the same sample and data but the
coefficient was stated as .56. n=41. No explanation was provided
for this apparent disparity.
Conformity to Social Approval 
Authoritarian prescriptions and proscriptions novern only a relative-
ly small proportion of the total behavioral options available to a
person and the situations in which he may find himself. Most of our
behavior is voluntary, governed by our own Predilection and our desire
for social approval. Social approval is conferred by reference groups
on their members when these members engage in (conform to) preferred
normative behavior. From recognized conformity to social approval as a
diagonal dimension of autonomy. The interpersonal behavior of the
productive character orientation was based on a deeper level than this
mutual stroking. behavioral mode. The productive character functions
on a truly autonomous level, not merely on an independent-from-
authority level.
Fodor (1971) conceptualized this type of autonomy as resistance to
social influence. He operationalized this construct through attempting
to dissuade subjects from their judgment after the administration of the
MJS. Those subjects who were dissuaded at least once were grouped as
'Yielders', while those who were not dissuaded were labeled "Resisters".
The Resisters' mean MMS, MMS=210, s.d. = 31, was significantly, p=.01,
higher than that of the Yielders, MMS=181, _s.d.=27. Fodor (1972)
replicated and extended these findings to delinquents versus nondelin-
quents. The mean MJS moral maturity score for delinquents, MMS=162,
was significantly, .001. lower than for the nondelinquents. MMS=196
)4
although both score's fall within the stag* I range. lodor dissuaded twenty-
six of forty delinquents at least once (yielders). Resisters had sig.
nificantly. jr.OS. higher MMS scores than the Yielding group. MMS•177.
1A.1.29. and MMS4.153. s.d.a27. respectively.
Saltzstein. Diamond. and Belenky (1972) used an Asch-type condition
to operationalize conformity. Subjects participated in this condition
in either one of two treatments: interdependent and independent. In the
interdependent treatment, subjects functioned as a member of a group
which had to reach a consensus while competing with other groups. The
independent treatment had the subjects competing as individuals against
all other individuals. Subjects were rewarded for 'correct' responses,
i.e., choosing the choice of the confederate in the Asch task.
Overall conformity was significantly related to moral judgment stage
score for both sexes combined, x2.8.41, p.02 . Stage 3 subjects were
most likely to conform while those at stage 4 and 5 were least likely to
conform. The expectation that higher MJS subjects would conform more in
the interdependent treatment was not supported by the data.
The McDonald Conformity Scale (MCS) was developed to discriminate
between yielders and nonyielders in an Asch-type situation. McDonald
(1971) found that conformity scores on the MCS were significantly corre-
lated, r=.45, df=42, p=.01, with stronger endorsement of the ethics of
social responsibility on the SEA. By implication, those possessing an
orientation of ethics of personal conscience are significantly less con-
forming on the MCS.
The Potter Locus of Control Scale (I-E) has been used by Alker and
Poppen (1973) ard Bloomberg (1974) in the study of moral judgment.
Neither study found a significant correlation between I-E scores and
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016IS global scams or DIT scores. Both studies, however, report isolated
significant findings. Alker and PoPoen (1973) reported that although
I-E scores were not significantly correlated with the overall WS scores,
I-E scores showed a significant. r .-.40, p..05, correlation with
principled (stage 6) versus premoral (stage 1 A 2) MJS scores. Principled
subjects were more internal than premoral subjects on the personal 1-E
subscale. There was no significant correlation between principled and
premoral subjects on the political subscale of the I-E.
Bloomberg (1974) used the DIT to measure moral judgment. The only
significant finding. t=2.12 (51). p=.05, was that internals chose a
greater average percentage of items which exemplified stage 6 thinking
than externals: 8.7 versus 5.8 respectively.
The use of the I -E scale by Bloomberg may be based on a theoretical
misinterpretation of the nature of locus of control and thus misapplied.
Bloomberg (19/4) conceptualized conventional external locus of control
as "an orientation that looks to forces outside the self for definitions
of morality " (p. 1077). The assumption that the I-E Scale measured
locus of control of morality is an untested extrapolation from Rotter's
locus of control of reinforcement. The conceptulization of locus of
control by Alker and Poppen (1973) was more in tune with Rotter's. They
posited locus of control as: "Does the individual believe that his own
actions will be casually efficacious in attaining the goals in pursuit
of which a given choice was made?" (p. 669).
A nonmetric representation procedure constructed by the computational
program TORSCA yielded some intriguing interpretations of Alker and
Poppen's data. TORSCA transforms correlation
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coefficients into indices of similarity. Similar variables are then
placed closer together in the resulting multidimensional space YhIS
was in spite of the lack of significant correlations found by thew between
the 1-E and the MJS scores. This technique presented external lotus
of control as being proximal to conventional morality. Internal locus
0 control was grouped with nonconventiond morality (principled [61
and instrumental (2)). Bloomberg's (1974) hypothesis predicted such
a curvilinear relationship. The difference between the instrumentalist
and the principled person was between selfish opportunism and morally
creative choices respectively. Fromm's theory supports such a distinc-
tion and relationship.
Guilt
Kohlberg (1964) reported that delinquents in his sample scored as
premoral on the MJS. Kohlberg reviewed other research which found that
delinquents expressed low self-guilt. This relationship between moral
judgment and guilt was investigated by Ruma and Mosher (1967) in delin-
quent males. Four measures of guilt were assessed: a transgression inter-
view was analyzed 1) by content analysis (CA), 2) by speech disturbance
(SD), 3) by a global clinical rating (GCR), and 4) the "Hostility" and
"Morality-Conscience Guilt" subscales of the Mosher Guilt Scale (MGS) were
administered. The Mosher Guilt Scale purported to measure the subject's
generalized expectancy for self-mediated punishment for violation or
anticipated violation of internalized standards of proper behavior.
Global MJS scores were significantly correlated with three of these
guilt measures: content analysis, r = .47, p =.01, global clinical rating,
r = .43, p =.01, and the Mosher Guilt Scale, r = .55, p_ =.01. In-
creased guilt was associated with a higher global MJS score. The insig-
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nificant correlation of the speech disturbance guilt measure with the
MJS WAS interpreted as due to its inapproortateness as an index of guilt.
These findings must be conservatively interpreted due to the dis-
tribution of MJS stage scores an which the results are based. The
sample consisted of: Stage 1-0, Stage 2-12, Stage 3-11. Stage 4-12.
stage 5-0. and Stage 6-1. RUM and Mosher's findings therefore reflect
the relationship between guilt and moral judgment for stages 2. 3. and
4 only. Post conventional quilt level was not represented in these
findings.
Haan. Smith. and Block (1968) used a Q-sort to study the person-
ality differences between Free Speech Movement participants and non-
participants. These subjects were divided into groups on the basis of
their MJS global stage score. Stage 6 females rated themselves on the
adjective "Guilty" as 4.10 on a seven step Likert scale. This ranking
was significantly, 2 -.01, higher than that expressed by Stage 4 females
(2.45). Males failed to show any significant differences across stages
on this adjective. Haan, Smith, and Block interpreted these findings as
indicating that the development of autonomous morality (Stage 6) might
be more "arduous" for females than males. Another possible interpretation,
and clarification of "arduous," posits that moral autonomy is a less secure
orientation for this%mple of women. The ranking of Stage 6 females
(4.30) as opposed to Stage 4 females (3.16) on the adjective "doubting"
supports such an interpretation, E =.05.
This relationship between doubt and moral stage is encompassed by Fromm
in his postulation that possessing an authoritarian conscience produced a
feelino of well-being and security. This secJrity ensued from the knowledge
of the approval granted by the authority for believing as the authority
does and from conforming to the authority. The quilt which Fromm
stated would be characteristic of authoritarians was guilt within the
system of authority. The security results from being within the authority
system rather than being outside of it.
The relation between guilt and moral judgment as shown through these
findings is inconclusive. Two types of relationships need further re-
search. An attempt to isolate the two levels of guilt (inter- versus
intra-system guilt) previously mentioned needs to be undertaken. Intro-
system guilt is the guilt experienced from failing to live up to one's
actualizing, productive potential. Inter-system guilt. on the other
hand, is the guilt experienced from violating the rules of social authority.
Inter-system guilt is similar to Freud's conception of the superego, while
intra-system guilt is a higher order of ego functioning. The other
problem resides in determining the source of the difference between males
and females on guilt and the nature of this difference.
Anxiety 
Guilt has been defined by From as the feeling which results from the
transgression of authority's (superego) rules. The authoritarian dependency
relationship was said by Fromm to be maintained by the authority's absolu-
tion granted for these transgressions. This guilt results in fear that
this absolution may not be forthcoming and the resultant rejection causes
the feeling of anxiety (Healy, Bronner, and Bowers, 1930). Note that
anxiety has been defined differently within other, non-Freudian theories
(Polster and Polster, 1973).
Fromm's central thesis, however, was that Freudian superego conscience
was only one stage of conscience. The productive character develops beyond
this authoritarian conscience. There will be no transgression anxiety for
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the productive character because there is no authority againSt whom
one can transgress.
But this does not preclude the productive character from experi-
encing anxiety. The anxiety is now of a different order and source.
Although From (1947) did not explicitly formulate this new anxiety.
It is proposed that May's (1967) conceptualization of normal anxiety
is congruent with Fromm's theory of the productive character.
May differentiated two types of anxiety: normal anxiety and neurotic
anxiety. Anxiety was defined as an apprehension caused by a threat to
the values 3 person identifies with his existence as a self. Normal
anxiety was apprehension which was proportionate to the threat and was
engaged constructively. The difference between normal and neurotic anxiety
was not the type, level, or source of apprehension but the response to that
apprehension. The person experiencing neurotic anxiety responds by
various techniques of blocking-off areas of freedom of awareness, experi-
ence, decision, and responsibility. Neurotic anxiety results in repression
and intrapsychic conflict. This denial of threat, anxiety, and response-
ability causes ( and is created by) a loss of the experience of one's
own significance. Neurotic anxiety, therefore, can be seen to result when
a person does not confront a threat or crisis and resolve it for further
expansion of the self.
The research reviewed which has investigated the relationship between
anxiety and moral judgment has not delineated the levels and types of
anxiety proposed by Fromm and May. Only the Sullivan and Quarter (1972)
study researched the anxiety relationship using Kohlberg's MJS. This
anxiety-moral judgment relationship needs further extensive and detailed
research.
pi0
The A scale of the MMPI was used by mow (1960 to measure
anxiety. The ES moral measure was significantly related to the MMP1
A (neurotic anxiety) scale for two samples, r • -.40, E •.01, and r =
-.41, E =.01. Hogan (1969) also found Taylor Manifest Anxiety (TM)
scores significantly correlated with the ES, r = -.49, E =.01, for
a sample of medical school applicants but not for a sample of female
college seniors, r = -.?0, E> .05. These findings were interpreted
as demonstrating that those measured as high in empathy (ES) had
low feelings of anxiety.
Sullivan and Quarter (1972) using the Anxiety scale of the UP!,
found that ten principled absolutists (stage 6) scored at the 56th per-
centile while nine mixed-stage postconventionals (pure stage 5, 5 [6]
and 6 [5] mixed stages), transitionals (mixed stages 5 [3], 3 [5],
5 [4], 4 [5], and 5 [2]), and conventionals (pure stage 3 and 4, and
mixtures ot 3 and 4), all scored at the 52nd percentile on the OPI
Anxiety level scale. Instrumental relativists (pure stage 2 adults)
registered a 47th percentile mean score. No significance levels were
presented.
Dogmatism and Tolerance
A technique for managing anxiety (the apprehension caused by threat
to the values of self) which can occur in today's age at transformation
of values is to seek the security of dogma. May (1967) defined dogmatism
as the crystallization of one's values. The dogmatic person denies the
freedom to become aware and to experience the information which would
not support his crystalline structure.
Fromm (1947) stated that the security provided by dogmatism was a
symbiotic security. The dogmatist aligns himself with an authority greater
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and morepowerful than himself. Ne Subjects Pies own integrity to a
submission to others. In relations with those who do not share the
same dogmatic values, the dogmatist responds with o blocking-out
technique. This becomes expressed as a lack of tolerance.
Hogan (1969) found the CPI Tolerance scale significantly cor-
related with one of his components of moral judgment but not with another.
The CPI correlated with ES scores for two samples, r = .42 and r = .33.
p =.01. but Hogan's (1970) SEA was not significantly correlated with the
CPI Tolerance scale for either Form A or B of the SEA, r = -.07, and
r = -.11, n = 94 . Consistent with the dogmatism-tolerance dichotomy,
Hogan reported in the same study that ES scores were significantly and
negatively correlated. r= -.31, p =.05, n =48, with scores on Rokeach's
Dogmatism scale for a separate sample.
A high score on the SEA represented professing an ethic of social
responsibility as opposed to an ethic of personal conscience. The di-
rection of thP results are consistent with Fromm's discussion of respon-
sibility directed outward rather than towards self. An individual either
feels responsibility toward the rules of social authority or feels respon-
sibility towards the standards of his own productiveness.
O'Connor (1971) used the MJS as his moral judgment index and the
Dogmatism scale of the Belief System Inventory. His rank order prediction
(3 & 4, and 5 & 6) was not supported by the data. His prediction that
those at the moral stages 3 and 4 would be high in dogmatism is both con-
sistert with either the findings reported for authoritarianism or the
theoretical exposition of a conventional moral organization by Kohlberg
(1963, 1968, and 1969).
The OPT Complexity scale was used by Sullivan and Quarter (1972) to
42
measure tolerance for ambiguity and complexity. They measured moral
judgment with the Kohlberg Heinz story. Those subjects at the conven-
tional stage (pure 3 and 4, and mixtures of 3 and 4) ranked in the
53rd percentile. Transitional stage subjects (mixed stages 5(3).
3[5]. 5[4]. 4[5]. and 5[2]) were at the 55th percentile. Post-
conventional subjects (stages 5, 5[6]. and 6[5]), indicated a 59th
percentile rank. Stage 2 instrumental relativists were characterized
with a 60th percentile, while pure stage 6 principled absolutists were
at the 62nd percentile. The direction of these percentiles is consis-
tent with the actual rank order findings reported by O'Connor (4 and 3,
5 and 6). Sullivan and Quarter hypothesized that stage 2 adults (instru-
mental relativists) were more like adults at the postconventional stage
than the preconventional stage. These findings support that hypothesis.
Alker and Poppen (1973) also compared conventional moral stage
subjects against nonconventional moral stage subjects (5 and 6, with 1 and
2) on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale. Again, no significant relationship,
r - .08, p >.0E , was found. Comparing principled subjects (5 and 6)
against premoral stage subjects (1 and 2), they did find a significant
correlation, r = -.35, p =.05 .
The TORSCA dimensional analysis used by Alker and Poppen to help
interpret these findings was not conclusive. The first solution grouped
dogmatism with external locus of control, machiavellianism, and right
political beliefs. An orthogonal solution placed dogmatism closest to
humanism and conventional morality. Alker and Poppen explained this
relationship as indicating that humanism and normativism as well-defined,
packaged ideologies represent ready-made solutions to life's dilemmas.
Continuing within an existential framework, they further concluded that
R3
humanism as an ideology can be used OS well as normstivism as a blocking-
out technique to escape from the burden of making a fret and unique choice.
Chapter V
Certitude
In this section the cognitive aspects of personality (ego strength),
the awareness of feelings, and the capacity to act on these conscious
feelings (will) will be reviewed. These three cognitive components are
integrated in May's (1967) concept of certitude. These three aspects
of certitude will be broken down into ego strength, intelligence, cog-
nitive development, attention, ego stages, and awareness of feelings.
A review of May's expostion of the concept of certitude will clarify
how those components are an integrated whole.
May (1967), adopting Kierkegarde's thought, defined certitude as
the full development of the human potential. This development requires
the creation of integrity through thinking, feeling, and acting as a
fully conscious gestalt. Fromm's productive character is defined simi-
larly. Certitude as here defined is also synonymous with self-actualiza-
tion (Shostrom, 1967).
May (1969) presented a parallel concept which has a more histori-
cally based relation to moral judgment: intentionality. Intentionality
is the totality of a person's orientation to the world. This orienta-
tion is the cognitive and conative structure which gives meaning to
experience, underlies the capacity to have intentions, and is the
meaningful action toward something.
The cognitive dimension of intentionality is what the intellect
grasps about the thing understood. Cognitively, intentionality is a
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process of forming meaning, a process of understanding the outSide world.
Creating meaning is defined as consciousness. May continued, "The act
and experience of consciousress itself is a continuous molding and remold-
ing of our world, self related to objects and objects to self in insep-
arable ways, self participating in the world ds well as observing it..."
(p. 225).
Constructing meaning is not, however, a strictly cognitive process.
Meanings are also constitutimiof connotive dimensions. Meanings become
associated with physiological-emotional feelings. This association, how-
ever, can be directional. When the perception of inner bodily sensations
(emotion) immediately preceeds the creation of meaning, the creation of
the meaning is influenced by the emotional perception underlying this
meaning process. Our experience of consciousness is an experience of both
cognitive and emotional dimensions.
Intentionality is further a motivation to action. It is an assertive
response towards the structure of one's world. This assertive response
is in the manner of taking care of something, to tend our consciousness.
"Cognition, or knowing, and conation, or willing, then go together. We
could not have one without the other. This is why commitment is so impor-
tant. If I do not will something, I could never know it; and if I do
not know something, I would never have any content for my willing "
(May, 1969: 228).
Intentions are specific motivations towards specific parts of the
world which are generated and directed from one's orientation to the world,
one's intentionality. An intention is a directing of one's attention towards
something with some purpose in mind. The conceptualizations of intention
used by Piaget and intentionality by Breznitz and Kugelmass (1967), Kugel-
mass and Breznitz (1968), Kugelmass, Breznitz, and Breznitz (1965), and
4$
Gutkin (1973) reflect this meaning of intention and not Hay's construct
of intentionality.
Ego Strength 
Kohlberg (1958). Fromm. and May all used Freud's construct of ego
strength to discuss the cognitive aspects of personality and moral
judgment. This usage results from the cognitive basis of realitrprinciple
functioning.
Kohlberg (1958 & 1963) stated that ego strength represents a set of
interrelated ego abilities. These abilities included 1) the intelligent
prediction of consequences, 2) the ability to differentiate and relate
means and ends, 3) the ability to weigh probabilities, 4) the ability to
abstract general rules. 5) the ability to maintain stable, focused
attention, 6) the ability to choose greater remote reward over lesser
immediate reward (delayed gratification), and 7) impulse control. Research
which focuses both on the individual components of ego functioning and on moral
development exists only for intelligence and attention.
Intelligence
Numerous researchers (Kohlberg, 1958, 1964; Keasey, 1971; Tracy &
Cross, 1973; Hoffman, 1970) have reported significant positive correla-
tions between I.Q. test scores and MJS scores. These correlations have
been, however, low to moderate. O'Connor (1971), Selman (1971), Haan,
Stroud & Holstein (1973, failed to replicate these relationships.
Hogan (1969) reported that ES scores were significantly, r = .32,
correlated with the SAT Verbal scores but not with the SAT Quantitative,
the MCAT Verbal, or the MCAT Quantitative scores. Hogan's (1970) SEA
was not significantly related to three measures of I.Q.
Fromm (1947) drew a distinction between intelligence and reason.
Intelligence is a process of analysis. Reason is a aleeper process of
synthesis. Fromm claimed that intelligence is applicable to manipulation
but that only reasoe was sufficient for the productive thinking of the
productive character.
Keasey (1975) has also challenged the validity of intelligence as
either a component or correlative of moral judgment. Keasey presented
data to support the argument that I.Q. tests do not measure qualitative,
structural cognitive development. Different amountiof intelligence.
therefore, could not produce qualitatively different modes of moral
reasoning. At most, intelligence may be related to the rate of moral
development but not to the development per se.
Although Kohlberg (1958, 1964) has reported I.Q. - MJS correlations,
he (1958, 1963, & 1969) has theoretically emphasized the role of cog-
nitive development and not intelligence in the development of moral
judgment.
Cognitive  Development 
Keasey (1975) reported empirical evidence to directly support his
previous contention. Keasey cited an urpublished study by Kuhn et al
which strongly suggested that formal cognitive operations are pre-
requisite for principled moral reasoning. Tomlinson-Keasey & Keasey
(1974) found that all principled (stages 5 & 6) moral judgment subjects
possessed "some" capacity for formal operational thought. All subjects
evidencing formal operational thought, however, did not exhibit prin-
cipled moral judgment. They concluded that cognitive development was
1) necessary for moral development, 2) not sufficient for moral develop-
ment,and 3) chronologically precedent to moral development. A similar
relationship was found between concrete operational thought
and stage 2 moral judgment (toasty. 1973). Hoffman (19751 presented
a theory of altruistic motivation (moral empathy) which explicated the
necessity of concrete nperational thought for moral empathy. If
young children have a natural tendency towards altruistic empathy
which progresses through a stage based on concrete operational thought,
then this altruistic behavior would seem to be incongruous with Stage
2 moral judgment.
Sullivan and Quarter (1972) investigated relationships between
MJS scores and Omnibus Personality Inventory (OPI) scores. The
'Thinking Introversion" scale of the OPI measures a subject's tendency
for reflective thought and abstractions. Conventional (Stage 3 & 4 and
mixtures thereof) moral subjects ranked in the fifty-first percentile.
Postconventional (Stage 5, 5[6], and 6[5]) subjects scored at the fifty-
sixth percentile,while principled absolutists (Stage 6) scored at the
fifty-eighth percentile. Stage 2 instrumental relativists ranked in the
fifty-sixth percentile. The significance level of these percentile
differences, if any, was not reported.
Fromm (1947) stated that product-ke character thinking was charac-
terized by objectivity, logical analysis, and the development of a
deeper structural view. Haan, Stroud, and Holstein (1973) used psychi-
atric interviews to assess the ego processes of coping, defense, and
fragmentation. This assessment included ratings on a number of cognitive
operations. They obtained significant, p= .05, positive relationships
between MJS scores and the ego coping processes of 1) objectivity, 2)




Hay (1969) emphasized the essential importance of attention for
perception and conceptualization. Consciousness and cognitive activity
consist of a figure-ground constellation. This constellation is cog-
nitively explorable and understandable only through attention. Grim.
Kohlberg, and White (1968) postulated that the positive definition of
ego control was not impulse control but attention. They stated that
cognitive performance was dependent on decentered acts of attention.
In a review of child development, Kohlberg (1964) reported that the
maintenance of stable, focused attention had been repeatedly found to
be significantly correlated with various measures of moral character.
The MJS was not one of these measures.
Grim, Kohlberg. and White (1968) intensively investigated the re-
lationship between attentional processes and moral character. They
specifically compared twelve measures of attention and five measures
of morality (not moral reasoning) with three age groups. The attention
measures consisted of four reaction time (RT) variables and eight
galvanic skin response (GSR) variables. The five morality measures were
based on two teacher-rated questionnaires (on untrustworthiness and
disobedience) and three experimental cheating conditions. These measures
were taken on a sample of first-grade pupils, sixth-grade pupils, and
college adults (mean age 31). Not all measures were gathered for each
group.
For the measure used with the first grade pupils, eight of a
possible twenty-seven correlations were significant. Ten of a possible
thirty-six attention-morality correlations were significant, p= .05,
in the predicted direction for the sixth-grade pupils (Table 17). Four
of these correlations were significant for both age samples, while
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Table 17
Major Correlations Between Attention and Morality Measures at Two Ages
Measure 6th grade 1st grade
.38 (.30) .59**(.59**)
Carrelations replicated at both ages
High untrustworthiness (disobedience)*
and high RT variability (S0)
High untrustworthiness (disobedience)*
and increase of RT (4-1) .50**(.37) .41**(.43")
High untrustworthiness (disobedience)*
and increase of nonspecifics (4-1) .25 (.37) .49**(.52")
High untrustworthiness (disobedience)*
and high movement artifacts .43**(.40) .41**(.27)
High cheating, all tests,
b 
and high
RT variability (SD) .61**(.61") (.16)
High cheating, all tests,
b and RT
increases (4-1) .36 (.33) (.44")
High cheating, all tests,
b 
and in-
crease of nonspecifics (4-1) .43**(.44") (.34)
Correlations found only at older age
High untrustworthiness (disobedience)
and long RT (X)
a
.74**(.53") .15 (.01)
High cheating, all tests,b and
high nonspecifics (X-) .42**(.36) (.12)
continued
High (heating. all tests.b and high
movement artifacts GSR
Correlations found only at younger age
High cheating, all tests,b and
high basal GSR
  6th ,grada1s_t rade
.47**(.46) (- 38)
-.13(-.12) (.484,*)
(a) Correlations of disobedience ratings and the given variable
are presented in parentheses.
(b) Correlations in parentheses indicate sums based on only the
circles and Lie Test used at both ages.
From: Grim, Kohlberg, & White (1968) Table 2.
**p<.05.
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three were specific to the sixth-grade sample and one to the first-
grade sample.
An unrotated factor analysis of the full correlation matrix
produced a primary factor which Grim. Kohlber 9. and White (1968) labeled
as "general behavior control." The major variables which defined the
factor were the two moral behavior ratings (untrustworthiness and dis-
obedience) and three measures of attentional instability (RT variability.
RT increase, and increase in nonspecifics (1st - 4th). Lack of general
behavioral control sianificantly, clustered with attentional
instability for both the first-grade and sixth-grade samples. Five other
variables were significantly clustered on this primary factor for the
sixth-grade sample only: I) cheating, circles test; 2) cheating, lie test;
3) cheating, block test; 4) RT mean; and 5) GSR movement artifacts. This
sample-specific finding was explained as due to the lower reliability
of the cheating tests for the first-grade sample.
A subsequent varimax rotated factor analysis defined three factors.
The first rotated factor was characterized as "task conformity." It
loaded on both psychomotor measures of steadiness (RT increase, RT mean,
and movement; the last two for the sixth-grade sample only) and on the
teacher's ratings of stable conformity to authoritative social expectations.
The second rotated factor isolated the experimental cheating measures
of morality. This factor was designated as one of "inner stability." It
was interpreted as follows: "It might be suggested that the morality com-
ponent of the second factor represents a more internalized disposition than
the performance dispositions picked up by the first factor. Where the
first factor seems related to the capacity of the child to exert restraint,
the second factor seems more voluntaristic. The child who resists an
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opportunity to augment a test score by cheating must have both a will-
ingness and capacite(p. 246). Note the similarity of this inter-
pretation of experimental findings to the theoretical interpretation of
intentionality by May (1967. p. 228) described earlier.
A third rotated factor was interpreted as being an artifact of
the measures and statistical treatment. It was, however, labeled as
"restlessness" and construed as analogous to impulsiveness.
Grim, Kohlberg, and White (1968) analyzed their findings to de-
termine the extent to which the differences were due to developmental
influences as opposed to "personality" factors. Analysis of the
correlation matrix revealed four sets of variables: I) developmental,
2) asymptotic developmental, 3) terminating developmental. and 4)
nondevelopmental variables.
Developmental variables were those which increased continuously
until adulthood. The two psychomotor variables (RT variability and RT
increase) were continuous developmental variables. These variables
were stated to represent second-order measures of stability or consis-
tency of performance. They concluded that this indicated a slowly develop-
ing factor of stability of attention.
Asymptotic developmental variables were those which increased until
approximately sixth-grade and then insignificantly thereafter. These
variables were grouped in discussion with the terminating developmental
variables which increased to sixth-grade and then terminated. The three
psychomotor variables of mean RT, mean nonspecific, and movement, and
the one psychophysiological variable (mean nonspecifics),which were
associated with moral behavior measures at grade 6 but not at grade 1, were
either asymptotic or terminating developmental variables. These variables
awe interpreted as being primarily indicators of pure psychomotor in-
ability rather than instability of attention. First graders would not
have the neuromuscular coordination necessary to hold their fingers still.
Sixth-graders would have developed this psychomotor stability ability.
Variations between individuals at the sixth-grade level, therefore,
represent instability of attention. Grim. Kohlberg. and White (1968)
concluded that "the asymptotic variables relating to morality at Grade
6 did so because they then began to be determined by the stability com-
ponents" (p. 248) (the developmental variables).
The general conclusions of Grim. Kohlberg. and White were primarily
focused on the interpretation that attention variables showed more clear
and regular age-developmental trends than do their moral variables. This
was viewed as indicating that honesty (one of their moral variables) was
not dependent upon character factors such as quilt or anticipation of
punishment. Since they did not investigate this alternative explanation,
their findings may represent spurious relationships.
They hypothesized that stable attention promoted honesty by enabling
a higher threshold to distracting thouants of the opportunity to cheat.
They viewed the temptation to cheat as an interesting and distracting
stimulus rather than as an arousal of an impulse. Resistance to temptation,
therefore, was considered an ego process of "ideational-volitional attention"
rather than emotional impulse control or inhibition. "Cognitive maturity of
verbal moral values or judgment interacts with the attentional-volitional
capacities discussed to determine cheating conduct" (p. 251).
Grim, Kohlberg, and White's construct of ideational-volitional atten-
tion has the conceptual constituents of May's (1969) concept of intention-
ality. This interpretation is further substantiated by the fact that both
9i
authors Quote the same passages of James (1963) on volition (will) and
attention (May. 1969. p. 218; Grim, Knhlberg. and White. 1968. p. 251).
konlberg (1969) reported that attention was nonlinearly and sig-
nificantly correlated with moral judgments. This result was not further
elaborated as to samples tested and measures of moral reasoning.
Haan. Stroud. and Holstein (1973) gathered data on "hippies"
with thirty different ego process measures. One of these ego measures
was the coping process of concentration (an attention-focusing operation).
Their sample of "hippiess"moral judgment global stage scores were divided
into three comparison levels: stage 2, stage 3, and stages 3(4) and above.
Concentration was more significantly, p .01. related to MdS scores
than the other ten ego coping processes. The level of concentration
increased as moral judgment increased.
Up Stages 
The ego stage development theories of Erikson (1963) and Loevinger
(1966 & 1976) have been used in research on moral judgment by Sullivan.
McCullough, and Stager (1970); Podd (1972); and Haan, Stroud. and
Holstein (1973).
Loevinger's (1966) model postulates seven stages of ego develop-
ment: 1) symbiotic, 2) impulse ridden, 3) opportunistic, 4) conformist,
5) conscientious, 6) autonomous, and 7) integrated. Sullivan, McCullough,
and Stager (1970) applied Loevinger's theory and Ego Development Test
(EDT) in their moral development research. They hypothesized that
Kohlberg's and Loevinger's stage formulations encompassed "overlapping
content areas of personality." Moral judgment (MJS scores) significantly
correlated with ego development (CLQ scores): r = .66, n = 120,T= .01.
This relationship decreased to r = .40, n = 120, a= .01, when age was
partialed out. The relationship between moral development and ego
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development increased between age samples. MIS scores correlated
La .19 with CO scores for 1? year olds, r • .48. a • 40. j- .01.
for 14 year old subjectse and to .S4. Au 40, ;L.- .01. for the 17 year
old sample. These moderate correlations supported their conclusion
that those scoring high on either measure did not score at a similarity
high stage with an extremely high frequency.
Haan. Stroud. and Holstein (1973) administered the MJS and CLQ
to an older sample of "hippies" between the ages of 16 to 35 (modal age
= 20). Table 18 presents the distribution of these subjects by ego and
moral stages. A chi-square test of this distribution failed to show
any significan!,p_ =.05, differences in either ego stages or moral stages
cross-classified. They concluded that the moral and ego stages do not
represent identical or parallel sequential phenomena in this sample "
(p. 600). Their conclusion is based on the assumption that adults who
scored as stage 2 are reasoning at the preconventional level of adult moral
judgment.
This conclusion should be reviewed taking into consideration the position
of Turiel (1973) on adult stage 2 scorers. Turiel argued that some indi-
viduals in late adolescence experience a conflict between society's con-
ventions and the inequalities and hypocrisies within society. Moral confu-
sion and relativity follow this conflict because these individuals fail to
distinguish between conventional and moral reasoning. Turiel (1975)
defined conventions as norms regulating sexual mores, dress codes, respect
modes, sex and age roles, and national and religious rituals and customs.
Society also incorporates within its normative system most of the moral
domain: honesty, the value of life, responsibility, and individual rights.






































































































































































































































































































System causes confusion and a lack of committment to the moral aspects
within that system (Sullivan and Quarter. 1972)
This stage of moral reasoning, rather than being a "regression"
as theorized by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969). may be a state of transition:
a groping for cohesive moral principles and a reorganization of the
moral ideology which excludes social conventions. Sullivan and Quarter
(1972) argued that adults or late adolescents classified as stage 2's were
structurally a hybrid postconventional stage. These hybrid postconvention-
al subjects. Omnibus Personality Inventory profiles were more like thoTof
postconventional subjects than conventional subjects. Haan, Stroud, and
Holstein (1973) conducted an analysis of their ego functioning data to
test Turiel's (1973) hypothesis against Kohlberg and Kramer's (1969)
theory. Their analysis supported Turiel's position that these instrumental
relativists are in transition from stage 4 to stage 5 moral thought.
Having performed this analysis, however, Haan, Stroud, and Holstein did
not then reanalyze their ego stage (CLQ) data. Such a reanalysis may
have modified their ego stage conclusion above.
Such a reanalysis by the present author shows that of the thirty
"hippies" classified as instrumental relativists, 3 are typed as either
impulsive, opportunistic, or conformist in ego stage, while 19 are in
a state of transition from the conformist ego stage to the conscientious
stage, and 8 subjects are either conscientious autonomous, or integrated
in ego stage. If Haan, Stroud, and Holstein's (1973) data in Table 18is
reorganized to place these instrumental relativists as transitional between
stage 4 and stage 5, a relatively clear parallel sequential pattern emerges
(Table 19). A chi-square reanalysis, however, failed to find significant,
x2 = 3.1 (4), at .05, concordance between ego and moral stages.
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Table 19





transitional 4-5 5,6,7 Total N's
Conventional 2 7 16
Transitional
(instrumental relativists) 3 19 8 30
Postconventional 2 4 6 12
Total N's 7 30 21 58
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Podd (1972) investigated the relationship between Erikson's (1963)
-go growth stages and Kohlberg's moral judilpeet stages. He pursued
this relationship through focusing on Marcia'S (1966) identity statuses.
Erikson's eight stages of ego growth were operationalized by Marcia
(1966) into four ego identity statuses. These four stages focus on the
process of adolescent identity crisis resolution. Identity crisis
resolution is accomplished through a process of committment in such areas
as occupational choice, religious beliefs, and political ideology. The
identity statuses are: 1) identity diffusion - the individual has no commit-
ment regardless of crises; 2) foreclosure - the individual has experienced
no crisis but is committed to goals and values of parents and significant
others; 3) moratorium - the individual is in crisis with vague commitments;
and 4) identity achievement - the individual has gone through a crisis and
is committed. Podd postulated that moral ideology was a part of the ego
identity construct.
Identity achievement status subjects had significantly higher MJS
mean ratings than subjects in all other statuses combined, t = 2.25
(107),a =.05 . A Newman-Keuls multiple-comparisons test indicated that
identity achievement subjects received significantly, a= .01, higher
mean MJS scores that either foreclosure or identity diffusion subjects
but not moratorium identity status subjects. The moratorium status sample,
however, made significantly, p =.01, higher mean MJS scores than those
in the foreclosure and identity diffusion statuses. For this sample of
male college students, those in the identity statuses reflecting a
higher degree of ego identity received significantly higher mean moral
judgment ratings than those in the statuses designated as reflecting a
lower degree of ego identity (identity achievement -moratorium- foreclosure
identity diffusion), t = 4.29(107), p - .01.
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An analysis of the distribution of 11US stage scores within the
respective identity statuses resulted in a complex pattern of relation-
ships. The identity diffusion status sample had more subjects at the
preconventional and less at the postconventional level of moral thought
than expected by chance, x2 • 5.82 (1). p • .02 and x
2 
a 8.08 (1). R • .005.
There were also a greater number of identity diffusion subjects who had
transitional MJS scores between conventional to postconventional moral
reasoning than expected on the basis of chance, = 8.60, (1), R =.005.
Podd hypothesized that foreclosure subjects would show significantly
greater tendency to use conventional moral reasoning. This hypothesis was
not statistically supported, although foreclosure was the only identity
status in which there were more conventional than either preconventional
or postconventional subjects. There were, however, significantly fewer
foreclosure subjects classified into the postconventional moral judgment
stage than expected by chance, x 2 = 4.32, (1), a =.05. The moritorium
subjects were distributed across the moral stages within chance expect-
ancies.
More identity achievement subjects were classified at the postcon-
ventional moral level than predicted by chance, = 16.27, (1),
p_ = .0005 There were fewer preconventional, = 4.14, (1), R =.05,
and transitional, ;e=9.01, (1), = .005, stage subjects distributed
within the identity status group than expected by chance.
Podd futher analyzed the variability of subjects' issue scores on
the MJS. These analyses revealed two significant relationships. Sig-
nificantly fewer subjects in the identity achievement status were variable
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a • 7.00 (1). • .01, and significantly mare in the marator1um status
were variable, 312 • 4.63 (1). • .05, than predicted by chance.
Awareness of  feelings,
Ego strength is only one aspect of certitude. Feeling sensitivity
and acting on these cognitive and feeling dimensions are the completing
dimensions.
Shostrom's (1967) borrowed concept of congruence aptly encompassed
these last aspects of certitude. Congruence is the ability to feel our
emotions physiologically, to experience them consciously, and to communicatt-
(act upon) them accurately. Kohlberg (1964) reported that stage 2 delin-
quents showed a lack of such affectional reactions (undefined).
Hoffman's (1970) investigation of conscience in 7th graders tested
hypotheses about feeling sensitivity and expression. Hoffman used two
Kohlberg dilemmas and two other dilemmas which were scored with modified
Kohlberg procedures to assess moral stage. Five measures of guilt were
administered: maximum guilt, terminal guilt, ego-alien guilt, impulse
tolerance, and repression. The last two were interpreted as measures
of feeling censitivity.
The measure of tolerance of anti-moral impulses did show a signifi-
cant difference, p_ = .001, in awareness of feelings between postconventional
(Hoffman's humanistic subjects) and conventional moral stage male subjects.
Responses to a story in which the "hero" desires to win a race and cheats
to accomplish this goal were scored for both an initial expression of
pleasure at winning and a subsequent response of quilt for having cheated.
Postconventional male subjects expressed both the pleasure and the guilt
feelings. Conventional male subjects expressed greater quilt but did not
express any positive feeling from having won the race. This was interpreted
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as indicating that young adolescent, conventional-moral-stag* Subjects
had such a low tolerance of anti-moral impulses that they could not even
experience the pleasure resultant from performing these impulses.
Postconventional subjects have appropriate impulse tolerance to both
experience positive and negative affects.
Conventional moral stage subjects had higher scores than post-
conventional subjects on four repression indexes, but the differences
were not significant.
Gutkin (1973) attacked Hoffman's (1970) interpretation of the
tolerance of anti-moral impulses on the distinction between impulse
and intention. Gutkin defines "impulse" as a thought or desire with no
instrumental behavior necessarily attached to it. This definition, however,
does not sufficiently discriminate it from his definition of intention.
Intention entails anticipated goal-oriented consequences. Halleck (1895)
provided a defining component which corresponds more closely to May's
(1969) definition of intentionality. An impulse, Hallack (1895) stated,
entailed no deliberation of the consequences of the potential action on
others,either goal-oriented or not. An anti-moral impulse then would be
any thought that violated an internalized norm. Postconventional subjects
(Hoffman, 1970) expressed more awareness of depriving another of the
deserved prize of winning the race (intention) than did the conventional
subjects who focused on their anti-moral impulses. Hoffman's results,
therefore, are not inconsistent with the findings between moral stage
and intentionality.
The ego functioning processes scaled by Haan, Stroud, and Holstein
(1973) included measures of affective operations. These nine operations
consisted of three each of ego coping, defensive, and fragmentation modes.
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No significant differences were found for moral stages between either
substitution, reaction formation, and unstable alternation ar suppression,
repression, and depersonalization. Conveitional moral stage (stage 3?)
subjects, however, had significantly. p =As. higher effective preoc-
cupation scores than either instrumental relativists (stage 2-S) or
postconventionals. Affective pleoccupation was trichotomized with
sublimation and displacement. Haan. Stroud. and Holstein did not inter-
pret this finding, although affective preoccupation was presented as an
ego fragmentation operation. Affective preoccupation's context within
the above trichotomy suggests that it can be interpreted as impulse dom-
ination. This would be consistent with Hoffman's (1970) findings.
Chapter VI
THE NATURE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHERS_ _ _ on,am.“41. •••••••••
The third dimension which Fromm (1947) proposed distinguishing
between the unproductive character and the productive character orien-
tation was the nature of our relation and interaction with others. One
can relate and interact in three ways: in symbiosis (e.g. to lose the
self either in submission to or dominance of others); in withdrawal
(e.g. to protect the self through either distance or destruction of
others); or in love (e.g. the affirmation of the truly human self through
caring, knowing, and respecting others' truly human selves).
Fromm's unproductive character lives in either a symbiotic or a
withdrawal relationship with others. The productive character nourishes
a love relationship with others which is not romantic love (Fromm, 1947
and 1956). Productive love is an active power to give active concern for
the life growth and integrity of that which we love under the condition
of preserving one's own integrity. The person whose character has not
developed beyond the stage of the receptive, exploitative, marketing or
hoarding orientation cannot experience love in this way (Fromm, 1956).
Since the unproductive character was conceived as possessing an authoritarian
conscience, the relationship with authority would be central.
Fromm recognized that the symbiotic relationship with the authority
could be expressed through two types of manipulativeness (Machiavellianism).
If one blocked his freedom and responsibilities through submission to others,
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then he would manipulate others either through servility and parasitical-
mess (Receptive Orientation) or through possessiveness (Hoarding Orien-
tation). If on the other side, one blocked his freedom through dominance
of others, then his manipulativeness would be expressed through either
overt exploitation (Exploitative Orientation) or covert opportunism
(Marketing Orientation). May (1967) similarly stated that Western man
has historically blocked awareness of his own perception and conscious-
ness, and freedom and responsibility through controlling and manipulating
the environment. The environment included nature, others, and self.
Shostrom (1967) conceptualized human existence as residing within
the dichotomy of manipulation versus actualization. This closely parallels
Fromm's unproductive and productive life orientations. The manipulator is
contrasted with the actualizer on four fundamental characteristics (see
Table 90). Shostrom presented four nanipulative systems which strongly
parallel Fromm's four unproductive character types:





The passive manipulator attempts to control others through feigning
helplessness and dependency. The active manipulator, however, exercises
control through creating obligations, threatening harm, and exercising rank.
Indifferent manipulation involves using withdrawal of contact (not
hearing, forgetting, not understanding) and being indifferent (claiming
not to care). The actual games used by an indifferent manipulator belie his
caring and possessiveness. The competitive manipulator continuously calculates
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Tablt 20
Fundamental Characteristics of Manipulators and Actualizors Contrasted*
Manipulators Actualizors
1. Deception (Phoniness. 1. Honesty (Transparency. Genuine-
Knavery). The mani- ness. Authenticity). The actual-
pulator uses tricks, izor is able honestly to be his
techniques, and maneu- feelings, whatever they may be.
vers. He puts on an act. He is characterized by candidness,
plays roles to create an expression, and genuinely being
impression. His expressed himself.
feelings are deliberately
chosen to fit the occasion.
2. Unawareness (Deadness, Boredom). 2. Awareness (Responsiveness, Alive-
The manipulator is unaware of the ness, Interest). The actualizor
really important concerns of liv- fully looks and listens to him-
ing. He has "Tunnel Vision." He self and others. He is fully
sees only what he wishes to aware of nature, art, music, and
see and hears only what he the other real dimensions of
wishes to hear. living.
3. Control (Closed, Deliberate). 3. Freedom (Spontaneity, Openness).
The manipulator plays life like The actualizor is spontaneous.
a game of chess. He appears re- He has the freedom to be and
laxed, yet is very controlled express his potentials. He is
and controlling, concealing his master of his life, a subject




4. Cynicism (Distrust). 4. Trust (Faith. Belief).
The manipulator is basically The actualizor has a deep trust
distrusting of himself and in himself and others to relate
others. Down deep he doesn't to and cope with life in the
trust human nature. He sees here and now.
relationships with humans as
having two alternatives: to
control or be controlled.
*Drawn from Table 1, p. 23-24, Shostrom, 1967.
lt,
and tries to outwit others either through active strategies or passive
ones.
Shostrom (1967 and 1972) stem to have focused on Fromm's third
dimension of moral character structure in his theortzing. Although
Shostrom does not explicitly cite Fromm (1947) for his theorizing, he
does acknowledge that Fromm (1957) was the inspiration for his thought
development in Man, the  Manipulator (1967).
Our relations with others is a broad construct consisting of four
broad dimensions: manipulativeness, aggression, social desirability, and
empathy. Each dimension has been divided and measured in numerous ways.
In particular, empathy has been widely discussed, divided, and tested.
Empathy is reviewed here by separating it into egocentrism and role-taking
empathy. These four dimensions Llosely parallel the underlying dimensions
of types of manipulators and unproductive character types.
Manipulativeness 
Kohlberg (1968) generalized the egocentric, self-enhancement nature
of the stage 2 moral orientation. This relationship was supported by
Fontana and Noel (1973), who found a significant correlation, r = .24,
= .05, between MJS and Mach V scores for stage 2 moral subjects. They
did not explain how they performed correlations between single stages of
moral reasoning and Mach V scores. Significant correlations were not
found for stages 3, 4, 5 and 6, r = .04, -.04, -.13, and -.10 respectively,
n = 93. The Machiavellian scale measures the orientation in interpersonal
relations which uses a manipulative, exploitative approach. These find-
ings must be cautiously evaluated until Fontana and Noel's correlation
analyses are explained.
Studying a similar population and relationship, Alker and Poppen (1973)
presented their results In both the total Mach V score. the Machiavellian
Tactics subscale score, and the Machiavellian Views subscale score. %one
of these scores were significantly correlated with NUS scores. r • -.04.
-.09. and .04 respectively, n • 192. These scores were not significantly
correlated or a comparison of conventional ( 3 • 4) and nonconventional
(1. 2, 5 & 6) moral stage subjects r = .07, .01. and .12 respectively.
n a 192. A comparison of premoral (1 & 2) versus principled (5 & 6) moral
stage subjects, however, did yield a significant correlation for the
Machiavellian Tactics subscale scores, r = -.35, p = .05. The overall
Mach V score and the Machiavellian Views subscale were not significantly
correlated to this premoral/principled comparison, r -.23 and .01
respectively.
The initial TORSCA dimensional solution added some interpretation to
these findings. The Machiavellian scores clustered with dogmatism, external
locus of control, and right political views. This solution was not consis-
tent with previous findingsreported by Alker and Poppen which indicated that
the Machiavellian person flourished in situations where others were
constrained by rigid compliance to norms since the Machiavellian was not
constrained by such norms and profited most in contexts which were ambiguous.
An orthogonal analysis of the same data resulted in a potentially salient
relationship. Machiavellianism clustered most closely with principled •
morality in this analysis. Alker and Poppen interpreted this finding in
terms of freedom of choice. Both the Machiavellian and the principled
moralist make choices free from the constraints of conventional morality.
Both orientations also accepted full resonsibility for their choices.
The difference between the two orientations rests on the nature of the
choices, either morally creative (principled morality) or selfishly
opportunistic (Machiavellianits).
The productive character was morally creative in Fromm's theory.
Morality itself was defined as the productive use of one's powers to
reason, to love, to imagine and create. The self-actualizor is morally
"constructive" in his relations with others, himself, and his environment.
The more productively and thus actualizingly one lives, the more developed
becomes one's conscience.
Aggression 
Aggression and self-destructiveness were, to Fromm, the counter forces
of productiveness. Using the same phraseology as later used by May (1967),
Fromm attributed aggression to the "blockage" of man's spontaneous experience
of his sensory, perceptual, emotional, physical, and cognitive capacities.
Aggression and self-destructiveness in whatever covert, insideous ways were
the direct outgrowth of the unproductive character. Shostrom (1967) defined
manipulation as a system of dealing with people and oneself which is self-
defeating in certain ways. Fromm observed that aggression against oneself
and others is conjunctive; Shostrom's thought on manipulation is concordant
with this view.
Anchor and Cross (1974) in investigating moral judgment examined a
construct with this conjunctive relationship: maladaptive aggression.
Maladaptive aggression was defined as behavior towards another which had
three characteristics: 1. the aggressive initiator received no instrumental
gain, 2. from his penalizing of the victim, and 3. the aggressive initi-
ator was himself penalized for behaving aggressively. Anchor and Cross
operationalized maladaptive aggression through a modified Prisoner's
Dilemma game. Subjects were given the opportunity on every tenth trial
to take away ten dollars from the opponents' account. This ten dollars
II?
went to the "bank" and not to the subject who exercised this option.
The "aggressive" subject was in turn deprived of two dollars which Was
Placed in the "bank." The subjects were not directly competing with
each other; both subjects were allowed to keep their earnings.
Subjects with lower MJS global scores aggressed their partners
significantly more than those higher in moral judgment, F 8 18.36.
(2/111). p .001. preconventional subjects penalized more than
conventionals,t = 2.58 (81), p .025, and postconventionals, t = 5.29
(47), p = .005, and conventional MJS subjects aggressed significantly
more than postconventionals, t - 4.80 (94). p = .005. Anchor and Cross
concluded, however, that moral judgment in itself was insufficient to
explain maladaptive aggression.
Social Desirability
Fromm (1947) detailed a high need for social approval as a charac-
teristic of the unproductive receptive character. He explained that this
need was an outgrowth of the unproductive character's insecurity in his
own ability to provide self-support. Shostrom (1967) used very similar
phraseology. The manipulator controls others because he needs their
support because he does not trust himself for self-support. Yet, he
does not trust others and therefore manipulates to insure their support.
Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) found significant differences be-
tween the Q-sorts of subjects at various moral stages on the MJS. The
descriptive adjective phrase "needs approval" was significantly, p = .05,
different across moral stages for males' ideal-self sorting. The order
from lowest to highest need for approval was stage 6, 2, 5, 3, 4. The
ideal to be "self-confident" showed a similar pattern for males: stages
5, 2, 6, 3, 4. Females did not show these significant patterns.
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Hogan (1969) reported that IS scores correlated significantly
with scores on the Edward's scale for Social Desirability for two
samples. r • .50. p • .01. p • 70; and r • .37. p .01. n - 51 respec-
tively. The sample of females showed the lower correlation. The ES
was also, however, significantly correlated with the 'Self-acceptance'
scale of the CPI for the same two groups. These results are not
consistent with Shostrom and Fromm's theories.
These results, however, are inconclusive. The ES scale, as
earlier criticized, seems to measure role-taking ability and sociability
rather than empathy. High ES subjects would be expected to show high
self-confidence. This sociability and confidence may, however, reflect
confidence in one's ability to control others' providing of support.
It may show successful manipulation, although the need for social
approval would still be present.
Results from another of Hogan's (1970) studies supports this latter
interpretation. Only the SEA Form B showed a significant, r = .22,
p = .05, n = 90, but extremely low correlation with the Edward's Social
Desirability scale. This finding was not duplicated for the SEA Form A.
The SEA distinguishes between two sets of ethical orientations: personal
conscience and social responsibility. Haan, Smith, and Block's (1968)
data indicates that stage 6 subjects would have the lowest need for social
approval and that stage 5 subjects would have a low need. The SEA
marginal findings support this finding. The CPI 'self-acceptance' scale
was not significantly correlated with the SEA. This finding can be
interpreted as due to the lack of a sufficient range of moral development
stages: personal conscience versus social responsibility.
Fontana and Noel (1973) generally replicated Haan, Smith, and Block's (1968)
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personality-morality relationships. Fontana and Noel compared studemt4,
faculty. and administrators on a number of demographic and personality
variables, and on moral judgment. They did not report an instrument to
instrument correlation between MJS scores and Machiavellian Social
Desirability (MSD) scores. Individual MJS stage to MSD scores were.
however, computed by a questionable, undescribed procedure. Stage 2
scores correlated signifcantly with MSD scores, r = -.24. e =An, which
was the only significant relationship. If the stage 2 moral person
is analogous to Fromm's exploitative character and Shostrom's active
manipulator then his control of others is through power domination and
not social amenities. He does not need other's approval to acquire their
support.
The order of correlation between MJS and MSD scores was stage 2,
3, 4, 6 and 5. This order varies in important ways from Haan, Smith,
and Block who found an order of 6, 2, 5, 3, 4. This variance may result
from the distinction between self-ideal description (Haan, Smith. and
Block) and actual self-description (MSD) The correlation between stage
5 subject's MJS scores and MSD scores was marginally significant, r = .20,
=.07. The marketing character and the competitive manipulator (stage 5)
must rely on establishing social good will in order to be successful.
Tracy and Cross (1973) administered the Children's Social Desirability
Questionnaire (CSDQ) to their sample of 12 to 14 year old subjects ,long
with the MJS. The CSDQ scores were not significantly correlated, .r = -.20,
n = 76, with MJS scores. A median split of low versus high CSDQ scores
showed that low scorers, however, had significantly higher MJS mean scores
(low = 281 MMS versus high = 255 MMS). MJS scores for this sample ranged
from stage 1 to stage 4. This latter finding is consistent with the previous
relationships.
IIS
Young adolescents are at a critical level of moral development.
Turiel (1969) and Itohlherl (1958. & 1963) have sham that this is a
period of rapid development Tracy and Cross (1973) found that CS00
scores were significantly correlated. r . 24 . ..05, with the MJS
difference scores between two administrations. Those subjects with
higher social desirability scores demonstrated greater jumps in MJS
scores. Subjects developing from preconventional to conventional moral
reasoning would be expected to reflect this relationship.
Eppathy
"Love is the productive form of relatedness to others and to
oneself. It implies responsibility, care, respect and knowledge, and the
wish for the other person to grow and develop" (Fromm 1956, p. 116).
The unproductive form of relatedness to others, according to From, is
manipulation. Shostrom (1967) stated that actualizing love is charac-
terized by empathy. He defined empathy as a "charitable, altruistic form
of love, which cares deeply for the other person as a unique human being.
...charity or compassion"(p. 122).
This definition of empathy includes much more than role-taking
ability. The distinction was made earlier in this paper between role-
taking empathy and moral empathy. Moral empathy is the consideration
of the consequences of one's actions for the welfare of others. The
concept of "love" in Fromm (1947) and May (1969) and of empathy in
Shostrom is considered to be moral empathy. Kohlberg (1958) stated
that 'moral set' was higher than social role-taking but dependent on it.
Empathy on the most basic level can be dichotomized into egocen-
trism versus role-taking empathy. Egocentrism is behaving and interacting
almost completely within the individual's private perspective, neither
Communicating the self-assumed perspective to Others nor considering
the perspective of others into one's interaction. On the other end
of the continuum would be role-taking empathy which is the ability to
incorporate the perspective and feelings associated with a role other
than one's own into one's own perspective. Since Piaget (1932) has
shown that children develop from egocentric behavior to role-taking empathy
the review of the research will follow this developmental pattern.
Egocentrism
Kohlberg (1958) reviewed Piaget's and Mead's theories of moral
development. Piaget (1932) theorized that higher moral reasoning re-
quired the ability to be aware of and use different points of view
(role-taking). Mead (1934 ) developed a similar emphasis on reflexive
and projective thought. Moral thought, according to Mead, is a process
of inner intercommunication among the self and those to be effected by
the consequence of a decision (role-taking). Both theorists predicted that
children developed from an egocentric perspective to a more social, role-
taking perspective. Piaget (1932), Ruben and Schneider (1973),and Moir (1974)
have established this relationship.
As an adult personality trait, egocentrism can be considered as an
unwillingness to consider the cognitions and feelings of others and as
viewing everything in relation to oneself. The egocentric adult is cap-
able of role-taking empathy but either willingly or neurotically chooses
to disregard and disrespect others. Such egocentric individuals would be
expected to be aloof, reserved and unresponsible in their interaction with
others.
Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) found that stage 2 females rated them-
selves significantly higher on the adjective "reserved" than the females of
all other stages. Stage 6 males, however, had the lowest self-ratings on
11?
on "reserved" end the highest self-ratings on the edjective -responsive.-
The ideal-self descriptions of stage 2 subjects indicated some
potential pwholoqical conflicts. Although male stage 2 subjects
desired to be "aloof." they simultaneously. however, communicated the
ideal of being "responsive." The order on this adjective was stage 2
(i.36). stage 6 (5.31). stage 3 (5.20). stage 5 (5.04), and stage
4 (4.50). The difference between stage 2 and stage 4 was significant.
..05 .
Fontana and Noel (1973) factor analyzed a similar adjective self-
description sorting resulting in seven factors. One of these factors
they labeled "Egocentrist" because it was characterized by lack of both
sympathy and moral empathy. An undescribed procedure of calculating
only individual correlations between moral stages and egocentrist
individuals was performed. This procedure is questionable. The
egocentrists were significantly correlated, r = .24, p_=.05, with stage
2 moral reasoning. The remaining order of declining positive correlations
between egocentrists and moral stages was stage 3, r = .04 , stage
4, r = -.04 , stage 6, r = -.10 , and stage 5, r = .13.
Role-Taking Empathy. Consistent with Piaget's and Mead's theories,
Kohlberg (1958) found moral development to be dependent on role-taking
ability. The subjects' teachers rated them on role-taking ability and
social participation. These ratings showed a significant, F = 44.18,
=.01, difference between stages with role-taking empathy increasing
with moral development. Selman (1971) hypothesized that role-taking
ability was an age-developmental, social-cognitive process paralleling
moral development. He defined role-taking as the ability to understand
the interaction between the self and another as seen through the other's
eyes. Role-taking would necessitate the cognitive abilities to make
IIC
specific inferences about another's capabilities, attributes. es.
Pectatims. feelings, and potential reactions. These inferences must
be based on the cognitive ability to attend to, shift, balance, and
evaluate both perceptual and cognitive social-object input. Role-taking
development involves an increasingly accurate perception of both what
another will do in a specific situation and how one's own actions will
effect the attitude of another towards oneself.
Selman (1971) administered two role-taking tasks to a sample of 8
to 10 year olds. The responses were structurally scored and dichotomized
into reciprocal and nonreciprocal categories. The reciprocal category re-
flected role-taking ability.
The two levels of role-taking ability for both tasks were significantly
associated with the preconventional versus conventional moral reasoning.
Eighty percent of the preconventional subjects had non-reciprocal scores while
74 of the conventional moral reasoning subjects had reciprocal scores.
A subsequent, longitudinal study of the preconventional subjects indi-
cated that no subject attained conventional moral reasoning without reciprocal
role-taking. Selman (1971) concluded that reciprocal role-taking was a
necessary and developmentally prior ability to conventional moral development.
Tracy and Cross (1973) administered two role-taking measures to 12
to 14.66 year old students. One of these was an adapted ES scale for children,
the other was a projective story measure. A median split of scores on these
two measures failed to significantly distinguish between moral maturity
mean scores, and the correlations between the two role-taking tasks and MJS
scores were not significant. Tracy and Cross (1973) suggested that their
failure to replicate Selman's (1971) findings probably reflected both the
variation in operational definitions of role-taking and the general lack
of construct validity for role-taking.
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Mbir (1974) investigated the relationship between non-moral role-
taking and moral role-taking ability. His measure of moral role-taking
ability was the MOS. Two of the five non-moral role-taking measures
were those used by Selman(1971). Only one of the measures used by Selman
was significantly. r • .446, p z.01. correlated with moral maturity scores
with intelligence controlled. Two of the other three measures with intel-
ligence controlled were significantly correlated ,r = .543. p -.01. and
r = .417. p. =.01.with MMS scores. Moral maturity scores were significantly
correlated. r = .639, p -.01, with all role-taking scores combined and
with intelligence controlled. Moir interpreted these findings as indicating
that nonmoral and moral role-taking abilities are a structure d'ensemble 
defined by intrinsic structural connections.
Maitland and Goldman (1974) hypothesized that social participation in
a peer group working towards consensus would foster role-taking and provide
social role input to moral development. Subjects of ages 15 to 17 years
were administered the OMJS and were assigned to one of three conditions on
the basis of paired pretest OMJS scores, either an open-ended discussion
group, a consensus orientation discussion group or no group participation.
Only the consensus condition significantly increased pretest to post-test
OMJS scores, 55.538 to 60.538, t = 2.241(11), p - .05. Maitland and
Goldman questioned the adequacy of the role-taking explanation in moral
development. They claimed that the consensus and open-ended discussion
conditions both provided equal opportunities for role-taking. Yet only
the consensus condition significantly affected moral development. Further-
more, the OMJS scores for those in the open-endeddiscussion condition did
not significantly increase over those who were in no group and who thus had
no role-taking opportunities. They vaguely suggested that a will or desire
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factor was present in the consensus condition that was not in the open-
ended diScwSsion condition.
Head (1934) and Hoffman (1975) both presented evidence to support
the hypothesis that role-taking empathy was an ability which was sub-
stantially developed before adolescence. Several studies have reported
the relationship between role-taking empathy as an adult personality trait
and moral judgment.
Kohlberg (1969) in his discussion of moral judgment and the Milgram
obedience-to-authority experiment, stated that subjects with high versus
1Jw empathy scores showed no significant difference in obedience. Since
Kohlberg neither specified the instrument used to measure empathy nor defined
the type of empathy being investigated, further evaluation is speculative.
Kohlberg did argue, however, that empathy was an affective aspect of moral
judgment. A person's affective strength, however, was not the determining
element of behavior. Kohlberg (1969) and Milgram (1974) both concluded
that the cogniti4e definition of the Milgram-type situation determined
behavioral choice.
Role-taking empathy involves not only recognition that others have
their own perspective but also the ability to perceive. discertl and have
insight into others' perspectives. Two measures of this type of role-
taking are Hogan's (1969) Empathy Scale and the People Are Easy to Judge
(PAEJ) scale on the Philosophy of Human Nature Scales. O'Connor (1971)
found that subjects' level of moral judgment on the MJS was distributed
in a rank order from highest to lowest on the PAEJ of stage 3, 4, 1 and
2, and 5 and 6. This order failed to match O'Connor's predicted order
of 1 and 2, 3, 4. 5 and 6. Since subjects with conventional moral reason-
ing can be considered externally oriented, it could theoretically be pre-
dicted that they would require a higher effectiveness in social acuity.
The lack of a significant relationship between PAL,) scores and MUS
scores may therefore be a function of the inappropriateneSs of the
prediction.
Hogan (1973). and Grief and Hogan (1973), have investigated the
relationship between the Empathy Scale (ES) and Measure of Moral Values.
Social acuity as measured by the ES was significantly. r 2 .58. p '.05.
n , 92, related to MMV scores of maturity of moral judgment (Hogan 1973
and 1975) while Grief and Hogan (1973) found correlations of .48 and
.51 for two samples, total n = 71.
Empathy was one of the ego processes examined by Haan. Stroud, and
Holstein (1973). It was theoretically considered a type of ego-coping,
self-reflective, intraceptive operation. Subjects were divided into three
moral stage groups: stages 2's, stage 3's, and stage 4's and above.
A marginally significant, p =.10, F ratio was calculated for these three
groups on the measure of empathy. The stage 2 groups had the lowest empathy
score while the stage 4 and above group had the highest. Those findings
partially support the actual rank order found by O'Connor (1971). More
substantial support was precluded by grouping all stage 4, 5 and 6 subjects
into a single category. This ordinal relationship appears to generalize
from the Air Force cadet subjects of O'Connor to the "Haight-Ashbury
Hippies" in Haan, Stroud, and Holstein's study.
DePalma (1975) reported research findings between scores on the DIT
and the ES without providing statistical analysis of these findings. He
found that subjects high on principled moral reasoning (D1T p scores?2:48)
were more likely to be high on the ES. This implied, significant relationship
was made somewhat ambiguous by the finding that subjects with principled
moral reasoning scores below 48 were equally divided on high versus low
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empathy scores. Mogen (1969 and 1973). and Grief and Kogan (1973),
Lontend that empathy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
mature moral reasoning. It is but one of four components required for
mature moral reasoning.
DePalmes findings initially seem to contradict the findings of
O'Connor (1971), and Haan. Stroud. and Holstein (1973). This contra-
diction may be an artifact of the research and analysis. By grouping
all stage 1 - 4 subjects together in the below 48 DIT score group.
DePalma's analysis eliminated the potential discovery of a distribution
of high versus low ES scores by DIT stage.
The research findings for role-taking ability are inconsistent for
both pre-adolescent and adolescent samples. Much of this inconsistency
may be due to the variety of measures of role-taking ability used:
behavioral, teacher ratings, projective measures, and objective self-
report measures. Another contributor to these variant findings may
be the various ways the MJS and DIT scores are categorized for analysis.
Future research needs to further investigate the relation of role-taking
empathy to moral development.
Chapter VII
PROBLEM STATEMENT_ _  _
This study has one primary objective: to test the relationship between
moral reasoning structures and character (personality) structures. This
primary objective encompassed four subgoals: (1) a comparison of moral
reasoning instruments. (2) a test of a trait theory of moral character.
(3) a test of the relationship between moral reasoning structure and
level of self-actualization. and (4) a test of moral reasoning structures
and personality organization.
Problem 41:  Comparison of Moral Reasoning  Instruments
Four (MJS, SMJS, OMJS, and MMV) of the seven measures of moral judg-
ment reviewed earlier were selected for comparison in this study (see
Table 12). These instruments index the same construct of moral reasoning
and have been used to investigate a similar range of research interests.
This past research is not, however, comparable or generalized because
the relationships between the MJS, SMJS, OMJS, and MMV have not been
systematically determined. The goal of this stage of the present study
is to determine these inter-instrument relationships. These main consid-
erations determined the selection of these instruments for comparison:
1. The instrument had to claim to measure moral reasoning and
not a subtrait of moral reasoning.
2. The author of the instrument had to report a claim that his




3. The instrument had to be available to the author for inclusion
in the study.
Several related instruments were not used because they did not meet
one or more of the above criteria.
The Empathy Scale (ES) was eliminated because it failed to meet the
first decision criterion. Hogan (1969) claimed that the ES measured only
one dimension of moral judgment. The Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA)
was likewise eliminated because it measures a single trait of moral
reasoning. Although Hogan proposed that the two ethical attitudes
indexed by the SEA appeared to parallel Kohlberg's distinction between
stage 5 and stage 6 reasoning. Hogan philosophicallyargued that neither
attitude represented a higher form of moral reasoning. The SEA, therefore.
failed also to meet the second decision criterion.
The Defining Issues Test (DIT: Rest. et al., 1974). however, was
disqualified based on the third criterion. Rest et al. (1974; Rest,
1975, 1976) claimed that the DIT measured the complete concept of moral
reasoning and measured the same Kohlbergian construct. The DIT requires,
however, a different response task. The MJS responses require a spontan-
eous production type of response, whereas the DIT response involves com-
prehension and preference tasks. Unlike the instruments included in this
study, Rest (1975, 1976) has conducted extensive DIT-MJS comparisons.
He reported a correlation of .68 between the DIT and the MJS. The moral
judgment instruments included in this study lacked such extensive validity
and reliability comparisons.
Another instrument not available for this study was the Measure of
Conscience (Hoffman, 1970). Gash (1976), however, has compared the MJS
with the Measure of Conscience and found significant associations between
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the two instruments. This association was particularly strong at the
ends of the scales which indicate the greatest moral development.
The PUS, SMJS. 0046, and MMV met all three decision criteria and
were, therefore, included in this study. The MJS was designated as the
validity criterion measure because of its extensive history of use,
revision, and testing (Kohlberg. 1976).
Each instrument involved somewhat different problems to be in-
vestigated. The SMJS presented two problems. Reported data on the
SMJS is based on pre-college age, adolescent subjects (Gilligan, et al.,
1971). The increased intellectual and social sophistication resulting
from reaching adult maturity may change the psychometric properties of
the SMJS. The present study will broaden this data base by sampling adults
ranging in age from twenty to fifty-one.
Turiel (1975) reported a study which failed to indicate the same
developmental pattern for the SMJS as for the MJS. Turiel hypothesized
that this finding could be interpreted as showing that the SMJS does not
actually measure a moral domain, but rather a social custom domain which
would not show a developmental pattern. The moderate, significant cor-
relation between the SMJS and MJS reported by Gillian et al. (1971) was
not replicated in the study cited by Turiel. The correlation between
the MJS and the SMJS, along with the directional change in SMJS scores,
needs to be replicated and extended to another sample. This study encom-
passes this aspect in its design.
Although Maitland and Goldman (1974) reported a comparison of OMJS
scores and MJS maturity scores, this comparison was not based on a direct
comparison in which the same group of subjects took both tests. They
compared their OMJS scores with the MJS norms for a similar age group.
This type of comparison provides suggestive supporting evidence, but
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not empirical evidence. The OHO and MJS, therefore, were administered
to the same sample of subjects and then statistically compared.
The OMJS reported scores have only been based on 12 to 19 year old
high school students. The reported psychometric properties are, there-
fore, sample age specific. Administering the OMJS to older. adult
subjects would expand the age base upon which the psychometrics of
the instrument are based. Again, the increased intellectual and social
sophistication of adult subjects could change the reliability of the in-
strument. This hypothesis was tested in this study.
While Hogan and Dickstein (1972) claimed that the MMV was a parallel
technique of the MJS. they failed to conduct either a direct or indirect
comparison of the two instruments. Their claim is untested and unsub-
stantiated. This study conducted a direct comparison of the two instru-
ments to determine the estimate of method variance and isomorphism between
the scores of the instruments.
Problem yq: Test of a Trait Theory_of Moral Character
The majority of research reviewed in this study investigated either
one personality trait or a narrow selection of personality traits. The
results of these investigations have been inconsistent for many of the
traits (such as ,,uperPco strength, ego strength, guilt, and intelligence).
There are at least four hypotheses to explain these inconsistent findings:
(1) the different instruments used to measure moral reasoning may
account for the differences between studies, (2) the different instruments
used to measure the same personality trait may account for the differences
between findings, (3) the differences in sample populations tested may
account for the differences in results, and (4) there may be no one to
one relation between single personality traits and level of moral reasoning.
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Kohlberg (19SP) hypothesised the relationship between a variety of
personality traits and stages of moral judgment. He warned that traits
like autonomy and conformity would not show consistent relationships
because both traits are ambiguous. They are ambiguous in the sense
that Kohlberg distinguished two types of autonomy and noted that
different stages would conform to different sources of influence. He
noted the same type of problem with the need for the social approval trait.
Kohlberg saw emotive traits like sympathy, guilt, and anxiety as bearing
an uncertain relationship to moral reasoning because of their multiple
definitions both within psychology and in the vernacular. Ego strenath
was the only trait which Kohlberg (1958, 1963) emphasized as bearing
an important relationship to moral reasoning. He did not, however,
specify this relationship.
Kohlberg (1958) hypothesized important similarities between the
traits of stage 2 and stage 5 individuals. The pattern or organization
of these similar traits with other traits distinguished one stage from
the other. Kohlberg (1958) concluded his theorizing about the relation-
ship between personality traits and moral judgment levels by hypothesizing
that "the general elements of the type may hang together to form a distinct
and unitary whole, or a concrete 'personality type'"(p. 229).
Kohlberg (1969) again treated the relationship between personality
traits and moral judgment indicating deeper theoretical considerations.
He proposed that only age-developmental personality traits would show any
consistent relationship to the developmental moral judgment stages.
Personality traits which are single dimension, polar traits would not have
the formal-structural base paralleling the developmental, structural basis
of moral judgment stages. Kohlberg suggested that two personality domains
might possess a structural basis: affective and interpersonal schemata.
In
He did not list any traits which eight be within the interpersonal domain
and only two traits for the affective domain quilt and empathy. Guilt
Was not defined and the chantrin Kohlberg's thinking (1958. 1969) was
not discussed. He concluded by hypothesizing that consistent relation-
ships should be found only between the few structural. developmental
personality traits and stages of moral reasoning. He essentially denied
a personality trait theory of moral reasoning.
From (1947) also denied a personality trait theory of moral reasoning.
He emphasized a conative organization theory of moral reasoning. The
organization of traits is the fundamental entity of character, the single
traits follow from the specific motivational structures. From proposed
five conative structures listing the traits in each (see Table 9).
This study attempted an initial test of the personality trait theory
of m(ral reasoning. The possible inconsistencies due to the different
instruments used to measure moral reasoning and personality traits in
previous research were controlled by administering a single sample of
subjects the same set of personality and moral judgment instruments. All
comparisons were then computed on this comparable data. Separate personal-
ity trait scores were then calculated across the stages of moral reasoning.
Selection of Instruments for a Test of Moral Reasoning Structures and
Personality Structures.
A study which attempts to empirically test the relationship between
such broad constructs as personality and moral reasoning is confronted with
the problem of selacting appropriate instruments to measure these constructs.
Each construct represents a separate problem.
The detailed analysis of the four moral judgment instruments compared
in Chapter IXof this research project formed the basis for selection of
the most adequate moral reasoning instruments. The MS INS eliminated
because of its poor reliability and failure to discriminate between
stages of moral reasoning as determined by the MJS. The MRV showed
promise as a reliable instrument,but it tog failed to significantly
demarcate the moral judgment stages determined by the MJS. The SKJS,
however. replicated previous research (Gilligan, et. al. 1971) indicating
acceptable reliability and comparable identification and discrimination
of moral reasoning stages with the MJS. The small percentage of subjects
scoring lower on the SMJS than on the MJS is consistent with theoretical
and empirical reports (Kirkendall, 1967; Wisbroth, 1970; Barclay, 1975;
D'Augelli & Cross, 1975; Turiel, 1976). The MJS interjudge agreement rate
is substantial, adequate for research purposes, and comparable with that
reported for other studies (Kurtines & Grief, 1974).
The combination of MJS scores with the SMJS scores constituted the
final resolution for the most appropriate index of the moral reasoning
construct. This decision is based on the following six reasons:
1. the specific construct of moral reasoning under investigation
is the one proposed by Kohlberg
2. the MJS was constructed and standardized by Kohlberg
3. the SMJS was co-authored by Kohlberg to measure a specific
content domain to which moral reasoning was applied
4. the majority of studies reviewed in this study were based on
the MJS, only two studies reported findings based on the MMV
5. the psychometric properties of both the MJS and SMJS in this
study are appropriate
6. the reliability of the index (stage) scores should have been
increased by the judicious doubling of responses on which they
were based by combining the MJS and SMJS scores.
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The seemingly endless number and variety of inStrumeWs used to
measure personality presents a formidable problem to researcherc. An
Initial problem is the decision between selecting a single trait
measure such as empathy or autonomy versus a multi-factor instrument
like the 16 PF or Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. Having made this
in;tial decision, the researcher is then faced with selecting appropriate
instruments for his purposes from the wide number and range that exist
within either type.
This study began as a broadly conceived project to identify person-
ality profiles and conative organizations. This original conception
determined the selection of one or more multi-factor instruments. A
sufficiently wide range of single trait instruments to measure person-
ality organization would have required an inordinate amount of time of
the subjects. The increased reliability and construct validity of single
trait measures was sacrificed for the more time-efficient, global, multi-
factor instruments.
Practical and theoretical considerations determined the final selection
of personality instruments. The practical consideration concerned the
selection of a widely used, extensively tested, instrument which would
index as full a range of personality traits as possible. The theoretical
selection sought to investigate the productive, self-actualization aspect
of personality which provided a theoretical organization of this study.
The Cattell (1965) 16 PF most closely met the practical criterion. The
16 PF is one of the most extensively tested instruments, Cattell having
continuously verified and revised the 16 PF. The 16 PF is further frequent-
ly used in a wide range of research indicating widespread recognition and
acceptance. Cattell (1965) purposely constructed the 16 PF to measure what
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I% gloorally considered the caselete range of personality dimensions.
These dimensions consist of sixteen general cognitive-emotive-behavioral
factors. Any findings between the 16 Pf scores and the moral judgment
stages is widely generalizable on a theoretical plane to the vast array
of research using the 16 PF. The 16 Pr Form A (1968 edition) was administered.
The Personal Orientation Inventory (POI: Shostrom, 1965) appeared
to be the best selection to meet the theoretical goals. This study
is based both on Fromm's character model of morality and Kohlberg's
moral judgment developmental model. Fromm's distinction between the
improductive versus the productive character has strong parallels to
May and Shostrom's theory of self-actualization as was noted in the
literature review. There is a strong implication of greater moral
efficacy with increased self-actualization in the writings of May (1967),
Shostrom (1967), and Mahoney (1974). Self-actualization as a formal
ethical theory has a long history from Aristotle to the Neo-Hegelians
(Baldwin, 1940) through Kierkegaard (Shostrom, 1967) and Bradley (1951).
Shostrom (1965) specifically constructed the POI to measure the human-
istic psychological construct of self-actualization. Shostrom (1968)
reports substantial reliability and validity findings for the POI. There
is a growing body of research based on the POI.
In addition to these strictly instrument related considerations, the
POI was also selected for historical reasons. Shostrom developed his theory
of actualization with an acknowledgement of Fromm. Shostrom stated "I was
moved to write it [Man, the Manipulator) after reading an article, "Man Is
Not a Thing", by Erich Fromm, in the March 16, 1957 Saturday Review"
(1967, p. xiii). This influence is further demonstrated in the parallel
of Fromm's four unproductive character types with Shostrom's
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(1967) four manipulator typos. The theoretical continuity from Fromm
to Shostrom and May is maintained in another way through the P01. The
time orientation construct in the POI is based on May's theorizing (May.
Angel & (llenberger. 1958). Yet, another continuity in moral development
personality research is created between the Peck and Havighurst (1960)
research and the P01 since both relied on the inner-directed and other-
directed dimension of Reisman et al (1961). The POI consists of fourteen
scales measuring fourteen dimensions of self-actualization. The P01
(1965 edition) was administered.
Problem 43: Moral Reasoning and Level of Self-Actualization
Implicit in self-actualization theory is the idea of concomitant moral
development as a facet of self-actualization. The humanistic theory of
self-actualization is a psychological model of human potential. Self-
actualization has a much longer intellectual history as an ethical theory
(Baldwin, 1940). The theorizing of Fromm (1947) and Shostrom (1965) has
been directed toward integrating the psychological and ethical aspects
of self-actualization. Child (1973) noted that Kohlberg's theory of moral
development did not grow out of humanistic psychology, but that it has a
distinctive humanistic character. The moral judgment theory is a develop-
mental theory with analogous parallels to Maslow's hierarchy of need ful-
fillment development. Child concluded that the reserch associated with
Kohlberg's theory provides some of the most substantial cnd pertinent
evidence for the value of a humanistic approach to the psychological study
of personality and social interaction" (p. 25).
The extensive use of the theoretical ideas of Fromm, May (1969) and
Shostrom (1967) which are essentially self-actualization oriented in the
exposition of this study made it desirable to test the relationship between
II!
moral judgment stages and levels of self-actualization. This hypothesis
was included in the design by administering the Personal Orientation
Inventory (P01) constructed by Shostrom (196A) to the subjects along
with the moral reasoning instruments. The P01 subscale scores of subjects
within each stage of moral reasoning were compared across stages and
an overall self-actualization score was likewise analyzed.
Problem 14: Test of Moral Reasoning Structures and Personftliti Structures
Model
The primary objective of this study is to empirically test the re-
lationship between moral judgment staaes and personality organization.
Such a test involved four steps: (1) a test of a trait theory of moral
character (see Problem 02), (2) the search for anidetermination of
personality profiles for each moral stage group. (3) the statistical
comparison of the stage-specific, personality profiles determined, and
(4) a test of a character-moral reasoning structure model through an
analysis of its predictive power. The specific character organizations
proposed by Fromm (1947) were not empirically under investigation. Any
parallels between his theoretical model and the empirical model will be
discussed.
The discovery of personality profiles associated with moral judgment
stages is a very different type of problem than that required for a test
of the trait theory (see Problem 02). The discovery procedure required
two stages of analysis. The first stage generated the empirical structure
of scores on the POI and the 16 PF. A factor analysis of these subscale
scores provided the underlying structures. The failure of the test of the
trait theory of character to substantiate this model warranted a deeper
structural analysis. This analysis was also felt to be appropriate be-
cause Shostrom (1965) reported only a matrix of correlations between
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the POI and the 16PF. A factor analysis of the pool of both POI and 16Pf
subscale scores would determine whether any of these subscales measured
factorially similar domains.
Although this involved factoring Cattell's 16PF factors, this
procedure seemed appropriate in light of the criticism of Howarth (1976).
He questioned the statistical assumptions and factoral methods employed
by Cattell in his generation of sixteen personality factors. Howarth's
review of research on the factoral structure of the 16PF items indicated
that the most frequently found number of factors was five, seven, and ten.
Howarth reanalyzed the 16PF items using more recent statistical guidelines,
criteria, and computational procedures than the earlier, somewhat anti-
quated ones used by Cattell. This reanalysis resulted in only six rather
than sixteen factors. Cattell 's sixteen personality factors are not,
therefore, sacred. Howarth's research reduced the concern that the factor
analysis of the present study would generate second-order factors.
The second stage of this discovery process determined the factor scores
for each of the moral reasoning stages. This required an analysis of
variance to be computed on the factor scores. The patterns of these
composite scores were then examined. This did not, however, provide a
statistical comparison of the stage profiles.
In order to determine whether there are statistical differences be-
tween the stage-specific, personality profiles, a discriminant analysis
will be used. The discriminant analysis determines and maximizes the
differences between groups. The salient structural differences between
the personality profiles, therefore, will be identified while leaving a
residue of shared personality traits and structures between the groups.
The discriminant analysis also provides a statistical test of the profile
in
differences between groups.
The first three steps of the structural model test provide evidence
to substantiate the empirical presence of the model. The final step iS
to then test the power and efficiency of the model and to examine its
predictive power. In the present study the prediction of moral reasoning
stages by personality structures is the directional test of predictive
power. The information needed for this test is contained within the aiscrim-
inant analysis. Since Kohlberg's model of moral reasoning consists of six
stages within three levels of reasoning. it seemed desirable and appropri-
ate to test the predictive power of the character model both for the six




Subjects. The sample consisted of thirty-one continuing education
students enrolled in Psychology 510, thirty-nine continuing education stu-
dents enrolled in Psychology 521, and ten continuing education students
enrolled in Psychology 450. Eighty-four percent (65) of these subjects
were elementary and/or secondary teachers, counselors, and administrators.
Eleven percent (9) were military personnel while five percent (3) were
divided amongst a wide range of occupations.
There were forty-five female (57 ) and thirty-four male (43 ) subjects.
Of these, fifty-five were married (70 ), fourteen were sinale (18 ), six
were divorced (8 ), and two were widowed (4%). Religious affiliation was
distributed as follows: Catholic-10 (13), Baptist-32 (421, Methodist-
10 (13%), Christian Church-5 (6 ), other Protestant denominations-14 (18 ),
and no affiliation-6 (8 ). The age range was from twenty-one to fifty-one
with the mean age being 30.45 (Table 21).
Administration
All instruments were administered in a group form. This group admin-
istration required using a written format for the MJS. Although individual
interviews were preferred by Kohlberg (1973), he stated that group, written
administration was suitable for verbally proficient subjects. This sample
of college enrolled students was assumed to be comprised of verbally
proficient subjects.
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Each group of subjects u4S told that data WS being c011ected for
a Master's thesis. Each was further instructed that this study was
investigating the relationship between various personality variables and
subjects' views on selected social problems and issues. The MJS,
MMV, and OMJS were contained in a mimeographed booklet which attempted
to disguise their nature by being titled the "Social Attitudes Question-
naire" (SAQ). Appropriate instructions preceded the instruments to
further this deception (see Appendix CN.
Subjects were explicitly instructed that their supporting reasoning
for their judgments was more important than the judgments alone. Subjects
were requested to be as explicit and detailed in their supporting reason-
ing as possible. The instructions further noted that there were neither
correct, nor right or wrong answers, and that the SAQ was purely an
opinion survey. Confidentiality was assured and subjects were asked to
be completely honest and to express their true feelings.
The administration procedure varied at each test site due to the time
restrictions and other limitations. Each administration pattern,
therefore, will be discussed separately.
Pattern A. Following the general instructions, half the subjects were
administered the POI while the other half were given the 16 PF. The two
sets of personality tests were then exchanged. The "Social Attitudes
Questionnaire" was subsequently presented the subjects. The long administra-
tion time (312 to 4 2 hours) required that some subjects take the SAQ
home with them. These subjects were explicitly instructed neither to
discuss with nor collaborate with anyone else. The protocols were
collected at the next class session.
Pattern B. An accomplice gave the general instructions and then
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administered the SAO package. Again. some Subjects took the instrument
home with them. The following week, the author administered the P01
and then the 16 Pr to the subjects.
Pattern C. A member presented both the general instructions and
all instruments to the subject. The instruments were given over two
sessions with the SAQ being taken home by some subjects.
Scoring
MJS: The protocols were initially scored by two judges. A third
judge scored those protocols for which the first two judges either
failed to agree on major stage assignment or had major-minor stage
reversals. The judges applied different scoring procedures due to
their respective training. Kohlberg (Kuhmerker, 1976a) stressed that
research papers should specify which scoring method was used.
The MJS scoring procedures have been modified and revised twice since
the original version by Kohlberg and his associates. Kohlberg (1976)
discussed the differences, similarities, advantages, disadvantages, and
consequences of these three scoring methods. The original formulation,
called the Aspect-Scoring System, consisted of twenty-five (or twenty-
seven, Kohlberg 1971) aspects which served as classification criteria.
An aspect was defined as a consideration that people made about moral
judgments (Kohlberg 1971). These aspects were clustered under eight
issues. An issue is a designation of a content area (see Appendix A
for the aspects and issues).
Responses to dilemmas could be scored either by sentence scoring or
story rating. Story rating was used by one of the primary judges in this
study. The rater read through the complete protocol for one story and
isolated the main consideration (issues) produced by the subject. Each
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of the aspects associated with that issue were then scared against the
proto-typical manual responses. Any variation of stage scores across
Issues within a story were intuitively weighted to yield a dominant and
a minor stage score for each story (see Kohlberg. 1976 for an example
of this technique). An overall global score for a subject was deter-
mined by rereading the complete. four-story protocol and intuitively
weighting the subject's responses as a whole across stories.
This scoring procedure was modified by Kohlberg (1976) to more
closely approximate the construct validity of moral development. An
apparent excess of extraneous content (aspects) was yielding stage
classifications which were not invariant in longitudinally measured
subjects. The modified scoring method was disseminated in 1972
(Kuhmerker, 1976a). Called Intuitive Issue Scoring, it further developed
the issues of the previous Aspect scoring system. The original eight
issues or types of content were expanded to eleven issues postulated
to be found in every society and culture. The unit of scoring was
little changed, e.g., all the ideas a person used concerning an issue
in a story. The major change was a change from defining the stages on
the basis of aspects to one of defining the stages on the basis of issues.
Kohlberg (1976) claimed that Intuitive Issue Scoring was theoretically
the most valid method of scoring. It could be applied to any moral
dilemma and was thus instrument free. Simultaneously, it was, however,
too intuitive to provide satisfactory psychometric test characteristics.
One disadvantage mentioned by Rest (1976) was the fact that this scoring
method scoredthe content of the responses which included varying issues
for different subjects. Kohlberg further revised the scoring system to
partially incorporate this criticism.
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This third version of scoring has been labeled Standardized Issue
Scoring. The manual for standardized issue scoring was ready for distri-
bution in 1975 ((ohlberg, Colby. Speicher-Dublin, and Lieberman. 197S).
The manual was based on a standardized interview that probes only two
Issues for each story. The protocols are scored using a criterion con-
cept which is the reasoning pattern that is most distinctive of a given
stage. This criteria established a structural as opposed to a content
scoring basis. Kohlberg (1976) noted that this newest scoring method
returned to certain features of the 1969 procedure but with controls.
These controls guarantee that each subject is explicitly probed for two
and only two identical issues thus making all protocols more comparable.
The second control replaced the aspect-content criterion for a structural
criterion.
This review of these scoring methods is necessary to explain the scor-
ing system used by the other primary judge. This judge used an interim
version of the Standardized Issue Scoring (Candee, 1975), dated Jan. 30,
1973 and Nov. 15, 1974. The life and punishment issues are probed in the
interim version while life and law are elicited in the current method
for the Heinz dilemma. This change of issues does not change the control
of invariant issues scored across subjects.
Kohlberg (Kuhmerker, 1976b) has warned that judges using the 1969,
1972. and 1975 versions can possibly come to different stage scoring
conclusions. The divergence would primarily occur at two points. First,
many protocols scored stage 4 by the aspect system are scored stage 3
by the 1972 and 1975 versions. The second discrepancy occurs in disting-
uishing adult stage 2 thinking from stage 5. The aspect scoring classified
many responses as stage 2 which would be scored stage 5A by the more recent
systems.
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Th. three Judges in this study were 4w4fr the shifts in scoring
and met to standardize their own scoring. The 1969 and 1974 interim
systems were discussed and hypothetical dilemma responses debated. All
raters scored protocols using a standardized issue scoring form (see
Appendix D). This insured that all judges scored identical issues. It
was hoped that these procedures would minimize discrepant classifications.
The major difference in scoring between judges was that the judge
using the 1974 interim system made decisions on stage scoring for a story
on a non-intuitive basis. A story was scored a pure stage if 75 of the
issue responses were of a single stage. A major-minor score was attributed
when responses distributed in a 60 to 40% pattern. The subject's global
score across stories was determined by the same decision criteria. Dis-
crepancies between the two primary judges were aikibuted to stage typing
decisions and not to actual scoring. Such discrepancies were resolved
through the independent scoring of the third judge.
SMJS. The SMJS was scored by both judges following the manual
(Gilligan, Kohlberg, Learner, & Belensky; 1971). All scoring used a
standardized issue scoring form (see Appendix n). The SMJS scoring
form varies from the MJS form in that the SMJS has more than two issues
per story. This maintained that all judges scored identical issues.
As in the MJS scoring, the two primary judges used different decision
criteria for assigning a stage classification after issue scoring had
been completed. The judge using the 1974 interim procedure assigned stage
classifications on the 75%-25' criterion described in the previous section.
The other judge used the intuitive method previously described.
MMV. Both judges scored the fifteen conversational responses using
the procedure described by Hogan and Dickstein (1972). The responses
•
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were scored two points if any one of four ore.awfimed moral concerns was
clearly impressed: 1) concern for the sanctity of the individual.
2) judgments based on the spirit rather than the letter of the law.
3) concern for the welfare of society as a whole. and 4) capacity to see
both sides of an issue. A response was assigned one point if any one of
the four concerns was easily imp!ied. Each response was scored only once
regardless of the number of concerns contained in a response. This
method yields a score from 0-30 for the fifteen statements totaled. The
average scale score assigned by the two judges for each subject was
used as the best available index of the MMV.
Interrater 
MJS & SMJS. The interrater reliabilities on the MJS and SMJS protocols
were examined using the procedures followed by Haan, Smith, and Block (1968)
and Gilligan, Kohlberg, Learner, and Belenky (1971). Agreement was de-
fined as "either complete (both major and minor), major code only, or re-
versals of major and minor designations" (Haan et al, 1968, p. 182).
The rates of agreement are shown in Table 22.
The raters had agreement rates of 68 for the Heinz Dilemma and 56
for the Karl and Bob Stealing vs. Lying Dilemma chosen from Kohlberg's
(1974) Form A. This compares with a product-moment correlation of .79
for the Karl and Bob Stealing vs. Lying dilemma reported by Kohlberg (1958).
These differences in interrater reliability for these two dilemmas are
probably not random but reflect that: This may be due to the differential
values of the questions in representing the typologr(p. 91).
For the SMJS stories, the raters had agreement rates of 69 for
Dilemma 'B' (sex in the context of a marital relationship) and 60' for










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with rates of 88-.: for Wow* '8 and 80 for alleged 'C' reported by
6111igan et al (167)).
Since the subjects' scores on the two sets of stories were highly
similar, as is discussed later, the four stories were combined for a
single global rating of moral judgment. The rate of interrater agree-
ment in assigning global scores was 74 . This rate of agreement compares
favorably with the 71% reported by Rest. Turiel. and Kohlberg (1969)
and stated as an acceptable degree of reliability by Kurtines and Grief
(1974). Protocols on which the raters disagreed or had major-minor stage
reversals (for example. one rater gave a subject a major stage rating of
4 and a minor stage rating of 3 while the other rater reversed these major-
minor ratings) were scored by a third experienced rater. When the third
rater's scoring agreed with either of the two primary judges, that
agreement was accepted as the 'true' moral judgment rating of a subject.
This procedure resulted in a final global score agreement rate of 91 .
Since there were few clear representatives of principled thought in
the sample ( i.e. stages 5 and 6), all subjects scored as major stage
five by one judge and either a major or minor stage five by the other
judge were classified as stage five for all subsequent analyses. For the
same reason, a similar procedure was used for assigning subjects to stage
two. Thus the subjects assigned to stages two and five are not necessarily
pure types, but are subjects judged by both judges as having large compo-
nents of these stages in their moral thought. There were no stage one
or stage six subjects in this sample. The resultant distribution of
subjects across moral stages is presented in Table 23.
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Table 23
Distribution of Subjects by Moral Stage















Compftrison of Moral ReasoninsLipstruments
Analyses of the moral reasoning instruments involved two types:
(I) a test of the internal reliability of the instrument, and (2) a test
of between instrument construct validity. Item-total reliability con-
stituted the primary test of internal reliability where appropriate
(OMJS ana MMV). Internal reliability for the MJS and SMJS were determi
ned
using a less formal analysis. Inter-instrument comparisons used both
correlational analysis and analysis of variance.
The internal reliability of the MJS and SMJS are estimated together.
This estimation is based on the percentages of agreement in scoring
between the two judges presented in Table 22. The range of perfect a
gree-
ment varied from 30 for the Heinz story to 25 for both the 'Bob
 and
Karl Stealing versus Lying' story and the 'Single Woman's Pregnancy'
story. Examination of agreement percentages for major stage agreemen
t
with a difference in the minor stage revealed a similar range of per-
centages. The Bob and Karl story again has the lowest agreement rate
 with
26" while the other three stories have an agreement rate of eit
her 33% or
34. A chi-square analysis of the number of cases in each of thes
e two
levels of agreement failed to indicate any significant difference 
between
agreement rates (see Table 24). A test of rates of both one 
stage and
two stage disagreement revealed the same level of consistenc
y (Table 25).




















24 20 22 20 26 112
Minor Stage
Major-Minor




4 4 6 1 11 26
Agreement 54 45 54 48 59 262
X2 = 14.06 (8) p a' .05
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Table 25












Difference 11 19 16 20 12 78
Two Stage
Disagreement 14 11 8 9 7 49
Unscorable 0 5 1 3 2 11
Totals 25 35 25 32 21 138
X2 = 9.27 (8) p b .05
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'latency of their scoring and of the between-stories consistency Is
reliable. All Of these four stories are used to calculate the global
moral judgment score for each subject. All four stories are reliably
consistent in their story-to-global agreement rates.
The more traditional alpha reliability coefficient is used to
determine the instrument reliability for the OMJS and mmv. The item-
total correlations for the OMJS are presented in Table 26. These range
from a low of .06 for item 6 (Obedience to Military Authority) to .54 for
item 10 (Landlord's Rignt of Freedom to Rent) with a mean of .30. All
the correlations are significant at the p - .05 level except two item 6.
P = .29 and item 14, p = .08 (Lying to Deceive Another of Money). The
alpha coeficient, however, is a low .48 for the present sample. This
low alpha reliability is improved slightly to .51 by eliminating item 6
which is the least related item. The scale's reliability is not improved
by additional deletion of items.
The internal reliabilities of the OMJS for this sample are substan-
tially lower than in Maitland and Goldman's original study, r -.71. The
present alpha of .48 is dangerously low for a research instrument. These
differences in reliability found in the two studies may be due to the
adult sample's more sophisticated comprehension of all choices. Maitland
and Goldman's adolescent samples may reflect a comprehension ceiling con-
sistency across items rather than an actual moral judgment. The obtained
reliability in the present study, however, raises serious doubt concerning
the reliability and usefulness of the OMJS.
The item-total correlations for the Measure of Moral Values (MMV) were
computed for each rater and for the rater's pooled scores on each item.
Table 27 presents these sets of item-total correlations. The correlations
for judge 'A' range from .24 for item 9 (Death Penalty) to .52 for item
1 tern
Table 26


































Item Scorer A Scorer B A • 8 Averaged P.
1 .51425 .45202 .50322 .00001
2 .48303 .52962 .55370 .00001
3 .38490 .60204 .55321 .00001
4 .51966 .33986 .43997 .00002
5 .43348 .29469 .34057 .001
6 .52032 .49469 .53696 .00001
7 .49719 .43412 .49894 .00001
.52761 .34344 .48896 .00001
9 .23986 .36769 .35492 .00062
10 .45450 .55001 .53652 .00001
11 .47970 .46804 .46199 .00001
12 .42726 .49578 .51260 .00001
13 .47360 .30717 .42357 .00005
14 .49205 .33587 .36900 .00038
15 .37621 .38017 .38812 .00019
8 (Incompetent Doctor and Illegal Abortion). For judge 'IV, the
correlations ranged from .29 for item 5 (Taking Credit fo
r Another's
Ideas) to .60 for item 3 (Displacement of Poor by Sup.whighway
). The
averaged scores of the judges showed the followinp range: lowest
. item
5; highest. items 2 and 3. All of the item-total correlati
ons are sig-
nificant, p .02. The total scale scores assigned by the tw
o raters
are correlated r = .66.
The coefficients of reliability were computed identically as for
 the
item-total correlations. The alpha reliabilities are .69 and
 .68 for
rater A and B respectively. The pooled scores have an alpha relia
bility
of .72. The alpha coefficient was not improved for either 
rater or for
the combined ratings by deleting peripherally related items.
Relations Between the Four Instruments
MJS-SMJS Ccfparison. The global scores on the MJS served
 as the
criterion for a comparison with the SMJS scores. The findi
ngs of this
comparison are similar to those found by Gilligan et at (19
71) but with
important differences. Eighty-four percent (59 cases) of the
 subjects
in this study reasoned at the same level for both the standa
rd moral
dilemmas (MJS) and the sexual moral dilemmas. This compa
res with a rate
of 47 of adolescent girls and 50 of the adolescent boys
 in the Gilligan
et al study. Eight (11 ) of 70 classifiable subjects wer
e judged by
both raters as consistently lower on the SMJS stories than 
on the MJS
stories, while three subjects were judged as higher on 
the SMJS stories by
both raters. Seventy-three percent of the small group 
that have different
scores on the SMJS than on the MJS, scored lower on th
e SMJS. Seventy-
nine percent of the adolescent girls and 80% of the 
adolescent boys in
the Gilligan et at (1971) study had lower scores on th
e SMJS than on the MJS.
1 1,1
Even though the percentage of subJects who scored differently on the two
scales decreased substantially in the present study, the percentage of
those who scored lower on the WS than on the MJS remained very similar
in both studies. An additional 16 subjects are scored consistently lower
on the SMJS stories by one of the judges, while five additional subjects
are judged higher on the SMJS stories by one judge. In all cases, the
difference between the mean scores assigned to the two sets of stories
was one stage or less.
In spite of the tendeicy for subjects to score lower on the SMJS than
on the MJS, the two instruments are correlated. r .66. The moral
maturity scores determined in the Gilligan et al. study for the standard
stories and sexual stories were correlated, r = .405 for the girls
and r = .482 for the boys. The increaseicorrelation in the present study
is probably attributable to the greater consistency in MJS and SMJS scores
for the present adult sample than for the adolescent sample of Gilligan
et al.
Turiel (1975) has challenged the validity of the SMJS. He contends
that (a) the greater variability of response scores and (b) the trend for
subjects to receive lower scores on the SMJS suggests that reasoning about
sexuality is not moral but normative. He further cites a study which
found that stage changes were not sequential for Gilligan et al's subjects
over a two year period. The present results show that for an adult sample
there is not a greater variability in scores and that the lower trend in
SMJS scores is small. A suggested hypothesis to explain this greater
consistency of adult subjects than adolescent subjects across content
domains is that increased experience in sexual relationships provides
the necessary experiential information to assimilate the sexual domain
155
Into the peneral moral reasoning structure. In childhOod and early
adolescence. reasoning about sexual relationships and dilemmes my be
largely normative. As these sexual relationships become part of the
individuals experience, they loose their normativeness and assimilate
into the moral reasoning schema of the person.
The present findings further substantiate the reliability of the
SMJS and counter Turiel's (1975) claim that the SMJS is not an appropriate
measure of a moral domaii. Kohlberg et al. (1972) and Gash (1976) pro-
vided evidence indicating that judgments made about certain moral domains
(prison dilemmas and closeness of relationship) were less developed than
judgments made about 'normal' dilemmas. The present data suggest that
the area of sexual relations is a moral domain which is also less developed
in some individuals but becomes more developed for most individuals after
adolescence.
Since the comparison of the MJS and SMJS revealed that the subjects'
scores on the two instruments were similar, the combined global score
compiled across all four dilemmas served as the stage classification for
comparison with the MJS and MMV. One-way analyses of variance were used
to test the relation between the subjects' global scores on the MJS-SMJS
and on the scores of the OMJS and MMV. The subjects' classification on
the moral stories served as the independent variable in each analysis.
Six subjects who could not be classified were eliminated from these
analyses.
MJS-OMJS Comparison. Contrary to Maitland and Goldman's (1974)
theoretical predictions, the subjects' scores in the present study on
the OMJS were not significantly related to their global MJS-SMJS scores,
F = 1.82, (4,64), p. = .15. Table 22 presents the OMJS wean and standard
IS6
Table Pi
OPIJS Scores as a Function of Stage
Classification on the Morally Ambiguous Stories
Moral Judgment
Stage
iS's Mean SD Standard Error
2 4 70.00 6.4807 3.2404
3 12 64.4167 8.1849 2.3628
3-4 mix 29 67.8276 14.3977 2.6736
4 16 67.1875 10.1929 2.5482
5 12 73.000 7.6277 2.2019
TOTAL 73 68.0959 11.3935 1.3335
deviation scores as • function of the MJS-SMJS scores. Scheffes post-hoc
comparison procedure indicated that none of the moral stage groups had
OMJS means significantly diflitrent from one another. An Omega-square
analysis revealed that only 4.4/ of the variance in the OMJS %cores was
attributable to the subjects' global classification on the MJS-SMJS.
A separate analysis of variance was run on the OMJS scores elimina-
ting the MJS-SMJS mixed 3-4 stage subjects. While the statistical
inappropriateness of such a reanalysis is recognized, an attempt was
being made to determine the impact of these mixed stage scores. Run
with the purer stage scores only, the F-ratio increased to_F_. 2.079.
_p_ '.117. Although this is a substantial increase in F-ratio, the OMJS
still fails to discriminate the MJS-SMJS stages. The non-significant
relationship between the OMJS and the Kohlberg protocols is largely
ascribable to the OMJS's low reliability and large within-group variance.
This absence of relationship still shows that the OMJS does not validly
assess the Kohlberg moral reasoning stages.
MJS-MMV Comparison. The findings for Hogan and Dickstein's Measure
of Moral Values suggest that this instrument has greater potential. Table
29 presents the MMV means and standard deviations as a function of stage
classification on the MJS-SMJS global scores. Analyses of variance were
again computed for both the mixed 3-4 stage scores included and excluded.
Unlike the OMJS, the MMV has significant relationships with the MJS-SMJS
scores in both analyses, (mixed stages included, F = 4.50, (4, 64), R=.003;
and pure stages only, F = 6.292, (3, 64), R=.001). Post-hoc analyses




measure of Moral Values Scores as a Function of
Stage Classification on the Morally AmpiquOuS Stories
Moral Judgment
Stage
SDOS's Mean Standard Error
2 4 5.3750 .6292 .3146
3 12 8.7500 3.320 .9584
3-4 29 9.2759 3.8651 .7177
4 16 9.3438 3.8588 .9647
5 12 13.2500 3.7809 1.0915
TOTAL 73 9.6438 4.0229 .4708
IS!
An Omega squared analysis revealed that MJS-SMJS stage classifica-
tion accounted for 16.71 of the variance in NM scores. This increased
substantially to 23.21 when the analysis excluded the 3-4 mixed stage
subjects. Finally. the OMJS and MMV are not significantly correlated.
r . .135. The MMV is, however, significantly correlated with the MJS-
SMJS global scores (mixed 3-4 stage included. r = .399. p - .0002; pure
stages only, r = .53. E =.0001). Haler (1q75) reported MMV scores for
college females to be significantly correlated with the MJS. r = .51.
p =.01. but not for college males, r = .22, p =.05. The present study
found no such sex differences.
The relationship of the MMV to the Kohlberg protocols is strong.
particularly so since the reliabilities of the two instruments are only
moderate. The reliability of the MMV can, however, be improved with only
limited costs. The present 15-item format can be reliably scored in about
five minutes. Doubling the length of the scale using similar items would
increase its reliability to .83, and the scale could still be scored with
a fraction of the effort required for scoring the Kohlberg protocols.
The MMV in its present form, however, can be used as a quick, reliable,
and valid index of mature moral judgment.
Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) demonstrated that adults scored as stage
2 in moral reasoning were more probably in transition from stage 4 to stage
5 and thus should be properly classified as stage 5-A. The MMV data suggest
that the four subjects in the present sample are not stage 5-A because they
have the lowest MMV scores rather than scores intermediate between stage
4 and stage 5. This ambiguous stage 2 (5-A) classification on the MJS
and the MMV needs further clarification.
ISO
Since the MMV scores are continuous, the scale does not delineate
MJS stage boundaries. The present MMV means and standard deviations
cannot be used to establish MMV ranges which can be used as equivalents to
the MJS stages. The PV cannot., therefore, be used alone in any research
which attempts to investigate Kohlberg's stages as stages per se. Re-
searchers committed to the investigation of stages cannot use the MMV
as the primary assessment technique. Those who wish to investigate the
continuous concept of moral maturity should find the MMV sJitable and
convenient for their purposes.
Comparison of POI and  16 PF Traits with Moral Stages
MJS-POI Comparisons. Four analyzes were conducted on the POI scores
to test the self-actualization character model: (1) a Pearson Product-
Moment Correlation of POI subscale scores with moral stage scores and
(2) an analysis of variance. The observed rank order of mean POI scores
for each stage was also examined. The only analysis of the POI mean
profiles for each moral stage group was a visual comparison. The
standardized means for each moral stage group. the correlation coefficients,
the F ratios, and observed order of POI means a , presented in Table 30.
The most simplistic and direct hypothesis tested examined the hypothesis
that self-actualization scores would possess a linear relationship to
moral reasoning stages, i.e. self-actualization increases as the maturity
of moral reasoning increases. A correlational analysis revealed only
one significant and moderate correlation (Sy scale. r = .27, p= .05) be-
tween developmental level of moral reasoning and self-actualization as
measured by the POI. As the level of moral judgment increases, the ability
to be synergistic (i.e. to transcend dichotomies) increases. The cor-
relational analysis, therefore, provided very little supportive evidence














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The correlational results Presumed the assumption that the stage
2 moral reasoning subjects were indeed genuine stage 2 subjects.
Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) concluded that most adults scored as stage
2 were nor, correctly classified as stage 5-A. Stage 5-A reasoning
Is reasoning which has content but not structural similarities to stage
2 reasoning and is expressed only by individuals who have developed
stage 4 reasoning. Developmentally, therefore, the subjects judged as
stage 2 in this study are more probably stage 5-A subjects. The scores
of these subjects should be re-ordered to indicate their true developmental
position. A reanalysis using the same correlational procedures failed
to disclose any new significant linear relationships. Moral development
received no support as a linear function of self-actualization. These
findings resulted both when the scores were computed including the mixed
stage 3-4 scores and when the mixed stage 3-4 scores were excluded from
the analysis.
An alternative hypothesis proposed that the relationship between
moral judgment and self-actualization is not a simple. linear function.
An analysis of variance allowed a more statistically powerful technique
to test this hypothesis than correlat-;onal analysis. ANOVA's were computed
both including and excluding the mixed stage 3-4 scores. Seven significant
F ratios, R..05, resulted out of twenty-eight compl!tations (see Table 30).
Two of these significant findings duplicated the significant correlations
on the Synergy scale. Fouf significant results appeared for the two bi-polar
scales of Outei-Directed and Inner-Directed. The remaining significant find-
ing was for the Existentiality scale with the mixed stage 3-4's included.
Existentiality measures one's flexibility in using good judgment in applying
values and principles to one's life. Since the Outer-Directed. Inner-
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Directed scales are polar opposites, only three dimensions of self.
actualization show any significant relationship to moral development:
Inner-Outer Oirectedness. Synergy. and Existentiality.
The remaining two analyses, an examination of observed order of mean
stage POI scores and a visual comparison of stage POI profiles. are most
directly described by referring to Figure 2. This visual examination re-
veals some unexpected relationships between moral development and self-
actualization subscale scores for stage 3 subjects. Stage 3 sub-
jects have the highest mean scores on five of the twelve scales: Self_
Actualization Value. Existentiality, Spontaneity, Acceptance of Aggression.
and Capacity for Intimate Contact. The most morally developed subjects
in this study (stage 5) have the highest scores on three of the scales:
Feeling Reactivity, Nature of Man. and Synergy. Stage 2 (5-A) subjects
have the highest scores on two subscales: Self-regard and Self-acceptance.
While these stage 2 (5-A) subjects are highest on these two scales,
they are the lowest on four scales: Self-actualization Value. Nature of
Man, Synergy, and Acceptance of Aggression. The stage with the largest
frequency of lowest scale scores is, however, stage 4. Subjects in this
stage are lowest on five scales: Feeling Reactivity, Spontaneity,
Self-Regard, Self-Acceptance, and Capacity for Intimate Contact. They also
have the lowest score on Existentialitv with the mixed stage 3-4 subjects.
The stage 5 scores are not the lowest on any scale and are either the
highest or second highest on all but onescale: Self-Acceptance.
Table 31 shows the distribution of POI subscale scores by moral stage.
The 'Inner-Directed-Outer-Directed scores are eliminated from this com-
parison. This distribution demonstrates important differences between the
self-actualization profiles and tendencies between stages 3-4 and 4, and












































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 (5-A) 7 3 0 1
3 0 3 2 6
3-4 9 2 0 0
4 11 0 0 0
5(5-B) 1 6 2 2
1(7
differences between the scores of moral stage groups on the individual
subscales, this distribution of the scores for each moral stage group
over all subscales indicates substantial differences in their self-
actualization scores. A chi-square check for significant differences
between the moral stage distributions on subscales was not appropriate
oecause of the high number of cells with zeros.
These profile scores and comparisons provide suggestive and moder-
ately supportive evidence for the self-actualization - moral aevelopment
relationship. This evidence is, however, not statistically significant.
MJS-16PF Copparisons. The same four types of analysis as performed
on the POI scores were executed with the 16 PF subscale scores: (1) a
Pearson Product-Moment correlation of 16PF subscale scores with
moral stage scores, (2) an analysis of variance on the mean subscale
scores for each moral stage, (3) an examination of the observed order of
mean 16 PF scores for each stage, and (4) a visual comparison of the 16 PF
mean profiles for each moral stage. The standardized means for each moral
stage group, the correlation coefficients, the F ratios, and observed
order of 16 PF means are presented in Table 32.
Unlike the POI scales which have a theoretical directionality from less
self-actualized to more self-actualized, the 16 PF is not a unitary,
dimensional scale. The sixteen factors are statistically independent with
no predetermined, theoretical directionality. There is no underlying,
value theory which distinguishes each factor scale from more desirable to
less desirable. The correlation analysis is performed with these reserva-
tions taken into consideration. No directional hypothesis of 16 PF sub-
scales for moral stages is proposed. The correlational analysis is test-



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































are analyzed for both the scores for pure moral Stage subjects only
and for all moral stage subjects including those with mixed 3-4 global
scores.
Four significant, moderate correlations resulted from thirty-two
computations. Two scales ('I.' Tough-Minded versus Tender-Minded; r = .34
and 'L.' Trustino versus Suspicious r = .31) are significant for both
the pure stage and mixed-stage analyses. Tender-mindedness increases
with moral development while suspiciousness increases as one moves down
the moral judgment stage hierarchy.
As with the POI scores. the 16 PF scores were reanalyzed changing the
stage 2 scores to an intermediate stage 5-A between stage 4 and stage 5-6.
This reanalysis produced sixteen significant correlations out of thirty-two
computations. This number of significant correlations is a dramatic in-
crease over the four calculated with stage 2 as the lowest rather than the
next to highest moral stage. The six scales for which there are significant
correlations for both the pure stage and mixed-stage computations are dis-
cussed first.
These six scales consist of: 'A,' Reserved versus Outgoing; 'E,'
Humble versus Assertive; 'I,' Tough-Minded versus Tender-Minded; 'M,'
Practical versus Imaginative; 'Ql,' Conservative versus Experimenting,
'Q2,' Group-Dependent versus Self-Sufficient. Being both reserved and
assertive increases as moral development increases. Even though being
tender-minded increases from the lowest stage to the highest moral stage
when stage 2 is the lowest stage, this same linear relationship holds
when stage 2 is the second highest stage. This finding suggests that the
results are not influenced significantly by the stage 2 group scores which
consist of only four subjects. This contradictory finding introduces
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a problematical element to the interpretations of these correlitiemal
results. Continuing a review of the findings. imaginativeness and ex-
perimentingness increases as moral development increases. Self-
sufficiency tends to increase with moral development.
Three scales have significant correlations only for either the
pure stage comparison or the mixed stage analysis but not both. With
the mixed 3-4 stage scores eliminated. intelligence 'B' increases with
moral development Two significant results exist only for mixed 3-4
stage scores included. Suspiciousness 'L' again increases as one moves down
the moral stages. This is the same anomaly that arises with the tender-
minded correlation above. Being self-assured increases with moral develop-
ment.
An analysis of variance permitted an examination of between-moral-
stage-group scores without the necessity of these being linear in any
direction. ANOVA's were computed both including and excluding the mixed
stage 3-4 scores. A total of five significant F ratios resulted from
thirty-two computed and none of these five were significant for the mixed
stage 3-4 scores both included and excluded. The only sinnificant re-
lationship, F = 2.97, p =.05, for the mixed stage 3-4 scores excluded
is for subscale 'E,' Humble versus Assertive. This supported the sig-
nificant correlation for 'E.' The significant F ratios for 'A' (Reserved
versus Outgoing), 'B' (Intelligence), and 'L' (Trusting versus Suspicious)
replicated the significant correlations for these scales. The 'G' scale
(Expedient versus Conscientious) has a significant F ratio with no con-
comitant significant correlations. Stage 4 subjects are most conscientious
while stage 5-A and 5-B subjects are the most expedient.
These statistical analyses were complimented with visual comparisons
of both the 16 PF profiles for each moral stage and the observed order of
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16 PC Scores by moral judgment stage. These comparisons added little
additional clarity to the analysis. Two types of visual examinations
are possible: (1) a comparison of the paths of each moral stage to
disclose parallel paths. and (2) a comparison of the moral stage profiles
to determine the most normal and least normal profiles. The lack of
unitary directionality of the 16 PF prevents other types of visual analyses.
There are not the strong parallel profile paths for the 16 PF (Figure
3) between stages 3-4 and 4, and between stages 3 and 5 as there are for
the P01. The parallel paths of the stage 3-4 and 4 profiles will re-appear
in the factor analysis and discriminant analysis generated profiles.
Although there is no theoretical directionality in the 16 PF, com-
parisons could be made with the norm. Table 33 presents the number
of subscale scores within distributions around the norm for this sample.
Even though a statistical test of this data is desirable, a chi-square
test is not valid because of the large number of cells with zero frequencies.
This data, however, does indicate that the stage 3-4 and stage 4 subjects
constitute the norm for this sample. The stage 2 subjects are farthest
from the normative group. A similar radical profile for the stage 2 group
appears for the POI. It should be kept in mind that this group, however,






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Stage? 5 8 3
Stage 3 3 13 0
Stage 3-4 0 16 0
Stage 4 0 16 0
Stage 5 4 7 5
* Z scores
Faqa! Analysis of_ ?ersonlitimyrots
A central problem in using rector analysis is determing the number of
factors and the most replicable and adequate factors. The present
research encountered these problems. Although this research has primarily
used Fromm's typology and the findings of Peck and Havighurst (1960),
this research was not designed to test a hypothesized number of factors
deduced from From and Peck and Havighurst. This area of character struc-
ture was not felt to be sufficiently investigated to warrant such hypothesis
testing. The present factor analysis. therefore, is an exploratory analys
is.
Gorsuch (1974) discussed the problem of determining the proper number
of factors and presented a number of methods for making this determinatio
n.
Four decision criteria were chosen on the basis of Gorsuch's explication:
(1) to extract only thogefactors which account for non-trivial variance.
(2) to eliminate factors that account for such small portions of the
variance as to be theoretically uninteresting, (3) to extract only those
factors which would be most probably replicable in future research, and
(4) to extract only those factors which were theoretically and meaningfull
y
interpretable. The procedures used to accomplish these goals follow.
The initial analysis consisted of an unrestricted factor computation
of the subscale scores for both the POI and the 16 PF for all subje
cts.
The calculated eigenvalue for the nine factors ranged from 9.14661 to
.57747. The fifth factor was the last factor to have an eigenvalue 
of
greater than 1.00. Now that the maximum number of factors for the sub-
scale scores had been determined, it was necessary to decide whether thi-
was the 'proper' number.
The 'proper' number of factors was estimated using the scree test.
The scree test (Gorsuch. 1974) is a procedure which can provide a sol
ution
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with the minimum number of factors accounting for the maximum amount
of variance based on the factor's roots. The resulting scree for
the nine factor analysis is presented in Figure 4. This scree test
unfortunately does not provide a clear-cut solution When there are
more than two breaks in the plotted roots. it is difficult to decide
which break represents the 'proper' number of factors (Gorsuch. 1974).
Additional evidence is required to determine whether the 'proper' number
of factors in this analysis is five or six as indicated by the number
immediately preceding where the straight line begins.
Gorsuch (1974) suggested an additional method in the above sit-
uation which involved examining varying numbers of factors. This pro-
cedure involves five steps: (1) compute a factor analysis with no
specified number of factors to be extracted (in the present study, this
resulted in nine factors), (2) examine this factor matrix for trivial
factors, (3) subtract the number of trivial factors from the total number
of factors in step 1, (4) recalculate the factor analysis using a spec-
ified factor format indicated by step 3, (5) examine this new factor
analysis for trivial factors and adjust the factor analysis again if
trivial factors are still present.
An examination for trivial factors in the nine factors clearly elim-
inated one of the nine and suggested three others. Trivial factors are
defined as: (1) those factors without a unique set of defining variables.
and (2) those factors which do not have at least two loadings above .5.
This loading minimum level was selected to maximize replicable factors
based on the number of subjects and variables in the analysis. The nine
factors with their subscale loadings are presented in Table 34.
177
Figure 4






























Defining Variables of Nine Factor Analysis
17$
Factor 1 SELF-ACTUALIZATION
0 -.94022 other directed
I .94264 inner directed
Ex .78418 flexibility in applying values
Fr .67533 sensitivity to one's own needs & feelings
S .73615 ability to spontaneously express emotions
Sa .68573 self-acceptance of one's weaknesses
A .63727 acceptance of own aggression
C .80965 capacity for intimate meaningful relation
ships
Sr .53924 ability to like one's self because of
one's strength as a person
0 (16PF) -.53305 confident vs. apprehensive (guilt pronene
ss)
Factor 2 SOCIABILITY
A (16PF) .65882 reserved-sociable, emotionally expressive
H .76055 shy (inferior) - sociable. spontaneous.
emotionally expressive
F .64680 sober (introspective) - sociable (impulsive)
Q2 -.51897 
group-dependent vs. self-sufficient
Factor 3 SUPEREGO STRENGTH
G .75987 expedient - superego strength
Q3 .78615 self-conflict follow
s own urges - high self
concept (follows self concept) impulse
control
Factor 4 ANXIETY
.65928 trusting vs. suspicious
Q4 
.57880 (unfrustrated) - (frustrated)
Factor 5 CONFORMITY
.67159 conforming - assertive (authoritarian)
Q1 .50601 co
nservative - experimenting
Factor 6 TIME ORIENTATION
Ti -.83872 time incompetency
Tc .75709 time competency
Factor 7 CONVENTIONALITY
.87622 conventional - imaginative (bohemian)
Factor 8 PERCEPTION OF NATURE OF MAN
Nc .55865 ability to be synergic in understanding
of human nature
Factor 9 ACCEPTANCE OF AGGRESSION
A (POI) .67880 acceptance of own aggression
Factor nine by definition is a trivial factor since it is not
defined by a unique set of defining variables. The sole defining
variable for factor nine is also a defining variable for factor one
.
Factor six is defined by two variables which are statistically de-
pendent due to the scoring system. The variables are defined depend-
ently and scored dependently resulting in their being intercorrelated
at almost 1.0. (Shostrom. 1965). Nunnelly ( 1967) lists this as one
way to derive spurious factors. This examination further reduces
 factor
six to being defined by only one variable. Both of these subscales
further load greater than .46 on factor one. Factor six was, therefore,
tentatively classified as a trivial factor at this stage of anal
ysis.
Factors seven and eight are defined by only one variable each. 
A
final judgment on these two factors was withheld, however, since this
factor analysis consisted of a factor analysis of Cattellis 16 fact
ors
rather than discrete variables. To an extent, the factors determined 
are
second-order factors, although none of the nine factors match Ca
ttell's
(1965) second-order factors. In this situation, a factor with only
 one
defining variable may be a theoretically significant factor.
A second factor analysis (Table 35) with a specified seven facto
r
format was computed based on the above analysis. Failure of 
either factor
seven or eight to replicate on this second analysis was considered as
evidence against their existence as a nontrivial factor.
A comparison of the nine versus seven factor analyses disclosed 
both
the stability of defining variables within a factor and the replica
bility
of the factors themselves. Factor eight in the first analysis
 did not
replicate in the seven factor analysis. The 'Nature of Man' factor was
therefore eliminated as trivial. The 'Conventionality' factor, however,









































affirmation of self-actualization values
flexibility in applying values
sensitivity to one's own needs and feelings
ability to spontaneously express emotions
self acceptance of one's weaknesses
ability to see life's opposites as related
acceptance of own aggression
capacity for intimate, meaningful relationships
SOCIABILITY
reserved-sociable, emotionally expressive
sober (introspective) - sociable, impulsive
expressive






ability to like one's self because of strength
self-confident (adequate) - apprehensive
(guilt proneness)
composed (unfrustrated) - tense (frustrated)
SUPEREGO STRENGTH
expedient-superego strength










as a substantive factor. The 'Time Competency* factor which had been
tentatively classified as a trivial factor previously, re-appeared
as a distinct factor.
An examination of the remaining factors indicated that their
respective defining variables were very stable. Eight of the defining
variables for the "Self-Actualization" factor remained the same. The
four defining variables for the 'Sociability' factor and the two variables
of the 'Superego Strength' factor remained invariant. The composition
of the defining variables for the 'Conformity' factor and the 'Anxiety-
Ego Strength' factors, however, changed. The loading of the 'conservative-
experimenting' variable dropped below the established inclusion level for
the 'Conformity' factor. The change in the defining variables for the
'Anxiety-Ego Strength' factor chanced more drastically. The 'trusting-
suspicious' variable fell below the acceptable loading level while two
unique variables (self regard and quilt proneness) and two non-unique
variables (inner-outer support) rose above the inclusion level. This
brought this factor into question as to its stability and replicability.
A final check for the 'proper' number of factors was perfomed by
recomputing the factor analysis with a factor format of five. This
procedure would permit an examination of the last three factors extracted
in the seven factor format analysis.
Factor seven (Conventionality) was not extracted in the five factor
analysis and its defining variable did not load heavily on any resulting
factor. The 'Conformity' factor, however, retained its previous status
while the 'Time Competency' factor became subsumed under the "Self-
Actualization" factor. The defining variables of the remaining four
factors maintained a high level of stability (Table 36).
Factor
Table 36





































affirmation of self-actualization values
flexibility in applying values
sensitivity to one's own needs & feelings
ability to spontaneously express emotions
self acceptance of one's weaknesses
acceptance of own aggression
capacity for intimate, meaningful relation-
ships
ability to like one's self because of one's
strength as a person
ability to see life's opposites as related
SOCIABILITY
sober (introspective) - sociable, impulsive,
expressive





low frustration tolerance, low ego strength






expedient - superego strength




On the basis of evidence presented to this point, five factors were
determined to be the minimum number of appropriate factors. This
decision was, however, modified by theoretical and statistical consid-
erations. Statistically, a factor analysis of known factors results
in second-order factors. Not all of the prior factors would be expected
to collapse into second-order factors. Factors in the present analysis
which are defined by only one variable (a factor in previous research)
are, therefore, considered as valid factors. Gorsuch (1974) stated
that determination of the number of factors, particularly in situations
where there were as few variables as thirty, should be mediated by
theoretical purposes. The 'Time Competency' and 'Conventionality'
factors have hypothesized theoretical significance in the current re-
search. The final decision, therefore, was to use the seven factor
results in all further analyses as the most appropriate number of factors.
These factors are described in Table 35.
Analysis of Moral  StaGroup Factor Score Means 
The factor analysis grouped the sample of thirty variables into
seven sets of correlated variables (factors). This prccedure permits a
valid statistical analysis, based on sample size to variable ratio,
of the variance between moral stage groups.
Factor scores were computed for each subject using the SPSS Factscore
Program. The means for each group were calculated and an ANOVA was run
for each factor. The Z-score means for each factor by each moral stage
group are presented in Table 37. The 'Self-Actualization,' Superego,'
'Conformity-Assertiveness,' and 'Conventionality' factors were significan
t
across moral sti.ges. The 'Anxiety' factor was marginally significant,
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2 3 3-4 4 5 F-ratio
Observed Order
1 -.331 .618 -.254 -.270 .211
2.482 .05 2,3-4.4,5.3
2 -.517 .047 -.184 .144 -.234
.A77 .51 2.5.3.4,3-4
3 1.062 .146 -.252 -.158 .246 2
.124 .08 3-4,4.3.5.2
4 -.642 -.219 .148 .348 -.547 2.
596 .04 2,5,3.3-4.4
5 -.616 -.034 -.014 .078 -.039 .
357 .83 2,5.3.3-4,4
6 1.472 -.186 -.049 -.226 .120
3.756 OUR 4,3,3-4,5.2
7 -.726 -.229 -.238 .043 .704
3.982 .006 2,3-4,3,4,5
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The profiles of each moral stage group by factors are presented
in Figure S. This graph shows that the 'Ego-Strength' factor is
relatively invariant except for stage 2. Since the stage 2 an is
based on four subjects, the marginally significant finding for 'Anxiety'
must be conservatively interpreted. The 'Conformity' factor would also
not be significant without the stage 2 scores. This significant differ-
ence on this factor therefore, should be cautiously viewed until a
further study with a largarnumber of stage 2 subjects can be analyzed.
A visual analysis of the profiles in Figure 5 indicates a number of
theoretically interesting findings. The first of these finaincsto be
considered is the remarkably parallel profiles of the stage 3-4 and
stage 4 subject means. There are at least three possible interpretations
of these findings. These subjects may actually have personality profiles
consonant with stage 4 subjects. A second explanation suggests that those
subjects classified as mixed stage 3-4 subjects would have been more
appropriately classified as stage 4. Kohlberg's (1976) contention that
using different scoring systems and particularly the earlier systems could
result in misclassification of stage 4 subjects seems substantiated by
this finding. Another interpretation of this finding, that indi-
viduals in transition from stage 3 to stage 4 reasoning undergo person-
ality changes consonant with stage 4 subjects, cannot be tested on the basis
of the data from this study. A longitudinal study would be necessary to
provide such data.
A second finding indicates that stage 3 subjects have profiles
similar to stage 4 subjects except for an unexpectedly high self-actual-
ization score. In addition, the 'Superego' factor mean for stage 3 sub-


























































































































































































































































































The profile for stage 5 subjects shows a distinctive difference in
personality. For the first four factors, the profile of stage 5 subjects
Is practically a mirror iridoe of stage 4 subjects. Stage 5 individuals
are higher in self-actualization and in bohemianism or unconventionality.
Stage 5 subjects also appear to be less unreasonably dominated by superego
than stage 4 individuals.
Finally, there is a mild symmetry in vector paths between stage 3
and stage 5 subjects for the first four factors. Both groups have practi-
cally the same time-orientation mean. The difference between the two
groups resides in the means for the "assertiveness" and "conventionality"
factors. Both of these means are lower for the stage 3 group.
The most variant profile is that of the four stage 2 subjects. All
of the factor means for the stage 2 group are either the highest or lowest
for all groups. They have the lowest scores on 'self-actualization,'
'sociability,' superego,"time-orientation' and 'bohemianism' (con-
ventionality factor). Alternately, they have the highest scores on
'anxiety' and 'assertiveness.' All individuals except stage 2 subjects
had almost identical 'Time-orientation' scores. These extreme scores must
be considered tentative based on the small sample size for the stage 2 group.
Analysis of Moral  Stage Discriminant Centroid Means
The factor analysis and the resulting factor score profiles for the
moral stages provided a statistical basis for the major personality di-
mensions of this sample. A discriminant analysis was subsequently calculated
in order to statistically determine which of the personality dimensions
constituted the major statistical differences between the moral stage groups.
This discriminant analysis further permitted a general, if preliminary.
test of the character-moral reasoning model by determining the ability of the
1N
personality factors to predict moral stage classifications.
Discriminant analysis statistically maximizes the variance among
groups by combining the given variables into linear functions. These
functions represent the dimensions along which a priori groups distribute
with minimal overlap of distributions. Since the functions are dependent
on the a priori groups, a change in the set of groups can effect the
resultant functions derived. The profiles in Figure 5 suggested the:
the stage 3-4 group and stage 4 group be equated as one group. In
the actual analysis the stage 3-4 group was eliminated. Two separate
discriminant analyses were, therefore, computed to examine the effect of
such a consolidation.
An initial discriminant analysis used all the moral stage groups.
This procedure extracted four discriminant functions (roots). Roots in
a discriminant analysis are interpreted similar to factors. Table 38
presents the correlation matrix for the four roots. Only loadings equal
to or greater than .50 were used to interpret roots.
The centroid means for each moral stage group across discriminant
functions are presented in Table 39. Root one is defined by the "superego,"
"assertiveness," and "ego-strength" factors. The conventionality" fa
ctor
defines the second root. The third root is specified by the "self-actual-
ization" and "conventionality" factors. The "ego-strength" and "superego"
factors loaded heaviest on the fourth root. Table 39 indicates that
only the first two roots significantly discriminate between the groups.
Since the last two roots are non-significant explainers of between-group
variance, they are not considered in further analysis (Nunnally, 1967 ).
Table 38
Mixed Stage Discriminant Analysis Correlation Matrix
Factors
--Toots
3 4 Factor Label
1 .1985 .4179 .7501 .0816 Self-Actualization
2 -.3425 -.0153 .0845 -.1971 Sociability
3 .4987 -.0938 .1226 .6868 Ego Strength
4 -.5365 -.1659 -.1596 .6496 Superego Strength
5 -.1773 .1705 -.0316 .0688 Time-Orientation
6 .5342 -.4751 -.2083 -.1902 Compliance-Assertiveness
7 .1432 .7332 -.5861 .0569 Conventionality
BWG
Variance 57.76 30.12 11.06 1.06
Accounted For
Table 39
Mixed Stage Discriminant Function Means by Moral Stages
Moral Discriminant Functions
Stage Group 2 3
2 1.661 -1.366 -.047 .035
3 .104 .180 .674 -.006
3-4 -.381 -.276 -.027 -.143
4 -.467 -.020 -.201 .121
5 .741 .645 -.264 -.094
x2_ 34.98 20 .47 8.26 .835
d.f. 10 8 6 4
P. .000 .009 .219 .931
190
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The first met Consists Of a dimension with high superego, high
compliance, and low ego strength representing one polar end and low
superego, high assertiveness, and high ego strength at the other end.
This multi-variable dimension accounted for 57.767 of the between-group
variance. Root two, the other signficant discriminant function. is a
single variable. "conventionality" dimension which accounts for 30.12'
of the variance.
The discriminant analysis determined that the variance between
groups can best be represented in a two dimensional space. Figure 6
shows the two significant centroids of the moral stage groups plotted
in this two dimensional space. This visual representation indicates the
relative position of each group in this space and the relative distance
(variance) between the groups.
Before explicating this set of findings, the results of the second
discriminant analysis which used only the pure stage groups (stage 3-4
eliminated) will be presented. This second analysis derived three roots
(Table 40), again with only the first two beina significant (Table 41).
Root one has been reduced to a single-variable dimension in this analysis,
with the "superego" and "ego-strength" factors falling below the a priori
inclusion level. The "conventionality" root has remained unchanged. The
percentage of variance accounted for by these first two roots remains
substantially the same as in the first analysis. The distribution of the
moral stage groups within the two dimensional space (Fioure 7) is isomorphic
to the spacial distribution from the first discriminant analysis. This
evidence substantiates the previous interpretation that the stage 3-4





















Pure Stage Discriminant Analysis Correlation Matrix
Roots
Factors 1 2 3 Factor Label
1 -.0586 .4224 -.6917 Self-Actualization
2 .3525 -.0835 -.0179 Sociability
3 .4595 -.0449 -.2221 Ego Strength
4 -.4687 -.3707 .2702 Superego Strength
5 -.2485 .1049 .1144 Time Orientation
6 .8327 -.3056 -.0219 Compliance-Assertiveness
7 -.0583 .6366 .6348 Conventionality
BWG








2 1.7901 -.6681 -.1981
3 -.1426 .2703 -.6796
4 -.3603 -.1880 .2367
5 .5273 .8174 .1952
X2 24.085 14.874 7.305




















These findings for both discriminant analyses can be described
simultaneously because of their similarity. Stage 2 individuals based
on the data may be described is possessing high ego-strength. low superego
strength, high assertiveness, and high conventionality. High con-
ventionality in this context represents a very practical approach to life.
showing a strong pre-occupation with 'down-to-earth' concerns. This
suggests that stage 2 individuals are not conventional due to social
compliance but rather because being conventional is the most successful
mode of achieving personal goals within their social context. If this
interpretation is correct, then the actual behavior shown by stage 2
individuals would vary widely as their social class and social reference
group varied. The stage 2 subjects in this study appear to be behavior-
ally moral to their social reference group and society in general. Stage
2 individuals in a 'street corner, gang society' (Whyte, 1955 and Hannerz,
1969), however, would be behaviorally moral within their reference group
but not within the perspective of the majority society. This interpretation
presents an hypothesis for future research.
Kohlberg (1969) classified stage 3 and 4 within the conventional
level of morality. The current evidence from this study indicates that
while both stages are conventional in their moral reasoning, the conative
dimensions behind and/or associated with these stages of moral reasoning
are fundamentally different.
Of all groups, the stage 3 subjects are the most 'normal' individuals
as defined by statistical distributions. They are neither high nor low
in either ego-strength, superego strength or assertiveness. They are only
mildly "bohemian" but primarily are more spontaneously conventional.
Their conventionality is not motivated by a compulsive superego.
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Stage 4 subjects are in marked contrast to the stage 3 individuals
In this regard. While stage 4 subjects are normal in their conventionality,
this appears to be due to an overly compliant, compulsive superego and low
ego-strength.
Post-conventional individuals as represented by the stage 5 subjects
in this study show a very different personality profile. They have
moderately high ego-strengtn and assertiveness, with moderately low
superego strength. Stage 2 subjects showed a substantially lower,
ineffective functioning of superego while the post-conventional
individuals, also low in superego, demonstrated a mediating influence
of rational, reality testing (ego-strength) on the dictates of the
superego. Further, the largest difference between the stage 2 and
5 subjects concerns conventionality. The stage 5 individuals are the
least conventional. They are not controlled by external, objective
goals like the stage 2 subjects but are more concerned with internal,
subjective essentials. In a behavioral situation which involved a con-
flict between their internal principles and social, external rules, the
stage 5 person would more likely follow his universalistic principles.
This would result in the appearance of unconventional, immoral behavior
to the society at large.
This two-dimensional portrait of the personality profiles of the
moral stage groups can be further fleshed out by incorporating the
information from the earlier seven factor profiles. Both stage 2 and
5 subjects are lower than average on sociability, although not
significantly. The stage 2's pre-occupation with personal, practical
goals may interfere with their social inclinations and social expression.
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The inner-directed interests and fidelity to those self-realities nay
decrease stage S subjects' 'evel of sociability. Stage 3 and 4
individuals show an average level of sociability.
The self-actualiz,tion factor showed significant differences between
groups. As would be expected from the descriptions of stage 2 and 4 subjects,
both are low in self-actualization. A compulsive superego and weak ego-
strength may account for the low level of self-actualization of the stage 4
group. The intense concern for objective, material goals without the
balance of subjective, self-potential goals would preclude tne achievement
of self-actualization by stage 2 individuals. Unexpectedly, the stage 3
group possessed the highest level of self-actualization. An hypothesis for
this result is that the comfortable, untroubled conventionality and inter-
psychic balance of the superego and ego may facilitate the development of
one's potentialities. Post-conventional individuals also possessed a higher
level of self-actualization than average. The inherent awareness of self,
subjective essentials, and self-motivated desire to achieve these inner
potentials could explain the higher self-actualization scores. Their lower
score than the stage 3 group is hypothesized to reflect the stressful con-
flict between inner-directed principles and the prevailing principles of a
less than just and loving society. This interpretation is consistent with
Fromm's (1947) theory that the socio-cultural milieu in which one lives is
a limiting factor in the development of the productive personality. Our
findings suggest that this restricting conflict is most severe for post-
conventional individuals.
CHAPTER x
Discussion of Results and Conclusions
Test of Character Trait Hypothesis 
The evidence provided by the series of analyses in this study
support the hypotheses of Kohlberg (1969) and From (1947) that testing
individual personality traits will fail to demonstrate consistent and
significant differences between moral stages. This failure also
appeared in the review of the many personality trait studies. The
correlations and ANOVA analyses computed on the individual POI and
16PF scales indicated few significant differences. Figures 2 and 3
demonstrate, however, important differences between the aggregate scale
scores between moral stages.
These visual, non-statistical findings are statistically substantiated
by the factor analysis profiles and especially the discriminant analysis.
An examination of trait scores would lead to the conclusion that few, if
any, relationships exist between personality and moral reasoning stages.
This is exactly the hypothesis predicted by Kohlberg and From. The
alternative hypothesis that there is a relationship between personality
structures or schemas and stages of moral reasoning received statistically
potent support from the discriminant analysis.
Test of the Self-Actualization Hypothesis 
The implications by Shostrom (1965), Fromm (1947) and May (1967)
that increased self-actualization is an inherent schema of moral develop-
ment received equivocal support. Significant, consistent differences
between moral stages appeared only for the Synergy scale. Stage 5 subjects
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Piave the highest scores for this ability to transcend dichotomies in
order to see the opposite of life as meaningfully related. This
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that moral development requires
more cognitively adequate schema capable of evaluating and integrating
the complexities of moral ituations and principles.
This absence of evidence for specific traits is counter balanced
by the moral stage POI profiles (Figure 2 and Table 31) which indicate
a strong pattern of relationships between self-actualization and moral
development. Stages 4, 3-4, and 2 have consistent profiles of low
self-actualization scores. Stages 3 and 5 have consistent patterns of
scores above the norms for this sample. Most unexpectedly, the moral
stage 3 subjects have the highest self-actualization scores. Moral stages
3 and 5 subjects additionally have parallel path profiles except for the
scales 'Spontaneity' and 'Self-Acceptance' on which the stage 3 paths
rise while the stage 5 paths fall. A similar parallel path pattern
emerged for the stage 3-4 and 4 scores. There are three points out of
thirteen vectors which major divergence in path direction between the
two profiles occurs. This divergence occurs on the scales of 'Feeling
Reactivity,' Nature of Man,' and 'Acceptance of Aggression.,
Despite these strong nonstatistical patterns, the statistical test
which used the discriminant analysis failed to substantiate the non-
statistical evidence. This adds to the equivocal nature of any conclusions.
The self-actualization factor failed to reach the significance level
(p =.2l) set for the discriminant analysis. Self-actualization is not
a dimension which statistically discriminates between the moral stage
groups. Future research, however, is needed to try to overcome this
equivocal evidence.
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Future research is particularly important to test the supportive
profile patterns in Table Iland Figure 2 because of the hypotheses
this evidence suggests. TWO hypotheses are proposed from this admittedly
equivocal data: (1) based on the stage profiles. stage 2 is a transitional
stage between stage 4 and stage 5 as proposed by Kohlberg and Kramer
(1969); and (2) that moral development is personality-based and involves
conative and affective dimensions as well as Kohlberg's cognitive dimen-
sions. Providing that this evidence can be replicated and statistically
validated in future research, it seems unlikely that the radical shifts
in POI scores between stage 2 and stage 3 would occur. A more consistent
interpretation posits that the so-called stage 2 profile is a transitional
one between stages 4 and 5. The direction and magnitude of the changes
supports this transition between the least self-actualized profile
(stage 4) to the next highest self-actualization profile (stage 5). An
interpretation which accepts the hypothesis that individuals develop from
one of the lowest self-actualized stages (2) to the highest self-actualization
stage (3) without moving through intermediate levels of self-actualization
and moral stages is theoretically tenuous.
The second hypothesis that there are multiple developmental paths
(conative, affective, and cognitive)to the moral stages is a theoretically
much more significant one. Kohlberg (1969) claims a single, unitary
developmental path, namely cognitive development. This cognitive theory
has been proposed for childhood and adolescent development and has received
empirical support. Kohlberg, however, has not been able to explain why
individual adults stop developing before reaching principled moral reasoning.
Kohlberg's theory needs such an explanatory proposition to fully elaborate
his unidimensional developmental model.
The equivocal self-actualization data suggests that instead of this
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unidimensional development. there is a personality WSW, multi-
dimensional development of moral judgment. Fromm (1947) presents
this hypo'hesis that character is a conative structure which determines
the level of moral development. An individual's moral reasoning cannot
progress beyond his conative structure. Once an individual develops the
stage of moral reasoning congruent with his conative structure, any
further development requires that the conative structure change. This
hypothesis better fits the self-actualization profiles presented in
Figure 2. This interpretation states that an individual will develop
to and stabilize at a moral reasoning stage 4 because of his conative
structure. He will cognitively develop through the Kohlberg schema,
including stage 3 but will terminate at stage 4 because of his personality
structure. Stage 3 individuals likewise will stabilize at this stage
rather than further developing because of personality factors and not
cognitive factors. The stage 5 adult individual will cognitively develop
through all of the previous moral reasoning stages until he stabilizes
at a moral reasoning stage psychologically consistent with his conative
structure. A further hypothesis would be that stage 3 adults are more
likely to eventually develop to stage 5 reasoning than stage 4 adults
because of the greater similarity between the personality structures of
stage 3 and 5 individuals. Adult individuals with a conative structure
congruent with stage 4 reasoning will develop through the 5-A moral
judgment stage before stabilizing at stage 5-6.
Test for Character Model
The factor score profiles and discriminant analyses have demonstrated
significant differences between the personalities of moral staae groups.
A final question now considered is: how successfully can the knowledge
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of the relevant personality dimmnsion% be used to piste individuals withie
the moral stage groups? If there is an actual personological model that
either parallels or underlies Kohlberg's moral reasoning stages, then such
a model should be able to correctly predict a person's moral stage solely
on the basis of his pertinent personality dimensions. The discriminant
analysis provides the information necessary to test this hypothesized model.
The discriminant analysis computes a classification matrix which shows
how successfully the discriminant functions can predict the a priori groups.
Table 42 presents the matrix for the discriminant analysis of all moral
stages included. A purely random prediction would correctly classify
20 of the subjects into the moral stage groups. The prediction rate
for this specific model of all stages is 53, which is significantly greater
than chance (z = 5.4842, R = .000). A closer examination of the table
indicates that the poorest prediction rates occur for stages 3-4 and 4.
The single highest misclassifications are of stage 3-4's as stage 4
(24 ) and of stage 4's as stage 3-4 (31 ). This further substantiates
an earlier interpretation that those judged as stage 3-4 by the current
judges would have been more appropriately classified as stage 4. With
only three cases as exceptions, all misclassifications form a normal
distribution in which the a priori moral stage represented the median
and the mode. Although only slightly over half of the total cases were
correctly predicted by the personality model, the misclassifications
constitute a normal distribution which substantiates the model. Over-
lapping distributions (misclassifications) should be contiguous.
The classification matrix was recalculated using only the pure stage
scorings (Table 43). This procedure was done in order to test the
effectiveness of the model without the ambiguous stage 3-4 group. The
O4
Table 42
Discriminant Classification Matrix for Mixed Stages Included





2 2 1 0 0 1 4
50'; 25;, 0 O 25
3 0 9 2 1 0 12
0 75, 16.67,;, 8.33
3-4 0 6 13 7 3 29
c.,, 0 20.69 44.83 24.14 10.34
4 0 3 5 7 1 16
% 0 18.75, 31.25 43.75 6.25
5 0 2 0 2 8 12
0 16.67, 0 16.67 66.67
Total 2 21 20 17 13 73
Multivariate Theta = .5342
Z = 5.4842 P = .0000 (one-tailed test)
Table 43







3 4 5 Total
2 3 0 0 1 4
.. 75% 0% 0% 25
3 0 9 3 0 12
O. 75,z, 25; 0
4 0 3 12 1 16
0 18.75, 75' 6.25
5 0 2 i 9 lz
1h.6/- 8.33' 75
Total 3 14 16 11 44
Multivariate Theta = .750
Z = 6.6884 P = .0000 (one-tailed test)
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successfulness of the model increased to 751 as compared to a random
probability of 25%. Six out of the eleven misclassifications involved
stages 3 and 4. This may reflect the scoring difficulties pointed out
by Kohlberg (1976). The predictions are consistent for each stage,
(75%). The model, therefore, has consistency throughout and not only
overall.
Kohlberg's developmental model consists of three developmental
stages with two levels in each. Focusing on the three stages
(Preconventional, Conventional, and Postconventional), the predictive
Power of the personality model improves. Thirty-nine of the forty-four
cases in the pure-stages analysis are correctly classified by the model.
The predictive percentage increases from 75 to 88.6 . The prediction
rate increases even more substantially when making the same comparison
with the mixed-stage scores included. The correct percentage rises from
53% to 86. Seventy percent of the incorrect predictions in the
mixed-stage analysis are classified correctly within the broader pre-
conventional, conventional, and postconventional stages. Both models
are consistent in their level of prediction (88;, and 86). Overall, the
character-moral reasoning model receives impressively substantial support.
Deficiencies of the Present Study and Directions of Future Research 
This research has attempted to test the relationship between two
broad theoretical models: moral development structures and personality
organization. In attempting such an extensive study, there are a number
of potential weaknesses. The sample chosen is one area of concern.
The sample of teachers, counselors, and administrators is a highly
homogeneous, skewed sample of the population. They represent a relatively
homogeneous socioeconomic class, educational background, intelligence
level, occupation, and geographical region. The results of this study
are. therefore, potentially limited to this very specific sample.
Future research should expand the sample by testing a wider range
of subjects. Subjects should be chosen from the five major socioeconomic
levels: poverty level, working class, middle class, upper middle class,
and upper class. Even within the middle class and upper middle class the
range of occupations represented by the sample should be expanded. The
educational level of future subjects should be broadened to include below
high school, high school graduate, and college graduates. The range of
subjects' intelligence should also be expanded. Geographical variables
should be more extensively examined to include both regional variables
and urban versus rural differences. Although the present sample has an
age range from twenty to fifty-one, Dortzbach (1976) reported research
which indicated generational differences in moral judgment. This
suggests that a thorough test of the theory should test subjects beyond
the age of fifty. Marginally significant differences of moral stage by
age was found in the present sample (see Table 21). Age may be a more
important variable than has previously been suspected.
The sample of subjects is as important as the sample of instruments
selected for the research. A thorough test of moral judgment instruments
in this study forms the basis for confidence in their selection. Con-
fidence in the personality instruments chosen is not founded on such
empirical grounds. The 16PF is a highly reliable, widely used instrument.
It is, however, an omnibus measure. There are a wide range of other
such omnibus tests. The POI is a more specialized instrument chosen for
the specific construct which it measures.
Research on such an important topic as these theories should not be
based on only one or two measures of personality. These results should
be tested for generaliiability by using other personality tests.
Another direction for future research is to select instruments which
specifically measure the relevant personality traits identified in this
study. An analysis of the results of a battery of specially selected
trait measures might provide a more detailed, clear resolution of the
moral stage personality profiles.
The most severe restrictions of the present findings are products
of the analysis. Two basic deficiencies are associated with the analysis:
the total number of subjects and the number of subjects in each stage.
Both factor analysis and discriminant analysis are the main statistical
methods of this study. The reliability of both types of analysis
increases as the total number of cases analyzed increases. Gorsuch (1974)
stated that the sample used in factor analysis should be no less than 100
and should be at least five times greater than the number of variables.
Neither condition is achieved in this study, and this represents a major
deficiency. Future research should, therefore, use an appropriate sample
size.
The reliability of discriminant analysis increases with the number
of cases in each and every group analyzed. The largest group in the
current analysis is twenty-nine while the smallest is four (see Table 23).
All of the other groups number sixteen to twelve. The reliability of the
profile for the stage 2 group,which is based on only four subjects, is not
statistically satisfactory. Future research needs to significantly
increase the number in all groups in the discriminant analysis.
This study has established relationships between moral reasoning
structures and personality structures Provided that these findings
are replicated in future research, the next most important direction of
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research should be a developmental study of the development of thesetwo structural systems. Only a developmental study will determine whetherthere is either a causal relationship between the two developmentalstructures and what the direction is of this causality or whether bothare the result of an underlying causal factor. This research mightfurther discover characterlogical mechanism in moral stage transition.Selman (1971) has already concluded that empathy is a necessary anddevelopmentally prior trait to conventional moral development. Futureresearch may determine more complex trait structures which developmentallyprecede stage 4 and stage 5 moral reasoning respectively. Possiblythe rarity of the individuals functioning with stage six moral reasoningreflects the special personality structure accompanying it.
In addition to testing generational differences, more attentionneeds to be focused on sex differences. Haier (1975) reported significantdifferences between the moral reasoning scores of females and males. Notest is made for sex differences on the MJS, SMJS, OMJS, or MMV in thisstudy. The possibility that males and females may have either differentmoral reasoning structures for the same personality organization or viceversa is, therefore, not known. A check of the subscale scores on the POIand 16PF in the present study revealed that females had significantly(R. = .05) higher scores on the following subscales: POI-Feeling Reactivity,16PF-Tough Minded-Tender Minded (I), and Relaxed-Tense (Q4), while maleshad significantly higher scores on: Expedient-Conscientious (G), Trusting-Suspicious (L), Conservative-Experimenting (Q1 ), and Undisciplined Self-Conflict-Controlled (Q3). This evidence further supports the need forfuture research to explore sex differences. There may be differentcharacter structure for males and females.
710
Not only mey there be different character structures for each sex,
but there mey also be cultural differences in character structure. Sex
differences in personality have been clearly attributed to cultural
socialization (Mead, 1935). Kohlberg (1969) claimed that his theory
was a genetic model. He (1969) has supported this claim with cross-
cultural research. Simpson (1974) challenged Kohlberg's view and
asserted that his moral development scheme was ethnocentric and
culturally-biased. Another approach to establishing the cross-cultural
validity of moral development is to investigate the personality structures
concomitant with the moral stages. This would provide a test because of
the personality developmental schemas Kohlberg (1969) proposed as
paralleling moral development. Cross-cultural comparisons of character
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Appagtdis A
KohltilTsi!s 1969 Moral Amoct List 
Grouping I The Categories
A. Prima-Facie Obltgations 
Aspect 1: Extra-legal or Moral Norms. Ways of invoking and conceiving
of rules, norms, and role-stereotypes.
Aspect 1M: Metaethical issues about relativity of moral norms
and rules.
Aspect 2: Legal Norms. Ways of invoking and defining legal norms.
(Either explicitly or if norms about stealing. etc.,
are talked about in ways implying crime, police, etc.)
Aspect 2M: Metaethical issues about relation of morality to law.
Issues of legitimacy of civil disobedience.
(Aspect 2211: General reasons for making and
keeping laws is listed under Grouping III as a value.)
B. Conceptions of Prima-Facie Rights
(These are all defined under Grouping III where each
value aspect has a rights subaspect and a value
subaspect.)
C. Conceptions of  Dutiful Choice 
Aspect 3: Concept of "should"  or "ought" for an actor in a choice
situation involving a conflict between rules or
between rules and the interest of self or of others.
Aspect 3R: Obligation when have right not to fulfill obliaations-
the relation between rights and obligations.
Aspect 3M: Metaethical issues about relativity of obligations.
D. Takini_Re_vpnsibility 
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Aspect 4: Limitints.orsegyInces anit.mybons Actor_ t.s remon.siblikfor.
Aspect 5: Limiting autonomous choice t3 nellAnce on advice or compromise
with others.
Aspect 6: AccountabiliAL Limiting accountability for (not) performing
an act because of ignorance. lack of self control. etc.
E. PraisinALpnd Blapin97tIeWorth of Persons and
Personal Actions
Aspect 7: Culpability_or Blame. Judgments of whether to blame someone
as a person when he has violated a norm or oblioation.
(Aspect 8: Praise and Admiration.)
F. Meting Out Punishment and Reward
Aspect 9: Rules for Punishing. When, how, how much to punish.
(Aspect 2311: the general purpose of punishment, its
basic functions as expiative and preventive--is listed
under Grouping III as a value.)
Aspect 10: Rules for Rewarding. When, how to reward.
(Aspect 2411: purnose or function of reward--is listed
under Grouping III as a value.)
Grouping II. The Principles
G. Considerations of Prudence
Aspect 11: Fear of Punishment and anticipation of guilt (or shame)
was reasons for following norms.
(Aspect 12: Anticipation of Reward or of pride or self-esteem as reasons
for following norms.)
Aspect 13: Anticipation of pain to the self, of injury or failure as
reasons for following norms. (Differs from Aspect 11
in that these bad consequences are not punishment--
27A
they may be interpersonal. however. The her. to
the self coming from disruption of desired relations
is Aspect 13. altruistic relations are Aspect 15.)
(Aspect 14: Anticipation  of pleasure to self (outside a defined reward
system) as a reason for following norms.)
H. Consideration of Welfare of Others
(Note where the welfare is a matter of definite values
of Aspect 2211. Maintenance of Law; of Aspect 26.
Life; of Aspect 27. Property; of Aspect 28, Liberty;
of Aspect 29. Love and Fraternity--it is scored under
Grouping III values.)
Aspect 15: Welfare of other individuals (Love and friendship as altruistic
motives or reasons for helping others or conforming
come here, the reasons for entering into and maintain-
ing love or friendship relations are scored Aspect 29,
Love.)
Aspect 16: Welfare of group, institutions, and societies, as a reason.
I. Considerations of Respect
Aspect 17: Respect  for persons and personal authority as a reason.
Aspect 18: Respect for the group, for group consensus, and for social
order as a reason.
J. Considerations of Justice
Aspect 19: Maintaining_positive reciprocity and trust.
Aspect 19RX: Defining or justifying obligations by stating actor
should exchange places with the victim-Golden Rule.
Aspect 20: Maintaining  !native reciprocity by vengeance  or by refusal
to honor non-reciprocal demands.
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Aspect 21: Distrihytive Equality -- Maintaining equality or equity
(equality relative to need) as a reason.
Grouping 111. The Basic Values and Rights
Aspect 22: Security of Law  andjelpl Order as a Value.
Aspect 221: (Not used as comes under Aspect 2)
Aspect 22//: Reasons why laws and their enforcement are necessary
or desirable.
Aspect 23: Punishment as a Value
Aspect 231: (not used as comes under Aspect 9)
Aspect 2311: Reasons, purposes of punishment, its basic functions
as expiative and preventive.
(Aspect 24: Reward as a Value,)
Aspect 241: (not used as comes under Aspect 10)
Aspect 241 1: Reasons, purposes of reward.
Aspect 25: Contract, Promise and Non-Deception as Values. 
Aspect 251: Definition and Use of Contract and Promise-Keeping
Concepts.
Aspect 2511: Reasons for Maintaining Contract and Promise
Aspect 25M: The Social Contract--the contract of the individual
with abstract institutions or with society.
Aspect 25T; Truth values.
Aspect 26: Life as a Value.
Aspect 261: Definition of the nature of Life's Value, of the Right
to Life, e.g. of what lives are valuable under what
conditions.
Aspect 26//: The reasons why life is morally valuable.
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Aspect 27: Property as a V
alue.
Aspect 271: Definition o
f Property Riots and Values.
Aspect 27,1: Reasons for m
aintaining property rights.
Aspect 28: Liberty.or Au.topom
y_as.a Valkke.
Aspect 281: Definitions o
f rights and values of freedo
m from
coercion
Aspect 2P1/: Reasons for va
luing freedom, for having righ
ts of
liberty.
Aspect 29: Love and Frater
nity as Values.
Aspect 291: Definition of
 the obligations and nature 
of a good
relationship or of a good lov
e motive.
Aspect 29//: Reasons for lo
ve and friendship being valu
ed.
Aspect 30: Sexual Values 
Aspect 30/: Definition o
f appropriate sexual relation
s.
Aspect 301 1: Reasons for v




Objective Moroi Judgment Scale
You want eery much to on on a trip with your yo
uth group. Your
father promises you that you can go if you 1104V
0 up the money for the
trip yourself So you work hard at y
our part-time job and save up
the money it will cost to go on the 
trip, then your father changes
his mind. Some of his friends have d
ecided to go on a special fishing
trip, and your father is short of the
 money it will cost. So he asks
you to give him the money you have 
saved from your job. You don't
want to give up going on your trip so
 you think about refusing to give
your father the money.
Does it matter that it is your fat
her involved here, rather than
someone else? Why?
(1) Yes, though only as an issue 
of greater emotional concern bec
ause of
the nature of this relationship
. My affection for him and the
expectation of mutual interest wou
ld lead me to expect more from
the "contract" which we made.
(2) Yes, my father is in the po
sition to do something nice for 
me in
return for a favor or to punish me
 for not doing what he asks.
Others do not have as much power t
o do this.
(3) Yes, I have a responsibilit
y to my father and an obligation to
honor his wishes. This is an o
pportunity for me to repay him
for things he has done for me in the
 past.
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(4) Yes, obligations here are defined by conscience. love or affection
for my father is a value which I have chosen and I should be aware
of the implications of that choice.
(5) Yes. I should feel gratitude and appreciation for What My father
has done for me in the past. His affection is important to me.
I should be concerned for his feelings and willing to act unselfishly.
(6) Yes. It is my duty to do what my father asks and give him the
money. Obedience to my father is essential.
2. You want to go on the trip but you are afraid to refuse to give
your father the money. So you give him 510 and tell him that is all
you have made. You take your remaining $40 and pay for your trip
with it. You tell your father that the director said you could pay
later. So you go off on your trip and your father doesn't go on his
fishing trip.
Before you leave on your trip, you tell your younger brother that
you really have made $50 and that you lied to your father and said that
you had made only S10. He is now wondering if he should tell your father
or not.
Why would you think your brother should not tell your father what
he knows?
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(1) 1 won't trust him anymore if he doss and he may very well heed
me to do the same thing for him someday.
(2) Keeping secrets is a necessary part of maintaining friendships.
He knows that I won't desire his triendship if I can't trust him.
(3) He shouldn't see the need to tell him. He should respect my
rights as those of anyone else and respect my ability to make
decisions and to tell whomever I choose.
(4) He has a right to privacy, if my father doesn't ask he's really
not doing anything wrong. He is merely withholding information
which has not been requested.
(5) He shouldn't tell because he is younger than I am and,therefore,
shouldn't break his word to me. I have more power and authority
than he does. If he breaks his word he risks the consequences
of going against that authority.
(6) I told him because I trusted him and thought I could rely on him.
If he tells, he'll force reconsideration of that trust.
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1. Your mother is near death from a special form of cancer. There
is one drug that the doctors think might save her. It is a form of
radium that a druggist in your town has recently discovered. The drug
is expensive to make, but the druggist is charging ten times what the
drug costs him to make. He pays $200 for the radium and charges $2000
for a small dose of the drug. You have gone to everyone you know to
borrow the money, but you can only get together about $1000. which is
half of what it costs. You tell the druggist that your mother is dying
and ask him to sell it to you cheaper or let you pay later. But the
druggist says, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money
from it." So you get desperate and break into the man's store to steal
the drug for your mother.
Why shouldn't you steal the drug?
(1) I am quite desperate in this situation and I may not truly realize
I'm doirq wrong when I steal the drug. But I'll certainly know
I've done wrong after I'm punished and sent to jail. I'll always
feel guilty about being dishonest and breaking the law.
(2) I may not get much of a jail term if I steal the drug, butmy
mother will probably die before I get out so it won't do me much
good. If my mother dies, I shouldn't blame myself, it isn't my
fault she has cancer.
(3) I'll get caught and sent to jail if I do. If I get away my
conscience will bother me thinking how the police will catch up
with me at any minute.
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(4) It isn't just 
the druggist who will thin
k 1 am a criminal,
everyone else will too. After
 I steal it. I'll feel bad t
hinking
how I've brought dishonor on m
y family and myself; I won't b
e
able to face anyone again.
(5) If I stole the drug, 
I wouldn't be blamed by other
 people but I'd
condemn myself because I w
ouldn't have lived up to my ow
n conscience
and standards of honesty.
(6) I would lose my stand
ing and respect in the commun
ity and violate
the law. I'd lose respect fo
r myself if I'm carried away 
by
emotion and forget the long 
term effects of my actions.
4. The drug didn't work and th
ere is no other treatment know
n to
medicine which can save your mot
her, so you know she has only
 about
six months to live. She is i
n terrible pain, but she is so w
eak that
a good dose of pain killer wou
ld make her die sooner. She i
s delirious
and almost crazy with pain and
 in her calm periods she asks y
ou to
give her enough of her medicine
 to kill her. She says she ca
n't stand
the pain and she is going to di
e in a few months anyway.
How would the law influence yo
ur decision in this instanc
e?
(1) I'd consider the rules 
about killing, but with the 
view that they
should not be finally deter
mining here. The sympathetic 
nature
of my killing her out of m
ercy makes the action not r
eally murder.
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(2) No one has the right to take someone 
else's life and mercy
killing is in fact violation of the lam. b
ut I would expect mod-
ification of the law in this situatio
n.
(1) I would hesitate to institutionalize 
or legalize mercy killing
since human life retains its value ev
en under conditions of pain.
but I would be conscious of the neces
sity to value human person-
ality and life in other than physical 
terms.
(4) Killing her wouldn't be bad becau
se it has no effects, she
would die anyway. I could avoid leg
al complications by getting
her permission in writing, suggestin
g suicide, or making the death
look natural.
(5) I wouldn't see murder rules or 
laws as binding in this situa
tion.
It is hardly murder when agreeme
nt and consent of the 'victim'
are involved.
(6) It is against the law to tort
ure people and make them suffer
. By
refusing to give her the drug, I'm
 violating this law.
217
S. Imagine your country has been attacked in war. You are fighting
in a company of troops which is way outnumbered and is retreating before
the enemy. Your company has crossed a bridge over a river, but the
enemy is still on the other side. If someone goes back to the bridge
and blows it up, with the head start the rest of the company would have,
they could probably escape alive; there will be about a 4 to I chance
that he will be killed. You, the leader, are the one who knows best
how to lead the retreat. You ask for volunteers, but no one will volunteer.
If you go yourself, the troops will probably not get back safely and you
are the only one who knows how to lead the retreat.
Do you have the right to order a man to go if you think that is
the best thing to do? Why?
(1) Yes, it is part of my job to see that respect is maintained. Respect
for my position is a symbol of respect for the rules and laws of
society. It is therefore my duty to exercise the power associated
with my pcsition.
(2) Yes, in this instance I am aware of what is in the best interest
of all. I can better understand the circumstances than my sub-
ordinates as well as being aware of their point of view.
(3) Yes, I have been placed in command of the company. Anything I
have the power to command I also have the right to command.
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(4) Yes. I have the right in that the others in the company. in-
cluding the man ordered to go, would see the necessity for my
order. I give the order with the understanding that my request
Is something the in ordered to comply with would himself choose
to do.
(5) Yes, I have the right to order my troops to do whatever I con-
sider necessary. They may not respect my authority, but they
must obey my command.
(6) Yes, according to the rules of military command. I have the right
to order a man to do this. However. I must also recognize that
individual autonomy of a subordinate allows him the right to refuse
to comply.
6. You have finally decided to order one of the men to stay behind.
You think it is best to pick one of your two demolition men. Both of
these men have been trained to use dynamite to blow up bridges and
fortifications at the least risk to themselves. One of the demolition
men has a lot of strength and cotrage, but is a bad troublemaker. He is
always stealing things, beating up the other men, and not doing his work.
The second demolition man has gotten a bad disease and is likely to die
in a short time anyway, though he is strong enough now to do the job.
How should either of these men feel about obedience to your orders,
as opposed to a request from another person to do the same thing?
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(1) It is worse not to obey my official orders because it does more
harm. It is deviation against the government, or public service
rather than against an individual.
(2) Though my request may be more directly relevant to the general
social system, one man's request or order holds no more weight
than that of another.
(3) My position of authority comes from the trust and respect which
the company has placed in my judgment--the exercise of that author-
ity is like the return of an act of trust. It would seem most
important to be consistent with this trust in obeying my orders.
(4) He should feel that it is not that bad to refuse my orders be-
cause a refusal would not affect me that much. I am in the position
to order another man to do the same thing.
(5) It would be worse not to obey my o-ler because I give so much in
my responsibility for the company and work so hard to get things
done in the ways that are best for all.
(6) He should realize that it is always worse to disobey the request
of an authority than that of anyone else.
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7. In your town a few years ago th
ere was a poor men who could find
no work. Without money, he stole foo
d and medicine that he needed
for himself and his family. After a
 year, he escapeA from prison and
went to live in another part of 
the country under a n•vo name H
e
saved money and slowly built up a
 big factory. He gave his wor
kers
the hiohest wages and used most 
of his profits to build a hos
pital
for people who couldn't afford 
good medical care. A number of yea
rs
has passed since that time. You
 see the factory owner and recogniz
e
him as being the same man--the e
scaped convict whom the police have
been looking for back in your ho
me town.
What would be your feelings abou
t the punishment he now deserv
es?
(1) It would be very wrong to 
punish a man who thought he was 
doing
the correct and moral thing. 
He has more than adequately demonst
rated
his respect for other men and hi
s commitment to right. He should
n't
be punished.
(2) He broke the law and was 
sentenced. The rest of his sentenc
e is
yet to be served.
(3) Neither his motives nor i
ntent at the time of the crime w
ere evil.
Minimal punishment would be suffi
cient to indicate that stealing 
is not
a practice to be followed.
(4) Illegal acts are wrong, reg
ardless of the motive. In sp
ite of
the fact that he has acted fa
vorable since the time of the crime,
can appreciate the position of
 the victim of his crime and see
 the
need for his punishment.
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(S) He has undone the harm which he caused and there would therefore
be little need to punish him.
(6) Someone should not be punished in a situation where everyone would
be expected to do the same thing; laws come from the will of the
community and the will of the community in this instance would be
not to punish.
B. You are involved in war and your city is often bombed by the
enemy. So each person in the city has been given a post to go to
right after the bombing to help put out the fires the bombs started
and to rescue people in burning buildings. You have been made the
chief in charge of one fire engine post. The post is near where you
work so you can go there quickly during the day, but it is a long way
from your home. One day there is heavy bombing and you leave the
shelter in the place you work and go toward your fire station. But
when you see how much of the city is burning, you get worried about
your family. So you decide you have to go home first to see if your
family is safe, even though your home is a long way off and the station
is nearby and there is somebody assigned to protect your family's area.
Was it right for you to do this? Why?
(1) No, I should respect all persons' right equally. By leaving my post
I'm showing that I don't have that respect. It is inconsistent with
equal regard for all men and the rights of all to equal treatment.
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(2) No. the authority and power of those above me requires me to go
to my post under such circumstances. I act here in violation of those
commands.
(3) No. if I am to expect protection flr myself and my family I must
earn that by doing my assigned job.
(4) No, if I do this I am violating the rights of others to protection.
My personal rights can only come from a general social order.
(5) No, I am putting myself in a lot more danger by going across the
city. My first duty is to myself, not others. I should stay at my post.
(6) No, I am expected by others in the town to be at my post; I am
not doing my expected job in deserting my station.
9. Imagine that you are living before the Civil War and that there
are laws that allow slavery. According to the law, if a slave escapes,
he has to be returned to his owner like a runaway horse. You don't
believe in slavery and disobey the law and hide runaway slaves and
help them to escape.
Relate your feelings about slavery to your actions in this situation.
(1) Laws shouldn't interfere with individual rights. I have a re-
sponsibility to protect those rights for others since they form the basis
of our whole system of justice.
(2) Every human life has 4 right to respect MI equal treatment.
Slavery laws violate these rights and go against the principles
of human dignity and conscience.
(1) Slavery is wrong; you can't own other people. However, as the
law stands, it is wrong to help escaped slaves
(4) People with more power have a right to control those with less.
The law says that slavery is legal, by acting in this way I break the law.
(5) I did break the law, but I don't know if it's right to have laws
which restrict other rights.
(6) Everyone has a right to do what he wants, the law can't tell me
how to live my life.
10. Imagine that you are the owner of a rooming house which holds
seven rooms. The rent from the rooming house provides you with just
enough money to make ends meet.
All of your roomers are white and you know them very well. They
have told you that if you ever rent a room to a Negro they would move out.
If this happens you will receive much less money than the small amount
you now receive. }hilt you also know that if you refuse a Negro a room you
could get into trouble because the open housing law makes it 'illegal for
you to refuse to rent a room to a person because of his race.
A young black man, Mr. Jones, has just received a job in town He
has looked around the town all day for housing without success and toward
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evening notices the sign 'Room for Rent in front of your house.
When he asks you about the room, you tell him that you have just rented
the room and that there are no more rooms left. In fact, there are
two vacant rooms in your house at the time.
Should you have the right to say who lives in your rooming house?
Why?
(1) Yes. I work hard for the small amount I get from the house. 1
have a right to what I earn and no one can ask me to give that up for them.
(2) Yes. I have the right to control my own property It's none of
the business of the people to whom the house does not belong. I have
absolute rights in matters concerning my house.
(3) Yes, ideally, but property cannot be owned and controlled outside
of a system of general justice where each man's rights and duties are
respected equally. Discrimination goes totally against that equality.
(4) Yes, I should be able to expect my tenants to value my property
and appreciate my need to maintain a full rooming house. an impossibility
If I allow a Black man to move into the house.
(5) Yes, but I must recognize that property rights come only from in-
dividual rights and by not equally respecting the rights of all I risk
forfeiting the right to control my property.
(6) Yes, I own the house and people who live there are under my authority.
II.
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You have 4 very close relationship with 4 (boys) 
girl. (girls)
boy during your senior year in high school. Separ
ated for the Simmer, you
grow apart and return with very mixed feelings about 
one another. One
evening, feeling again your former closeness a
nd attraction, yo ,J go further
and further and have sexual intercourse 
A few weeks later you find out
(boys) she is. (girls) you are pregnant
What would be your feelings about abortion i
n this instance?
(1) It's not really killing. The fetus 
is not really alive. It's
killing something that was never really th
ere The life isn't worth
anything to the baby and it can only (ause 
trouble for me.
Its an unborn baby, that's the whole poin
t. If a kid isn't born I can't
see how anyone can say he's alive. Even
 little kids, babies when they're
just born, the only reason they're alive
 is because someone knows them.
And so the only people that they really hu
rt if they die are their parents.
But if this kid isn't born yet, then I don't
--nobody knows him. It wouldn't
be hurting anyone.
(3) Life is a universal human right. 
The life of the fetus, apart from
all of the considerations of difficulty
 for me has value in its own right,
and deserves the equal treatment of any 
human being.
(4) Life should be considered in the c
ontext of the baby's future. It
should be viewed not as a biological phe
nomenon but as an attitude of respect
for personality and justice. The fetus 
exhibits only the biological aspects
of life and the chances for respect for
 its personality and justice for it
in the future under these circumstances 
seem limited.
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(S) Physically the fetus hardly *sista see way
 or the ether It really
makes very little different,.
(6) An unborn baby has just as much right to
 live as anyone else and
I don't think that I or anyone else has the rig
ht to decide whether it
should live or not. Life is sacred and huma
ns have not the right to
terminate it.
12. Your parents are away for the weeke
nd and you are alone in the house.
Unexpectedly, on Friday evening your (girl
s) boyfriend, (boys) girlfriend
comes over. You spend the evening to
gether in the house and after a while
start necking and petting and having 
sexual intercourse.
What considerations would lead you to
 think your behavior is wrong
in this instance?
(I) It would be wrong if we had 
sexual intercouse without any though
t
about pregnancy because of the incon
venience--a child could cause a lot
of disturbance--especially to kids i
n high school.
(2) If we did not have intercourse we
 would show discipline and our
ability to wait for marriage when sex 
will be more meaningful for us and
more satisyfing because it will not be 
in violation of social and religious
norms.
(3) Because of our youth and even 
minimally dependent relationshipsof
our parents, we cannot fully respo
nd to considerations of personal d
ignity
and responsibility most necessary 
under such circumstances.
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(4) If pregnancy resulted from intercours• in this instance, my
parents would be most upset and even my friends might shy away from me.
(5) Since we were not totally convinced of the rightness of our actions
and able to fit them into a logically thought out pattern, VOI would be
apt to be bothered by conscience or other considerations.
(6) Sex in this instance could be an example of our using each other
for personal advantage. It would be very difficult at this age to have
built a relationship of real honesty and trust which would eliminate the
difficulties of personal advantage seeking.
13. You are thinking about putting out a mimeographed newspaper for
students in your school which would express many of your strong feelings.
In particular, you want to voice your opposition to the war in Viet Nam
and to many of the school's regulations.
Before publishing your newspaper, you ask your principal for permission.
The principal agrees on the condition that you submit all of your articles
to him for approval. You agree and begin to submit your articles. The
principal approves all of them and you publish two issues of the paper
in the next two weeks.
But the principal has not thought about the great attention your
newspaper would receive. Students reaa the paper eagerly and are beginning
to organize against school rules. Many classes are spent talking about
the paper and rallies are held before and after school. Furthermore,
many parents who favor Viet Nam war are phoning the principal and angrily
telling him that the newspaper is unpatriotic and should not be published.
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As a result of the commotion, the principal considers ordering you
to stop publishing the newspaper. HO gives as a redINIthet your activ-
ities are disruptive to the operation of the school.
If you had advocated the dropping of nuclear bombs on North Viet
Nam and China, what difference. if any, would this have made on the
consideration of your rights to continue publication?
(I) Rights and duties are very different. In this case it would seem
that legally I would have the right to publish what I want, but the
rightness of my actions in the latter case would be doubtful My rights
here come from equal respect for others' rights--publication of the latter
articles would not show that respect.
(2) It's nobody else's business what I write in my newspaper. I have
absolute rights to write and publish whatever I want.
(3) It's all in the hands of the principal. If the latter position
were less acceptable to him, then my rights to their publication would
also be less.
(4) I have worked to publish this newspaper. That right to publish is
mine in spite of others' interpretations of my use of it as good or bad.
I have the right to publish what I choose to publish.
(5) A student newspaper should express the views of students in general.
The latter positions do not fairly represent these views and therefore I
don't have as much right to publish them.
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(6) Equal rights have meaning only within a system of general justice
for all. The latter positions are in violation of the principles
of that justice. I can expect the rights to consistently publish
what 1 want only if I am personally consistent in upholding an equal
justice structure for all.
14. You have gotten into serious trouble. You are secretly leaving
town in a hurry and need money. You can't get it from anyone you know
and vou are faced with going to a retired old man who is known to help
people in the town. If you tell this man that you are very sick and
need $500 to pay for an operation, he will give it to you. Really you
aren't sick at all and have no intention of paying the man back. Although
he does not know you very well, he would loan you the money.
How important is it tnat you tell the truth in this situation?
(1) The old man gives money to people he doesn't even know. It really
shouldn't matter to him what the money is used for. It's not like I'd
be lying to someone I know and who depends on me. What I say to him
really makes little difference.
(2) My telling the truth is essential. Truth forms the whole basis of
our socialorder; it's something I have the right to expect and people must
expect from me.
(3) Since I need the money so badly, the truth matters very little.
should do and say what I have to in order to get the money.
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(4) The value of ny word goes beyond situational consideration. Jus-
tice and respect for human dignity can only he upheld in the context
of consistent truth.
(5) If this man is willing to give me money, he has earned the right
to expect the truth from me.
(6) He has lots of money and power so his word is important. I don't
have any money or power, so my word is worth very little one way or the
other.
15. One day the air raid sirens begin to sound. Everyone realizes that
a hydrogen bomb is going to be dropped on the city by the enemy and that
the only way to survive will be in a bomb shelter. Not everyone has
bomb shelters, but those who do have enough air space inside to last you
and yrur family five days. You know that after five days the fallout will
have diminished to the point where you could safely leave the shelter. If
you leave before that, you will die. There is enough air for you and your
family alone. Your next door neighbors have not built a shelter and are
trying to get into yours. You know that you will not have enough air if
you let the neighbors in, and that you will all die if they come inside.
So you refuse to let them in.
So now the neighbors are trying to break the door down in order to
get in. You take your rifle and tell them to go away or else you will
shoot. They don't go away. So you either have to shoot them or let them
come into the shelter.
Why should you shoot?
2S1
(1) 1 have the most power in this situation and 1 must do what it will
require to hold that position.
(2) Society is based on living up to special obligation of contract
or agreement. The special obligations to my family require that I
see first to their protection in this instance.
(3) There is nothing to be gained from letting them in and much to
be lust from their entrance. I have no responsibility to protect them.
(4) I have placed myself in a position where my family depends on me.
In spite of love and all other considerations, I owe more to those who
depend on me than I owe to humans in general. I must protect my family
first.
(5) My family is more important to me and personal affection makes my
duty to protect them the most binding.
(6) My rights to property are essential here. My family must see me as
responsible and reliable in my care for them.
262
Scoring Key for Objective More Judgment Scale
ROI Selection:
Situation: 1 2 3 4 5
1 5 2 4 6 3 1
2 2 3 6 4 1 5
3 4 2 1 3 6 5
4 3 4 6 2 5 1
5 4 3 1 6 2 5
6 4 5 6 2 3 1
7 6 1 3 4 2 5
8 6 1 4 5 2 3
9 5 6 4 1 3 2
10 4 2 6 3 5 1
11 2 3 5 6 1 4
12 1 3 5 2 6 4
13 5 2 1 4 3 6
14 3 5 2 6 4 1
15 1 5 2 6 3 4
ANSAdIZ C
Social AttitudeiOuestionnarie
This booklet consists of two different questionnaires. Each
questionnaire presents statements and questions dealing with several
current social problems and issues. Please read the instructions for
each questionnaire and its statenents and questions carefully. Be
sure to answer each question. Questions are on the front of each page.
The space provided for you in which to write your answers may
be small, you may. therefore, have to write small. Please state your
opinion or beliefs fully, explaining why you believe that way. There
are no right or wrong answers.
Instructions precede each questionnaire. This booklet usually
takes from 40 minutes to no more than 90 minutes to complete.
Thank you.
Instructions for Questionnaire 1:
The following eleven pages present four different stories Each
story situation is followed by questions about your attitudes relating
to certain aspects of the stories. Answer each one fully with your
supporting reasons. Please give your everyday, honest opinions. There
are no right or wrong answers.
7S4
Skint: In Europe. a woman was near death from I Pecia1 kind of cancer.
There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a
form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered.
The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging 10 times
what the drug cost him to make. He paid S200 for the radium and charged
S2.000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband. Heinz,
went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get to-
gether about S1.000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist
that his wife was dying. and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay
later. But the druggist said, "4o, I discovered the drug and I'm going
to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's
store to steal the drug for his wife.
Should Heinz have stolen the drug? Why or why not?
In this situation law and life come into conflict. How can you resolve
the conflict taking the best arguments for both into account?
Would you have stolen the drug if it was your wife who was dying? Why?
If you were the one dying, would you want your husband or wife to
steal the drug? Why?
If the husband doesn't love his wife, is he obligated to steal the drug
for her? Why or why not?
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Would it be as right to steal it for a stranger as his wife? why?
What are the rights of the druggist in this case? Does he have a
right to charge that much? Why or why not?
Heinz was arrested. Should the Judge sentence him or should he let
him go free? Why?
What responsibility does the judge have to follow the law? Is it ever
right to disobey the law? Why or why not? If so. when?
Story: A man and woman fall in love and get married. They have never
had sexual relations before marriage. After they are married, the
woman finds she doesn't like having sexual intercourse. it just makes
her feel bad and she decides not to have intercourse with her husband.
Was it riaht or wrong for the wife to do that? Why or why not?
Would you say that it is a duty for a wife to sleep with her husband?
Why or why not?
They talk it ow-n- at great length and no matter what the husband says,
the wife won't change her mind. What would be the best thina for the
husband to do? Why?
Does the husband have any obligation to the wife? Whj or why not?
PS'
KS finally decides that the only way to save the marriage IS to
threaten to separate from her. He thinks if she does have rel
ations,
after a while she will get used to it and like it. Should he do t
hat?
Why?
Should the husband get divorced in a case iike that? Why
 or why not?
Under what conditions might divorce be the best solution? Shoul
d the
law allow divorce only under these circumstances?
The husband doesn't get divorced. But he meets another gir
l and they
have sexual relations. Was he wrong to have relations with
 another
woman in this case? Why or why not?
Why is it (usually) wrong for a husband to have relations with s
omeone
besides his wife?
Is it the same for a wife to have relati)ns with someone besid
es her
husband? Why or why not?
Do you consider sexual intercourse in marriage right but not o
utside
of marriage? Why would that be?
Suppose that the husband and wife have an open 
marriage in which they
have mutually agreed that outside sexual relatio
nships are OK if these
outside sexual relationships are approached with
 the same committment
to mutual growth and with the same measure of r
espect that exists within
the marriage. Is this right? Why or why not?
1S7
Story: A man and a woman have a very ClOSO relationship. Separated for
the summer. they grow apart and return with very mixed feelings about
each other. One evenini, feeling again their former closeness and
attraction, they go further and further and have sexual intercourse.
But afterwards the doubts about the relationship return. A few weeks
later the woman finds that she is pregnant.
What would be the right thing for them to do? Why?
Who is responsible for making this decision? Why? What if they dis-
agree about the right thing to do?
She knows that she could arrange an abortion. Would it be right or
wrong for her to arrange an abortion? Why?
She considered having the baby and placing it for adoption as an
alternative to abortion. Would that be the right thing to do? Why?
The woman decided that she wants to get married and have the baby Is
it the man's responsibility to marry her? Why? (If no:) What is his
responsibility to her?
They decide that abortion is the best solution. Why is ending the life
of an unborn baby different from ending any other human life?
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4hat about the child seriously defective it birth-would it be right
for the doctor to let it die? Why?
Are there any conditions that might make abortions right (and wrong)?
What and why?
What if they were married and just didn't want the baby?
Would it make any difference if abortion was legal or illegal? Why?
Should abortions be legalized?
Do you think these issues about sex have anything to do with morality
and immorality?
What does the word moral mean,and what is its relation to sex?
Can you tell me something that you think is immoral in sex? Why?
Is this immoral for all people everywhere or only in societies where
it is not accepted? Why?
Story: Two young men, brothers, had gotten into serious tro
uble. They
were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money. Karl, the
older one, broke into a store and stole $1,000. Bob, the younger 
one,
went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town. B
ob told
the man that he was very sick and he needed $500 to pay for the 
operation.
Really he wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying th
e man
2S9
back. Although the man didn't bnow Rob very well, he loaned him the
money. SO they skipped town. Bob with SSOO and Karl with 11.000
Which would be worse, stealing like Karl or cheating like Bob? Why?
What is so bad about lying to people, in general?
Why shouldn't someone steal from a store?
What is the basic value or importance of property rights?
Which would be worse in terms of society's welfare: cheating like
Bob or stealing like Karl? Why?
Would your conscience feel worse if you cheated like Bob or stole like
Karl? Why?
What do you mean by conscience? What do you think of as your conscience
and what does it do?
What do the words morality or ethics mean to you?
Do you believe there is an objective right or wrong in morality or is
it a matter of personal opinion? For instance, in the first story
some people say that Heinz should steal the drug. some say he shouldn't.
Do you think there is an objective right answer to that kind of question?
Explain.
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It was a common practice in some ancient societies to kill many of
their female babies. Can you say whether something like this is really,
right or wrong? That is can one make valid moral judgments about a
practice in another society? Explain
The following pages contain 15 sentences. Read each statement
and assume that it has been made by a person with whom you are having
a conversation. Then, on the line below each statement indicate what
your reaction would most likely be.
1. The FBI has its hands tied in many cases because of the unreason-
able opposition of some people to wire tapping.
2. (Black speaker) Even after graduation from high school I can't
find work. Yet I know many white dropouts who have good jobs.
3. The city is going to repeat what has been done in many other cities
by building a superhighway right through the slum district. Many
apartments will be torn down and the people will be forced out.
4. Some boys had it so easy. They went to college and got out
of the draft, and we got sent to Vietnam. (Veteran speaking)
5. I told Jack my ideas for the new project. He took them to the
boss and got the credit.
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6. The new housing law IS unfair. Why should I be forced to take
in tenants that I feel are undesirable?
7 In many medical laboratories experiments are performed on live
animals and very little care is taken to minimize pain
8. I read another story today about a girl who was refused an
abortion in a hospital. An incompetent doctor gave her an
illegal abortion and she died
9. I think it is unnecessarily cruel to keep condemned prisoners
on death row for so long, and to make the execution such an
elaborate ritual.
10. The police should be encouraged in their efforts to apprehend
and prosecute homosexuals. Homosexuality threatens the founda-
tions of our society.
11. The government shouldn't have passed the medicare bill. Why
should we pay other people's doctor bills?
12. A powerful group representing hunters and gun manufacturers
is holding Lp a gun control law that the majority of the people
in this country want.
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13. Several policemen were calle
d into a OW art* to break up a street
fight but when they arrived the local resident
s threw bricks at them
from the windows.
14. During last year's ghetto riots a sh
opowner saw a boy jump out
of the broken window of his store with a televis
ion set. The man
shot the boy, who is now crippled as a result.
15. The police were rough when they broke up 
that crowd of students.
even though the students were parading without a 
permit.
What do you think this test was trying to find o
ut?
What comments do you have about this test?
Cu.
Story 1:
Life:
Punishment:
Global:
Story 2:
Marital Sex:
Extramarital Sex:
Fixity:
Roles:
Power:
Global:
Story 3:
Laws killing:
Laws sex:
Value life:
Affection:
Conscience:
Civil liberties:
Power:
Global:
Story 4:
Property/Trust:
Conscience:
Global:
Overall Global:
Appoodta 0
Standardised Scoria, Form
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